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Threat Model Analysis for sveltejs/svelte

Threat: Unintentional Data Exposure via Reactivity

  • Threat: Unintentional Data Exposure via Reactivity

    • Description: An attacker could potentially gain access to sensitive data that was unintentionally made reactive within a Svelte component. They might achieve this by analyzing the compiled JavaScript, observing network traffic, or exploiting other vulnerabilities to trigger unexpected component re-renders that briefly expose the data in the DOM or console. Svelte's reactivity system, if not used carefully, makes this easier than in some other frameworks.
    • Impact: Leakage of sensitive information such as API keys, user tokens, PII, or internal application state. This could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or further attacks.
    • Affected Component: Any Svelte component using reactive variables ($:) or stores, especially writable stores. Deeply nested components and components using complex reactivity logic are at higher risk. This is a direct consequence of how Svelte's reactivity is implemented.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Minimize Reactive Scope: Use const or let without reactive assignments ($:) for data that doesn't need to trigger UI updates.
      • Careful Store Usage: Avoid storing sensitive data in writable stores. Use read-only or derived stores with careful filtering.
      • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review code for unintentional reactive dependencies.
      • Avoid Debugging in Production: Never expose debugging information (especially reactive variables) in production.
      • Input Validation: Validate all data coming from external sources before assigning it to reactive variables.

Threat: Client-Side Only Security Checks in onMount/onDestroy

  • Threat: Client-Side Only Security Checks in onMount/onDestroy

    • Description: An attacker could bypass security checks that are implemented only within onMount or onDestroy lifecycle hooks. Since these hooks don't run during server-side rendering (SSR), an attacker could request the server-rendered version of a page and potentially access sensitive content or perform unauthorized actions. This is a direct consequence of Svelte's SSR behavior and lifecycle hook implementation.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality, bypassing of authentication or authorization mechanisms, potential for data manipulation.
    • Affected Component: Any Svelte component that relies solely on onMount or onDestroy for security-critical logic, especially in applications using SSR (SvelteKit). This is specific to how Svelte handles component lifecycle and SSR.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SSR-Safe Logic: Implement security checks both on the server (e.g., using SvelteKit's load functions in +page.server.js) and the client.
      • Conditional Rendering: Use conditional rendering ({#if}) to prevent sensitive content from being rendered on the server if security checks haven't passed.
      • Hydration Awareness: Ensure client-side state is properly initialized after SSR, including security-related state.

Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via @html

  • Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via @html

    • Description: An attacker could inject malicious JavaScript code into content that is rendered using Svelte's @html directive. This typically happens when the HTML string comes from an untrusted source. The injected script would then execute in the context of the user's browser. This threat is directly tied to the @html directive, a Svelte-specific feature.
    • Impact: Compromise of user accounts, data theft, session hijacking, website defacement, potential for phishing attacks.
    • Affected Component: Any Svelte component that uses the @html directive with untrusted or unsanitized input. This is a direct vulnerability introduced by the @html feature.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid @html if Possible: Use Svelte's built-in templating features whenever possible.
      • Sanitize HTML: If @html is necessary, always use a robust HTML sanitization library (like DOMPurify) to remove malicious code before rendering.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong CSP to mitigate the impact of XSS, even if sanitization fails.

Threat: Supply Chain Attack on Svelte Compiler/Build Process

  • Threat: Supply Chain Attack on Svelte Compiler/Build Process

    • Description: A highly sophisticated attacker could compromise the Svelte compiler, build tools, or the npm registry itself, injecting malicious code that would be included in all Svelte applications built using the compromised tools. This directly targets the Svelte compiler and build process.
    • Impact: Widespread compromise of Svelte applications, potentially affecting a large number of users. The attacker could gain control of affected applications.
    • Affected Component: All Svelte applications built with the compromised compiler or build tools. This is a direct attack on the Svelte infrastructure.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (but extremely low probability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rely on Community Vigilance: The Svelte community is active.
      • Monitor Official Channels: Stay informed about security advisories from the Svelte team.
      • (Extreme) Verify Compiler Integrity: In extremely high-security environments, it might be necessary to verify the integrity of the compiler and build tools.
      • Use a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Maintain and track an SBOM.