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Threat Model Analysis for veged/coa

Threat: Threat 1: Command Injection

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that, when processed by coa, results in the execution of unintended commands. This occurs when user-provided data directly influences the command string or options passed to coa without sufficient validation and sanitization. The attacker might inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&) to execute arbitrary code.
    • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), granting the attacker complete control over the application and potentially the underlying system. This can lead to data breaches, system compromise, and denial of service.
    • Affected coa Component: cmd() (command definition), .act() (action handler), and any API points where user input is used to construct command strings or option values. The core parsing logic is the vulnerable component.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Input Validation: Implement allow-lists (whitelists) for commands and options. Reject any input that doesn't match the predefined, allowed set.
      • Input Sanitization: Remove or escape any potentially dangerous characters (shell metacharacters) from user input before it's used to build commands or options.
      • Avoid Dynamic Command Construction: Prefer static command definitions. If dynamic construction is absolutely necessary, use parameterized queries or similar techniques to prevent injection. Never directly concatenate user input into command strings.
      • Least Privilege: Run the application with the lowest necessary privileges. This limits the damage an attacker can do even if they achieve command execution.
      • Avoid Shell Execution: If possible, avoid using coa to build commands that are executed directly by the shell. Use safer alternatives like child_process.spawn with carefully controlled arguments, rather than child_process.exec.

Threat: Threat 2: Option Type Confusion (String to Number)

  • Description: An attacker provides a string value for an option that coa is configured to treat as a number (using .opt() with type: Number). If the application doesn't perform additional validation after coa's parsing, this can bypass security checks that rely on numeric comparisons. For example, a check for a numeric user ID might be bypassed.
    • Impact: Bypassing security checks (e.g., authorization based on numeric IDs), application logic errors, potentially leading to denial of service or unauthorized data access.
    • Affected coa Component: .opt() (option definition), specifically the type parameter (e.g., Number, String). The parsing and type coercion logic within coa is the target.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Precise Type Definitions: Ensure the type parameter in .opt() is correctly set for each option.
      • Post-Parsing Validation: After coa parses the options, perform rigorous type validation and coercion within the application logic. Use functions like Number.isInteger() or typeof to verify the type and ensure it's within expected bounds.
      • Defensive Programming: Handle potential type errors gracefully. Don't assume the parsed value is always of the correct type or within the expected range.

Threat: Threat 3: Option Type Confusion (Number to String)

  • Description: An attacker provides a numeric value for an option expected to be a string (using .opt() with type: String). If the application uses this value in string operations (e.g., file paths, database queries) without proper validation, it could lead to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities.
    • Impact: Application logic errors, potential file system access vulnerabilities (if the string is used in file paths), SQL injection (if used in database queries), denial of service.
    • Affected coa Component: .opt() (option definition), specifically the type parameter. The parsing and type coercion logic within coa.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Precise Type Definitions: Ensure the type parameter in .opt() is correctly set for each option.
      • Post-Parsing Validation: Perform additional type validation and coercion after coa parses the options. Explicitly convert the value to a string and validate its format if necessary.
      • Defensive Programming: Handle potential type errors gracefully.

Threat: Threat 4: Overly Permissive Actions

  • Description: coa is used to define actions (using .act()) that are too broad or powerful. If an attacker can successfully inject a command or manipulate options, they might gain access to functionality or data they shouldn't have. The vulnerability lies in the application's logic within the action handler, but coa is the mechanism by which the attacker triggers this logic.
    • Impact: Privilege escalation, unauthorized data access, data modification, denial of service.
    • Affected coa Component: .act() (action handler). The logic within the action handler, as defined by the application developer, determines the scope and potential impact of the action.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Design actions to perform only the minimum necessary operations. Avoid granting unnecessary permissions or access to sensitive data.
      • Granular Commands: Break down complex tasks into smaller, more specific commands. This limits the potential damage from a single compromised command.
      • Input Validation (within actions): Even if the command itself is valid (according to coa), rigorously validate all parameters and data used within the action handler to ensure they are within expected bounds and do not represent malicious input. This is crucial even if coa has already parsed the options.