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Threat Model Analysis for typicode/json-server

Description: An attacker, or any unauthorized user, can send HTTP requests (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) directly to the json-server API endpoints to create, update, or delete data in the JSON file. This is possible because json-server has no built-in authentication or authorization mechanisms. An attacker might maliciously alter application data, delete critical records, or inject harmful data.

Impact: Data corruption, data loss, unauthorized modification of application state, potential application malfunction, reputational damage if data integrity is compromised.

Affected Component: json-server core routing and data handling logic.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Avoid exposing json-server to untrusted networks or users. Use it only in isolated development environments.
  • Implement a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache) in front of json-server and enforce authentication and authorization at the proxy level.
  • Restrict network access to the json-server instance using firewalls or network segmentation.

Description: An attacker, or any unauthorized user, can send HTTP GET requests to json-server API endpoints to read all data stored in the JSON file. Due to the lack of authentication, anyone who can reach the json-server instance can access all data. An attacker might steal sensitive information, user data, or confidential application details if stored in the JSON file.

Impact: Information disclosure, privacy violation, potential misuse of exposed data, reputational damage, regulatory non-compliance if sensitive data is exposed.

Affected Component: json-server core routing and data handling logic.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Do not store sensitive or confidential data in the JSON file used by json-server, especially if it is accessible outside of a completely trusted development environment. Use dummy or anonymized data instead.
  • Restrict network access to the json-server instance to only trusted networks and users. Use firewalls or network segmentation.
  • Implement a reverse proxy with authentication and authorization to control access to the json-server API.

Description: The most critical misconfiguration is deploying and running json-server in a production environment. json-server is explicitly designed for development and prototyping and lacks essential security, performance, and scalability features required for production. This exposes the application to all the aforementioned threats at a much higher risk level.

Impact: Severe security vulnerabilities, data breaches, data loss, application downtime, complete system compromise, significant reputational and financial damage, regulatory penalties.

Affected Component: Entire json-server instance and the application relying on it.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Absolutely avoid using json-server in production environments.
  • Clearly document and communicate that json-server is for development and prototyping only.
  • Implement infrastructure and deployment processes that strictly prevent accidental or intentional deployment of json-server to production. Use proper production-grade backend technologies instead.