Okay, let's create a design document for the Hyper project (https://github.com/vercel/hyper), focusing on aspects relevant for threat modeling.
Hyper is a terminal emulator built on web technologies (HTML, CSS, JavaScript). It's designed to be extensible and customizable, prioritizing user experience and developer convenience. It's an open-source project, likely aiming to build a community and potentially integrate with other Vercel products/services in the future (though this is speculative). The primary goal is to provide a beautiful and functional terminal application.
Business Priorities:
- User Adoption: Attract a large user base by offering a superior terminal experience.
- Extensibility: Enable users and developers to easily customize and extend the terminal's functionality.
- Community Growth: Foster a vibrant community around the project for contributions, support, and feedback.
- Performance: Provide a fast and responsive terminal experience, despite being built on web technologies.
- Cross-Platform Compatibility: Support major operating systems (macOS, Windows, Linux).
Business Risks:
- Security Vulnerabilities: Given its reliance on web technologies and a plugin architecture, security vulnerabilities (especially those related to plugins) pose a significant risk. Compromised plugins or core vulnerabilities could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's system.
- Performance Bottlenecks: Poor performance could deter users, especially those accustomed to native terminal applications.
- Maintenance Overhead: Maintaining a complex project with a large number of dependencies and a plugin ecosystem can be challenging.
- Competition: The terminal emulator market has established players, making it difficult to gain significant market share.
- Reputation Damage: Security incidents or negative user experiences could damage the reputation of the project and potentially Vercel.
Existing Security Controls:
- security control: Code Reviews: Pull requests on GitHub are subject to code review before merging. (Implicit in the GitHub workflow).
- security control: Dependency Management: Uses package managers (npm/yarn) to manage dependencies, allowing for updates and vulnerability patching. (Standard practice for Node.js projects).
- security control: Electron Security Best Practices: Likely follows some Electron security best practices, given Vercel's expertise, but this needs verification. (Assumed based on Vercel's reputation).
- security control: Content Security Policy (CSP): May implement CSP to mitigate XSS risks, but this needs to be confirmed in the codebase. (Recommended for Electron applications).
- security control: Node Integration Disabled:
nodeIntegration
is likely disabled in the Electron configuration to prevent renderer processes from accessing Node.js APIs directly. (Needs verification). - security control: Context Isolation:
contextIsolation
is likely enabled in Electron configuration. (Needs verification).
Accepted Risks:
- accepted risk: Third-Party Plugin Risks: The plugin architecture inherently introduces risk, as Vercel cannot guarantee the security of all third-party plugins. Users install plugins at their own risk.
- accepted risk: Dependency Vulnerabilities: While dependencies are managed, there's always a risk of vulnerabilities in third-party libraries. Regular updates are crucial.
- accepted risk: Zero-Day Exploits: Vulnerabilities in underlying technologies (Chromium, Node.js) could be exploited before patches are available.
Recommended Security Controls:
- security control: Plugin Signing/Verification: Implement a mechanism to verify the authenticity and integrity of plugins, such as code signing.
- security control: Sandboxing: Explore sandboxing techniques for plugins to further isolate them from the main process and the user's system.
- security control: Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits, including penetration testing and code reviews, focusing on the core application and the plugin API.
- security control: Vulnerability Disclosure Program: Establish a clear process for reporting and handling security vulnerabilities.
- security control: Automated Security Scanning: Integrate static and dynamic analysis tools into the build process to identify potential vulnerabilities.
Security Requirements:
-
Authentication:
- Not directly applicable to the core terminal application itself, but relevant for any potential integration with external services (e.g., cloud-based configuration syncing).
- If external services are integrated, use secure authentication protocols (e.g., OAuth 2.0).
-
Authorization:
- Plugin Permissions: Implement a permission system for plugins, limiting their access to system resources and user data. Users should be prompted to grant permissions to plugins.
- File System Access: Carefully control access to the file system, limiting plugins to only necessary directories.
-
Input Validation:
- Terminal Input: Sanitize user input to prevent command injection vulnerabilities.
- Plugin API: Validate all input passed to the plugin API to prevent malicious plugins from exploiting vulnerabilities.
- Configuration Files: Validate configuration files to prevent injection of malicious code or settings.
-
Cryptography:
- Secure Communication: If any network communication is involved (e.g., fetching updates, plugin metadata), use secure protocols (HTTPS).
