Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
67 lines (48 loc) · 7.6 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

67 lines (48 loc) · 7.6 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for sortablejs/sortable

Mitigation Strategy: Careful Handling of setData

  • Description:

    1. Avoid Sensitive Data: Do not store sensitive data (passwords, API keys, personal information) directly using SortableJS's setData method. This method is part of the SortableJS API and is used for drag-and-drop data transfer.
    2. Use Identifiers: If data transfer between lists is required, use a unique, non-sensitive identifier (e.g., a database ID) instead of the actual data. Pass this identifier through setData.
    3. Server-Side Retrieval: The receiving list's event handler (e.g., onAdd, which is a SortableJS event) should use this identifier to retrieve the full data from a secure source (typically the server) using an API call. Do not directly use the data from setData in the DOM without further processing.
    4. Sanitize/Escape (if unavoidable): If you absolutely must use setData with user-provided content (strongly discouraged), sanitize and escape that content (using a library like DOMPurify) before setting it via event.dataTransfer.setData(). The receiving list's onAdd (or similar) event handler should also treat this data as untrusted and re-sanitize/escape it if it will be displayed in the DOM. This is a double layer of protection.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Threat: Data Exposure (Severity: Variable, depends on the data) - Sensitive data could be exposed if intercepted or if the browser's developer tools are used, as setData uses the browser's DataTransfer object.
    • Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Severity: High) - If user-provided, unsanitized data is transferred via setData and then rendered without escaping.

  • Impact:

    • Data Exposure: Risk significantly reduced by avoiding sensitive data in setData.
    • XSS: Risk significantly reduced if sanitization/escaping is implemented on both the sending (before setData) and receiving (in the event handler) ends.

  • Currently Implemented: Mostly implemented. We are using IDs to transfer data between lists, not the data itself.

  • Missing Implementation: No missing implementation identified. We should add a code comment to explicitly document this security consideration within the SortableJS event handlers.

Mitigation Strategy: Restrict handle and draggable Selectors

  • Description:

    1. Analyze UI: Carefully analyze the user interface and determine precisely which elements need to be draggable and which parts of those elements should act as drag handles. This is crucial for limiting the scope of SortableJS's influence.
    2. Use Specific Selectors: When initializing SortableJS, use its configuration options:
      • draggable: Use specific CSS class names or IDs to target only the intended draggable elements. Avoid using tag names or overly broad selectors. Example: draggable: ".sortable-item" (good) vs. draggable: "div" (bad). This option directly controls which elements SortableJS will manage.
      • handle: If only a specific part of the draggable element should initiate the drag, use a specific CSS selector for the handle. Example: handle: ".drag-handle" (good) vs. no handle (bad, as the entire element becomes the drag handle). This option further refines the interaction with SortableJS.
    3. Review Regularly: Periodically review these selectors (within the SortableJS initialization code) to ensure they remain as restrictive as possible and haven't been accidentally broadened during UI updates.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Threat: Unexpected UI Behavior (Severity: Low to Medium) - Users might accidentally drag elements they shouldn't, leading to confusion or unintended data changes. This is directly related to how SortableJS is configured to interact with the DOM.
    • Threat: Limited Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Low) - In some edge cases, overly broad selectors could make it easier for a malicious user to trigger a large number of unintended drag events, impacting SortableJS's performance.

  • Impact:

    • Unexpected UI Behavior: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Limited DoS: Risk slightly reduced.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We are using class names for draggable, but the handle option is not used, making the entire item the drag handle.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • frontend/components/SortableList.js: Add a specific handle class to the item elements and configure SortableJS to use it within its initialization options.

Mitigation Strategy: Mitigate DoS via Excessive Operations (Event Handler Throttling/Debouncing)

  • Description:

    1. Identify Event Handlers: Identify the SortableJS event handlers that are most likely to be triggered frequently (e.g., onUpdate, onAdd, onRemove, onSort). These are the functions within your code that are called by SortableJS.
    2. Implement Throttling/Debouncing: Within these event handlers:
      • Throttling: Use a throttling function (e.g., _.throttle from Lodash) to limit the rate at which the event handler's logic can be executed. This ensures the core logic of the handler is called at most once every X milliseconds, even if SortableJS fires the event more frequently.
      • Debouncing: Use a debouncing function (e.g., _.debounce from Lodash) to delay the execution of the event handler's logic until a certain amount of time has passed since the last event from SortableJS. This is useful for events that might fire rapidly in succession (e.g., during a fast drag).
    3. Busy Indicator: While a sort operation is in progress (especially if it involves server communication triggered by a SortableJS event), display a visual "busy" indicator (e.g., a spinner) and disable further sorting interactions. This prevents the user from triggering multiple overlapping operations through SortableJS. This involves disabling SortableJS temporarily using its option method: sortable.option("disabled", true); and re-enabling it later: sortable.option("disabled", false);.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Threat: Client-Side Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Low to Medium) - A malicious user could trigger a large number of SortableJS events, making the application unresponsive in their browser due to excessive processing within the event handlers.
    • Threat: Server-Side Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Low to Medium) - If SortableJS events trigger server requests, excessive events could overload the server. This mitigation helps reduce the number of events that reach the server-side logic.

  • Impact:

    • Client-Side DoS: Risk significantly reduced with throttling/debouncing and a busy indicator (which temporarily disables SortableJS).
    • Server-Side DoS: Risk reduced by limiting the frequency of server requests originating from SortableJS events.

  • Currently Implemented: Not implemented.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • frontend/components/SortableList.js: Implement throttling or debouncing for the onUpdate, onAdd, and onRemove event handlers (these are the functions called by SortableJS).
    • frontend/components/SortableList.js: Add a busy indicator and disable sorting (using sortable.option("disabled", true/false)) during server communication initiated by SortableJS events.