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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for tryghost/ghost

Threat: Authentication Bypass in Ghost Admin Panel

  • Threat: Authentication Bypass in Ghost Admin Panel

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in Ghost's authentication logic (e.g., a flaw in how session tokens are generated or validated, or a bypass of the login form) to gain unauthorized access to the /ghost admin panel without valid credentials. This could involve manipulating cookies, crafting malicious requests, or exploiting a race condition.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the blog. The attacker can modify content, settings, user accounts, install malicious plugins/themes, and potentially gain access to the underlying server.
    • Affected Component: core/server/services/auth, core/server/web/admin/app.js (and related authentication middleware), session management components.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Regularly update Ghost to the latest version. Rigorously test authentication and authorization logic, including edge cases and potential bypasses. Implement robust session management with secure, randomly generated tokens and appropriate timeouts. Consider adding multi-factor authentication (MFA) support.
      • Users: Use strong, unique passwords for Ghost admin accounts. Enable MFA if available (via plugins or custom development). Restrict access to the /ghost admin panel to trusted IP addresses (if possible).

Threat: Privilege Escalation via Role Manipulation

  • Threat: Privilege Escalation via Role Manipulation

    • Description: An attacker with a low-privilege account (e.g., Author) exploits a flaw in Ghost's role-based access control (RBAC) implementation to gain higher privileges (e.g., Editor or Administrator). This might involve manipulating API requests to modify their own role or exploiting a vulnerability in how roles are assigned or checked.
    • Impact: The attacker gains unauthorized control over the blog, potentially allowing them to publish unauthorized content, modify settings, or delete data. The extent of the damage depends on the elevated privilege level achieved.
    • Affected Component: core/server/services/permissions, core/server/api/canary/users.js (and related API endpoints for user management), database queries related to user roles.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Thoroughly test the RBAC implementation to ensure that users cannot perform actions outside their assigned roles. Validate all user input related to role changes. Implement strict input validation and sanitization on API endpoints.
      • Users: Regularly audit user accounts and roles to ensure that no unauthorized privilege escalation has occurred.

Threat: Malicious Theme/Plugin Execution

  • Threat: Malicious Theme/Plugin Execution

    • Description: An attacker installs a malicious Ghost theme or plugin (either from a third-party source or by compromising a legitimate one) that contains code designed to harm the blog. This code could steal data, modify content, create backdoors, or perform other malicious actions.
    • Impact: Varies widely depending on the malicious code. Could range from minor defacement to complete system compromise.
    • Affected Component: content/themes, content/plugins, Ghost's plugin/theme loading mechanism (core/server/services/themes, core/server/services/apps).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Implement a sandboxing mechanism for themes and plugins to limit their access to the core Ghost system. Provide a way for users to report malicious themes/plugins. Consider code signing for official themes/plugins.
      • Users: Only install themes and plugins from trusted sources (e.g., the official Ghost marketplace or reputable developers). Carefully review the code of any third-party themes/plugins before installing them (if technically capable). Keep themes and plugins updated.

Threat: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Integrations

  • Threat: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Integrations

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in how Ghost handles external requests (e.g., fetching data from an external API for an integration) to make the Ghost server send requests to arbitrary internal or external resources. This could be used to access internal services, scan the internal network, or exfiltrate data. This is specific to Ghost's integration handling.
    • Impact: Exposure of internal services, data exfiltration, potential for further attacks on internal systems.
    • Affected Component: core/server/services/ (various integration modules), any code that makes external HTTP requests (e.g., using libraries like request or axios).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Implement strict input validation and whitelisting for all URLs used in external requests. Avoid using user-supplied input directly in URLs. Use a dedicated library for making HTTP requests that provides built-in SSRF protection. Consider using a network proxy to restrict outbound connections.
      • Users: Be cautious when configuring integrations that require external URLs. Avoid using untrusted URLs.

Threat: Unprotected API Endpoints

  • Threat: Unprotected API Endpoints

    • Description: An attacker discovers and exploits API endpoints within Ghost that are not properly protected by authentication or authorization mechanisms. This could allow them to access or modify data without proper credentials.
    • Impact: Unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion, depending on the specific API endpoint.
    • Affected Component: core/server/api/canary/ (and other API directories), API route definitions, middleware responsible for authentication and authorization.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Ensure that all API endpoints have appropriate authentication and authorization checks. Use a consistent and well-defined authorization strategy across all API routes. Regularly review and audit API endpoints for security vulnerabilities.
      • Users: If using custom API integrations, ensure they are properly secured and authenticated.

Threat: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Member Management

  • Threat: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Member Management

    • Description: An attacker manipulates parameters (e.g., user IDs, subscription IDs) in requests to the Ghost members management system to access or modify data belonging to other members, bypassing access controls. This is specific to Ghost's membership features.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to member data (email addresses, subscription details), potential for account takeover or modification of subscription status.
    • Affected Component: core/server/services/members, API endpoints related to member management.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Implement robust authorization checks to ensure that users can only access or modify data that they are authorized to access. Avoid using sequential or predictable IDs. Use UUIDs or other non-sequential identifiers.
      • Users: N/A (primarily a developer-side issue).