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Attack Surface Analysis for vercel/hyper

Attack Surface: Malicious/Compromised Plugins

  • Description: Plugins in Hyper are Node.js modules with extensive access to system resources. A malicious or compromised plugin can execute arbitrary code.
  • How Hyper Contributes: Hyper's plugin architecture provides a direct mechanism for loading and executing external code within the terminal's context. This is a core feature of Hyper.
  • Example: A plugin advertised as a "productivity enhancer" could actually contain code to steal SSH keys, install a backdoor, or exfiltrate sensitive data. A legitimate plugin could be compromised through a supply chain attack.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, data theft, installation of malware, remote control of the user's machine.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Implement a rigorous plugin vetting process before listing plugins in any official repository.
      • Consider a plugin signing mechanism to verify plugin authenticity.
      • Explore sandboxing techniques for plugins (e.g., running them in separate processes with limited privileges). This is a challenging area, but research should be ongoing.
      • Implement a plugin permission system, requiring plugins to request specific capabilities (file system access, network access, etc.).
      • Regularly audit the code of popular and critical plugins.
      • Encourage plugin developers to follow secure coding practices and keep their dependencies updated.
      • Provide clear documentation and warnings to users about the risks of installing untrusted plugins.
    • User:
      • Only install plugins from trusted sources. Prefer plugins from a curated repository (if available) or from well-known, reputable developers.
      • Carefully review the source code of plugins before installing them (if you are able).
      • Keep plugins updated to the latest versions.
      • Be wary of plugins that request excessive permissions or access to sensitive resources.
      • Remove any plugins you no longer use.

Attack Surface: Node.js Integration Vulnerabilities (Exploitation via hyper.js or IPC)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in Node.js itself, or in Hyper's use of Node.js APIs, can be exploited to gain arbitrary code execution. This can occur through a compromised hyper.js file or through malicious IPC messages. This is distinct from general Node.js vulnerabilities; it focuses on how Hyper uses Node.js.
  • How Hyper Contributes: Hyper's reliance on Node.js for core functionality and plugin execution creates a large attack surface. The hyper.js file is executed as JavaScript, and IPC is used for communication between the renderer and main processes. Hyper's design choices regarding Node.js integration and IPC are the key factors.
  • Example: An attacker could trick a user into replacing their hyper.js file with a malicious one. A flaw in Hyper's IPC message handling could allow a compromised renderer process (perhaps due to a less severe vulnerability) to escalate privileges to the main process and execute arbitrary Node.js code.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, data theft, installation of malware, remote control.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Ensure contextIsolation is enabled and rigorously tested. This is a Hyper configuration choice.
      • Ensure nodeIntegration is disabled in the renderer process. This is a Hyper configuration choice.
      • Ensure sandbox is enabled. This is a Hyper configuration choice.
      • Use contextBridge to expose only the necessary APIs to the renderer process. This is a Hyper architectural choice.
      • Implement strict input validation for all IPC messages, using a well-defined schema. This is a Hyper implementation detail.
      • Regularly update Electron and all Node.js dependencies to patch known vulnerabilities. While updating dependencies is good practice, the way Hyper uses these dependencies is the key attack surface.
      • Implement integrity checks for the hyper.js file (e.g., checksumming). This is a Hyper-specific mitigation.
      • Avoid passing complex objects or executable code through IPC. This is a Hyper architectural choice.
    • User:
      • Protect your hyper.js file. Ensure it has appropriate file permissions (read-only for most users).
      • Be cautious about modifying hyper.js with code from untrusted sources.
      • Keep Hyper updated to the latest version (which should include the developer mitigations).