mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for veged/coa

Mitigation Strategy: Leverage coa's Built-in Input Validation and Type Coercion

• Mitigation Strategy: Utilize coa's Input Validation and Type Coercion Features
• Description:
  1. Define Argument Types in coa Configuration: When defining commands and options using coa, explicitly specify the expected type for each argument (e.g., string, number, boolean, integer, float). coa will automatically attempt to coerce the input to the specified type.
  2. Implement Validation Rules within coa: Utilize coa's validate property within the argument definition to define validation rules. This can include:
     • Built-in validators: Use validators like coa.VALIDATE_REQUIRED to ensure arguments are provided.
     • Custom validation functions: Provide custom functions to perform more complex validation logic, such as range checks, format validation (regex), or checking against allowed value lists. These functions are executed by coa during argument parsing.
  3. Handle coa Validation Errors: coa will automatically generate errors if validation fails. Ensure your application gracefully handles these errors, providing informative (but not overly revealing) messages to the user about invalid input.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Command Injection (High Severity): By validating argument types and formats, you can prevent unexpected input that might be crafted for command injection.
  • Path Traversal (High Severity): Validation can ensure file path arguments conform to expected formats and potentially restrict characters that could be used for traversal.
  • SQL Injection (High Severity): Type coercion and validation can help ensure arguments intended for database queries are of the expected type and format, reducing the risk of injection.
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Medium Severity): Validation can help sanitize or reject inputs that might contain characters used in XSS attacks, especially if arguments are reflected in web outputs.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium Severity): Validation can prevent excessively long inputs or inputs of unexpected types that could lead to application crashes or performance issues.
• Impact: Significantly Reduces risk for multiple threats by enforcing input constraints directly at the argument parsing stage using coa's features.
• Currently Implemented: [To be determined - Specify if coa's built-in validation and type coercion are currently used in your project. Describe which arguments are validated and what validation rules are in place within your coa configuration.]
• Missing Implementation: [To be determined - Identify arguments in your coa configuration that are currently not validated or do not have type coercion defined. Are there opportunities to add validation rules to existing arguments to improve security?]

Mitigation Strategy: Control Argument Parsing Behavior with coa Configuration

• Mitigation Strategy: Configure coa Parsing Behavior for Security
• Description:
  1. Handle Unknown Arguments Strategically: coa allows you to configure how unknown arguments are handled (e.g., ignored, collected, error). Decide on a secure strategy.
     • Consider Erroring on Unknown Arguments: For stricter control, configure coa to throw an error when unknown arguments are encountered. This prevents attackers from injecting unexpected parameters that might be processed unintentionally.
     • If Allowing Unknown Arguments, Sanitize Thoroughly: If you choose to allow unknown arguments, ensure they are rigorously sanitized and validated after coa parsing, before being used in any application logic.
  2. Define Argument Aliases Carefully: coa supports argument aliases. Ensure aliases are well-defined and do not introduce ambiguity or unintended argument parsing behavior that could be exploited.
  3. Review coa Middleware and Hooks: If you are using coa's middleware or hooks, carefully review their logic to ensure they do not introduce security vulnerabilities or bypass intended validation steps.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Parameter Pollution/Unexpected Behavior (Medium Severity): Controlling how unknown arguments are handled prevents attackers from injecting unexpected parameters that could alter application behavior in unintended ways.
  • Logic Errors due to Aliases (Low to Medium Severity): Careful alias management reduces the risk of logic errors that could potentially be exploited.
  • Vulnerabilities in Custom Middleware/Hooks (Variable Severity): Reviewing middleware and hooks prevents introduction of vulnerabilities within custom coa extensions.
• Impact: Moderately Reduces risk by ensuring predictable and controlled argument parsing behavior through coa's configuration options.
• Currently Implemented: [To be determined - Describe how unknown arguments are currently handled in your coa application. Are argument aliases used? Is middleware or hooks implemented? Describe the configuration and logic.]
• Missing Implementation: [To be determined - Review your coa configuration for unknown argument handling. Is it set to error on unknown arguments, or are they allowed? If allowed, is there sufficient sanitization after parsing? Are aliases reviewed for potential issues? Are middleware/hooks security reviewed?]

Mitigation Strategy: Securely Handle Arguments Passed to External Processes (If Using coa for CLI Tools)

• Mitigation Strategy: Secure Handling of coa Arguments in External Process Calls
• Description:
  1. Parameterize Commands, Don't Construct Strings: If your coa-based CLI tool uses arguments to execute external commands (e.g., using child_process.spawn in Node.js), always use parameterized commands. Pass arguments as separate array elements to spawn instead of constructing command strings by concatenating user inputs.
  2. Avoid Shell Interpretation: When using child_process.spawn, set the shell: false option to prevent shell interpretation of arguments. This is crucial for preventing command injection.
  3. Validate and Sanitize Before Passing to External Processes: Even with parameterized commands, validate and sanitize coa arguments before passing them to external processes. This adds an extra layer of defense in case of unforeseen issues or vulnerabilities in the external process itself.
• Threats Mitigated:
  • Command Injection (Critical Severity): Parameterizing commands and avoiding shell interpretation are primary defenses against command injection when using coa arguments to interact with external processes.
• Impact: Significantly Reduces to Eliminates risk of command injection when arguments parsed by coa are used in external process calls.
• Currently Implemented: [To be determined - Describe how your coa-based CLI tool interacts with external processes, if at all. Are commands parameterized? Is shell interpretation disabled? Is there validation/sanitization before passing arguments to external processes?]
• Missing Implementation: [To be determined - Identify areas where external processes are called using arguments parsed by coa. Are these calls parameterized? Is shell: false used? Is there pre-processing validation/sanitization of arguments before external process calls?]