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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for vercel/hyper

Attack Surface: Unvetted Plugin Execution

  • Description: The ability to install and run third-party plugins without rigorous security review, allowing for potentially malicious code execution within Hyper.
  • Hyper Contribution: Hyper's plugin system is a core feature, actively encouraging users to extend functionality through external plugins, which may not be vetted for security.
  • Example: A user installs a plugin that claims to improve shell integration. This plugin, however, contains malicious code that intercepts user input, steals credentials, and exfiltrates data to a remote server.
  • Impact: Full system compromise, data theft (credentials, personal files, command history), unauthorized access to remote systems, persistent backdoors.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Users:
      • Exercise extreme caution when installing plugins. Only install plugins from developers with established reputations and strong community trust.
      • Thoroughly research plugins before installation. Look for reviews, community feedback, and ideally, open-source plugins where code can be reviewed.
      • Minimize the number of installed plugins. Only install essential plugins and remove any that are no longer actively used or maintained.
      • Run Hyper with restricted user privileges to limit the impact of a compromised plugin.
    • Developers (Plugin Ecosystem & Hyper):
      • Implement robust plugin sandboxing and permission models within Hyper. Limit plugin access to sensitive APIs and system resources.
      • Establish a formal plugin review process. Consider community-driven or automated security analysis for plugins in official repositories.
      • Provide clear security guidelines and best practices for plugin developers.
      • Implement plugin signing and verification mechanisms to ensure plugin integrity and author authenticity.

Attack Surface: Electron/Chromium Vulnerabilities Leading to Remote Code Execution

  • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities within the underlying Electron framework or Chromium browser engine that can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) within the Hyper application.
  • Hyper Contribution: Hyper is built upon Electron, directly inheriting the attack surface of Electron and Chromium. Vulnerabilities in these core components directly impact Hyper's security.
  • Example: A zero-day vulnerability is discovered in the version of Chromium embedded in Electron used by Hyper. An attacker crafts a malicious website link or terminal escape sequence that, when processed by Hyper, exploits this vulnerability, allowing them to execute arbitrary code on the user's system with the privileges of the Hyper process.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), full system compromise, data exfiltration, malware installation, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers (Hyper & Electron):
      • Prioritize keeping Electron and Chromium versions up-to-date. Implement rapid update cycles to incorporate security patches as soon as they are released.
      • Actively monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for Electron and Chromium. Proactively address and patch reported vulnerabilities.
      • Implement security hardening measures specific to Electron applications. Follow Electron security best practices and guidelines.
      • Consider using Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the capabilities of web content rendered within Hyper, mitigating some types of XSS and related vulnerabilities.
    • Users:
      • Maintain Hyper at the latest version. Updates frequently include critical security patches for Electron and Chromium vulnerabilities.
      • Be cautious when interacting with untrusted content within Hyper. Avoid clicking on suspicious links or executing commands from unknown or untrusted sources.

Attack Surface: Insecure Inter-Process Communication (IPC) Leading to Privilege Escalation

  • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in the Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanisms within Electron, allowing malicious actors to bypass security boundaries and potentially escalate privileges from a renderer process to the more privileged main process in Hyper.
  • Hyper Contribution: Hyper relies on Electron's IPC for communication between its UI (renderer processes) and backend logic (main process). Weaknesses in IPC implementation or message handling can be exploited.
  • Example: A vulnerability exists in Hyper's JavaScript code or a plugin that allows a renderer process to craft a malicious IPC message. This message, when sent to the main process, bypasses intended security checks and triggers a privileged operation, such as writing arbitrary files to the system or executing system commands with elevated privileges.
  • Impact: Privilege escalation, arbitrary code execution in the main process (Node.js environment), system compromise, data manipulation, persistent backdoors.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers (Hyper & Electron):
      • Design and implement IPC interfaces with a strong focus on security. Minimize the exposed API surface and enforce strict input validation, sanitization, and authorization for all IPC messages.
      • Adhere to Electron's best practices for secure IPC implementation. Avoid common pitfalls and insecure patterns.
      • Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing of IPC message handling code. Identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities.
      • Apply the principle of least privilege to IPC communication. Grant renderer processes only the minimum necessary permissions to interact with the main process.
    • Users:
      • Keep Hyper updated to benefit from security patches that address IPC vulnerabilities.
      • Exercise caution with plugins, as malicious plugins could potentially attempt to exploit IPC vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Insecure Configuration Loading Leading to Arbitrary Code Execution

  • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from the way Hyper loads and processes its JavaScript configuration file (~/.hyper.js), potentially allowing for arbitrary code execution if the configuration file is compromised or maliciously crafted.
  • Hyper Contribution: Hyper uses a JavaScript-based configuration file for customization, which, while flexible, introduces a significant attack surface if not handled with extreme care. Execution of arbitrary JavaScript from the configuration is inherently risky.
  • Example: A user's ~/.hyper.js file is modified by malware or through social engineering. The attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the configuration. Upon Hyper startup, this malicious code is executed within the Hyper process, allowing the attacker to perform actions such as installing backdoors, stealing credentials, or modifying system settings.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution at Hyper startup, persistent system compromise, data theft, installation of malware, unauthorized access.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers (Hyper):
      • Minimize or eliminate the need for arbitrary code execution within the configuration file. Shift towards declarative configuration options whenever possible.
      • If code execution in configuration is unavoidable, implement strict sandboxing and security controls. Limit the capabilities of code executed from the configuration.
      • Provide prominent security warnings to users about the risks of modifying the ~/.hyper.js file with untrusted code. Emphasize the potential for code execution vulnerabilities.
    • Users:
      • Protect your user profile and configuration files (~/.hyper.js) from unauthorized access. Use strong file permissions and be wary of suspicious file modifications.
      • Only modify ~/.hyper.js if you fully understand the code and trust its source. Avoid copying configuration snippets from untrusted websites or sources.
      • Regularly review your ~/.hyper.js file for any unexpected or suspicious code. If you find anything you don't understand or didn't add yourself, investigate and potentially revert to a known safe configuration.

Attack Surface: Insecure Update Mechanism Leading to Malicious Update Installation

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in Hyper's auto-update mechanism that could allow an attacker to inject and distribute malicious updates, replacing the legitimate Hyper application with a compromised version.
  • Hyper Contribution: Hyper includes an auto-update feature to simplify updates for users. However, if the update process is not sufficiently secured, it becomes a critical attack vector.
  • Example: An attacker compromises Hyper's update server infrastructure or performs a man-in-the-middle attack during an update check. They are able to replace the legitimate Hyper update package with a malicious version containing malware. When Hyper automatically updates, users unknowingly install the compromised version, leading to widespread system infection.
  • Impact: Mass malware distribution, widespread system compromise, data theft on a large scale, persistent backdoors across many user systems.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers (Hyper):
      • Enforce HTTPS for all update communication channels. Ensure all update checks and downloads are performed over secure, encrypted connections.
      • Implement robust code signing for update packages. Cryptographically sign all update packages and rigorously verify signatures before installation to guarantee authenticity and integrity.
      • Utilize a secure and hardened update server infrastructure. Protect update servers from compromise and ensure their security is regularly audited.
      • Consider implementing mechanisms for users to manually verify update integrity (e.g., providing checksums or allowing manual signature verification).
    • Users:
      • Ensure Hyper's auto-update feature is enabled (if you choose to use it, understanding the inherent risks of auto-updates).
      • Download Hyper only from the official website or verified and trusted sources. Avoid downloading from third-party or unofficial websites.
      • Be extremely cautious of any update prompts or notifications that appear outside of the Hyper application itself. Legitimate updates should be initiated from within Hyper.