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Attack Tree Analysis for standardnotes/app

Objective: Unauthorized Access/Modification/Deletion of User Data/Extensions

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Unauthorized Access/Modification/Deletion of User Data/Extensions

├── 1. Compromise User Account [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1 Weakness in Extension Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Bypass Extension Permission Model (e.g., malicious extension) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2 Craft a malicious extension that requests excessive permissions. [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.3 Trick user into installing a malicious extension (social engineering + technical exploit). [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Improper Handling of Extension Secrets/Tokens [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1 Extension stores API keys/tokens insecurely (e.g., in local storage without encryption). [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.3 Vulnerabilities in Extension Update Mechanism │ │ └── 1.1.3.2 Lack of signature verification on extension updates. [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.3 Weakness in Encryption Key Management (Client-Side) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.3.1 Predictable Key Derivation │ │ └── 1.3.1.1 Use of weak password hashing algorithm or insufficient salt/iterations. [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.3.2 Insecure Key Storage [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.3.2.1 Key stored in easily accessible location (e.g., unencrypted local storage). [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 2.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Local Data Handling │ │ ├── 2.2.1 Directly modify local storage data (if unencrypted or weakly encrypted). [HIGH RISK] │ └── 2.3 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Extension API │ └── 2.3.1 Use legitimate extension with excessive permissions to access/modify data. [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise User Account [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This is the primary high-risk path, as it grants the attacker full control over the user's Standard Notes account and data.
    • Sub-Paths: This path encompasses vulnerabilities related to extensions, authentication, and encryption key management.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Weakness in Extension Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This branch focuses on vulnerabilities within the extension system, which is a significant attack surface due to its reliance on third-party code and potential for broad access to user data.
    • Sub-Paths:
      • 1.1.1 Bypass Extension Permission Model (e.g., malicious extension) [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: This is a critical vulnerability where the core security mechanism controlling extension access is flawed. If bypassed, any extension could gain unauthorized access.
        • Likelihood: Low (should be a core security focus)
        • Impact: High (complete compromise)
        • Effort: High (requires finding a significant flaw)
        • Skill Level: Advanced
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • 1.1.1.2 Craft a malicious extension that requests excessive permissions. [HIGH RISK]
        • Description: An attacker creates an extension that, while appearing legitimate, requests permissions beyond what it needs. Success depends on the user approving these excessive permissions.
        • Likelihood: Medium (relies on user error)
        • Impact: High (access to sensitive data)
        • Effort: Medium (requires extension development)
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy (permissions should be clearly visible)
      • 1.1.1.3 Trick user into installing a malicious extension (social engineering + technical exploit). [HIGH RISK]
        • Description: Combines social engineering (e.g., phishing, deceptive marketing) to convince the user to install a malicious extension that may also exploit vulnerabilities.
        • Likelihood: Medium (combines social and technical aspects)
        • Impact: High (access to sensitive data)
        • Effort: Medium (requires both social engineering and extension development)
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium (relies on user awareness)
      • 1.1.2 Improper Handling of Extension Secrets/Tokens [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Description: This node represents a critical failure in how extensions manage sensitive information like API keys or authentication tokens.
        • Sub-Paths:
          • 1.1.2.1 Extension stores API keys/tokens insecurely (e.g., in local storage without encryption). [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: The extension stores sensitive data in a way that is easily accessible to other applications or attackers with local access.
            • Likelihood: Low (depends on extension developer practices)
            • Impact: High (potential for credential theft and misuse)
            • Effort: Medium (requires reverse-engineering the extension)
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires analyzing extension code)
      • 1.1.3 Vulnerabilities in Extension Update Mechanism
        • Sub-Paths:
          • 1.1.3.2 Lack of signature verification on extension updates. [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: The application does not verify the authenticity of extension updates, allowing an attacker to distribute malicious code disguised as a legitimate update.
            • Likelihood: Very Low (fundamental security flaw)
            • Impact: Very High (complete compromise via malicious update)
            • Effort: High (requires compromising the update process)
            • Skill Level: Advanced
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Weakness in Encryption Key Management (Client-Side) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Overall Description: This is the most critical node. Compromising the encryption keys renders all other security measures ineffective.
    • Sub-Paths:
      • 1.3.1 Predictable Key Derivation
        • Sub-Paths:
          • 1.3.1.1 Use of weak password hashing algorithm or insufficient salt/iterations. [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: The application uses a weak algorithm (e.g., MD5) or insufficient parameters (low iteration count, short salt) for deriving encryption keys from the user's password, making it vulnerable to brute-force or dictionary attacks.
            • Likelihood: Very Low (unlikely in a security-focused application)
            • Impact: Very High (complete data decryption)
            • Effort: Medium (for brute-forcing)
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (requires analyzing the key derivation process)
      • 1.3.2 Insecure Key Storage [HIGH RISK]
        • Overall Description: The encryption key is stored in a manner that makes it vulnerable to theft or unauthorized access.
        • Sub-Paths:
          • 1.3.2.1 Key stored in easily accessible location (e.g., unencrypted local storage). [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: The key is stored in plain text or with weak encryption in a location accessible to other applications or attackers with local access.
            • Likelihood: Very Low (major security flaw)
            • Impact: Very High (complete data decryption)
            • Effort: Low (easy to access if present)
            • Skill Level: Novice
            • Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires analyzing storage mechanisms)

Attack Tree Path: 2.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Local Data Handling

  • Sub-Paths: * 2.2.1 Directly modify local storage data (if unencrypted or weakly encrypted). [HIGH RISK] * Description: An attacker with local access (e.g., through another malicious application or browser extension) directly modifies the application's local data storage. This is possible if the data is not properly encrypted or protected. * Likelihood: Low (depends on local storage security) * Impact: High (data modification or corruption) * Effort: Medium (requires local access and understanding of data format) * Skill Level: Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium (depends on integrity checks)

Attack Tree Path: 2.3 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Extension API

  • Sub-Paths: * 2.3.1 Use legitimate extension with excessive permissions to access/modify data. [HIGH RISK] * Description: An attacker leverages a legitimate, but overly permissive, extension to access or modify user data. This highlights the importance of the principle of least privilege. * Likelihood: Medium (depends on availability of such extensions and user permissions) * Impact: High (unauthorized data access/modification) * Effort: Medium (requires finding and exploiting an existing extension) * Skill Level: Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires monitoring extension activity)