attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for veged/coa

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code or Cause DoS via coa

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code or Cause DoS via coa
├── 1.  Command Injection (Arbitrary Code Execution)
│   ├── 1.1  Exploit Unsanitized Command Names/Aliases
│   │   ├── **1.1.1  Craft command name containing shell metacharacters (;, |, >, <, $, ``, etc.)**
│   │   │   └── **1.1.1.1  Bypass any input validation (if present) in application logic *before* coa parsing.**
│   │   └── 1.1.2  Craft command alias containing shell metacharacters.
│   │       └── 1.1.2.1 Bypass any input validation (if present) in application logic *before* coa parsing.
│   ├── **1.2  Exploit Unsanitized Option Values**
│   │   ├── **1.2.1  Craft option value containing shell metacharacters, intended for use in a command's action.**
│   │   │   └── **1.2.1.1  Bypass any input validation (if present) in application logic *before* or *after* coa parsing.**
│   │   └── **1.2.2  Target options designed to accept file paths, attempting path traversal or injection of malicious files.**
│   │       └── **1.2.2.1 Bypass file path sanitization (if present) in application logic.**
│   ├── **1.3 Exploit Unsanitized Argument Values**
│   │   ├── **1.3.1 Craft argument value containing shell metacharacters, intended for use in a command's action.**
│   │   │   └── **1.3.1.1 Bypass any input validation (if present) in application logic *before* or *after* coa parsing.**
│   │   └── **1.3.2 Target arguments designed to accept file paths, attempting path traversal or injection of malicious files.**
│   │       └── **1.3.2.1 Bypass file path sanitization (if present) in application logic.**

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit Unsanitized Command Names/Aliases

• Description: The attacker crafts malicious input that is used directly by the application to construct the command name or alias that coa will parse. This is less common than injecting into option/argument values, but extremely dangerous if present.
• Sub-Steps:
  • 1.1.1 Craft command name containing shell metacharacters: The attacker includes characters like ;, |, >, <, $, or backticks in the command name itself. For example, if the application uses user input directly to form a command like mycommand <user_input>, the attacker could provide mycommand; rm -rf /.
    • 1.1.1.1 Bypass any input validation: The application fails to properly sanitize the user-provided command name before passing it to coa. This is the critical vulnerability.
  • 1.1.2 Craft command alias containing shell metacharacters: Similar to 1.1.1, but the attacker targets command aliases defined within the coa configuration or potentially provided through user input.
    • 1.1.2.1 Bypass any input validation: The application fails to properly sanitize user-provided alias definitions before passing it to coa.
• Risk Assessment:
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Exploit Unsanitized Option Values

• Description: The attacker provides malicious input as the value of a command-line option. This input is then used by the application, often within a shell command, without proper sanitization.
• Sub-Steps:
  • 1.2.1 Craft option value containing shell metacharacters: The attacker provides an option value like --file="; rm -rf /;". If the application uses this value directly in a shell command (e.g., some_command --file=$file_value), the injected command will be executed.
    • 1.2.1.1 Bypass any input validation: The application fails to sanitize the option value before or after coa parses it. This is the most common and critical vulnerability.
  • 1.2.2 Target options designed to accept file paths, attempting path traversal or injection of malicious files: The attacker provides a file path like ../../../../etc/passwd or a path to a malicious script.
    • 1.2.2.1 Bypass file path sanitization: The application fails to properly sanitize file paths, allowing the attacker to access or create files outside of the intended directory.
• Risk Assessment (1.2.1):
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Risk Assessment (1.2.2):
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Exploit Unsanitized Argument Values

• Description: Identical to 1.2, but the attacker targets command-line arguments instead of options.
• Sub-Steps:
  • 1.3.1 Craft argument value containing shell metacharacters: The attacker provides an argument value like some_command "input; rm -rf /".
    • 1.3.1.1 Bypass any input validation: The application fails to sanitize the argument value before or after coa parses it. This is a critical vulnerability.
  • 1.3.2 Target arguments designed to accept file paths, attempting path traversal or injection of malicious files: The attacker provides a malicious file path as an argument.
    • 1.3.2.1 Bypass file path sanitization: The application fails to properly sanitize file paths provided as arguments.
• Risk Assessment (1.3.1):
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Risk Assessment (1.3.2):
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Key Takeaways and Critical Nodes

The critical nodes are the points where user input is directly used without sanitization:

• 1.1.1.1: Failure to validate command names.
• 1.1.2.1: Failure to validate command aliases.
• 1.2.1.1: Failure to validate option values.
• 1.2.2.1: Failure to sanitize file paths in options.
• 1.3.1.1: Failure to validate argument values.
• 1.3.2.1: Failure to sanitize file paths in arguments.

These points represent the absolute highest priority for security hardening. Any failure in these areas can lead to complete system compromise. The application must assume all input from coa is potentially malicious and validate it accordingly before using it in any potentially dangerous operation (especially shell command execution or file system access).