- Data Storage: If sensitive data is stored locally (e.g., API keys, configuration), encrypt it at rest.
graph LR
User["User"] --> Hyper["Hyper Terminal"]
Hyper --> OS["Operating System"]
Hyper --> Plugins["Plugins (Third-Party)"]
Hyper -.-> UpdateServer["Update Server (Optional)"]
Element Descriptions:
-
Element:
- Name: User
- Type: Person
- Description: A person who interacts with the Hyper terminal.
- Responsibilities: Provides input, views output, configures the terminal, installs plugins.
- Security controls: N/A (External to the system)
-
Element:
- Name: Hyper Terminal
- Type: Software System
- Description: The Hyper terminal application itself.
- Responsibilities: Renders the terminal interface, handles user input, manages plugins, interacts with the operating system.
- Security controls: Input validation, plugin permission system (planned), CSP (potential), Node integration disabled (potential), context isolation (potential).
-
Element:
- Name: Operating System
- Type: Software System
- Description: The underlying operating system (macOS, Windows, Linux).
- Responsibilities: Provides system resources, manages processes, handles file system access.
- Security controls: OS-level security features (e.g., ASLR, DEP), user permissions.
-
Element:
- Name: Plugins (Third-Party)
- Type: Software System
- Description: Third-party extensions that enhance the functionality of Hyper.
- Responsibilities: Provide additional features, customize the terminal's appearance, integrate with external services.
- Security controls: Plugin signing/verification (recommended), sandboxing (recommended), permission system (planned).
-
Element:
- Name: Update Server (Optional)
- Type: Software System
- Description: A server that provides updates for Hyper and potentially for plugins.
- Responsibilities: Hosts update packages, provides metadata about updates.
- Security controls: HTTPS communication, code signing of updates.
graph LR
User["User"] --> BrowserWindow["Browser Window (Electron)"]
BrowserWindow --> RendererProcess["Renderer Process (HTML, CSS, JS)"]
RendererProcess --> PluginAPI["Plugin API (JS)"]
PluginAPI --> Plugins["Plugins (Third-Party)"]
BrowserWindow --> MainProcess["Main Process (Node.js)"]
MainProcess --> OS["Operating System"]
MainProcess --> NodeModules["Node.js Modules"]
MainProcess -.-> UpdateChecker["Update Checker"]
UpdateChecker -.-> UpdateServer["Update Server (Optional)"]
Element Descriptions:
-
Element:
- Name: User
- Type: Person
- Description: A person who interacts with the Hyper terminal.
- Responsibilities: Provides input, views output, configures the terminal, installs plugins.
- Security controls: N/A (External to the system)
-
Element:
- Name: Browser Window (Electron)
- Type: Container
- Description: The Electron browser window that hosts the terminal UI.
- Responsibilities: Displays the UI, handles window events.
- Security controls: Node integration disabled (potential), context isolation (potential).
-
Element:
- Name: Renderer Process (HTML, CSS, JS)
- Type: Container
- Description: The renderer process that runs the web-based UI.
- Responsibilities: Renders the terminal interface, handles user interaction, communicates with the main process.
- Security controls: CSP (potential), input validation.
-
Element:
- Name: Plugin API (JS)
- Type: Container
- Description: The JavaScript API exposed to plugins.
- Responsibilities: Provides a controlled interface for plugins to interact with the terminal.
- Security controls: Input validation, permission system (planned).
-
Element:
- Name: Plugins (Third-Party)
- Type: Container
- Description: Third-party extensions that enhance the functionality of Hyper.
- Responsibilities: Provide additional features, customize the terminal's appearance, integrate with external services.
- Security controls: Plugin signing/verification (recommended), sandboxing (recommended), permission system (planned).
-
Element:
- Name: Main Process (Node.js)
- Type: Container
- Description: The Electron main process that manages the application lifecycle and interacts with the OS.
- Responsibilities: Creates browser windows, handles inter-process communication, interacts with the file system and network.
- Security controls: OS-level security features, secure communication (HTTPS).
-
Element:
- Name: Operating System
- Type: Software System
- Description: The underlying operating system (macOS, Windows, Linux).
- Responsibilities: Provides system resources, manages processes, handles file system access.
- Security controls: OS-level security features (e.g., ASLR, DEP), user permissions.
-
Element:
- Name: Node.js Modules
- Type: Container
- Description: The Node.js modules used by the main process.
- Responsibilities: Provide core functionality, such as file system access, networking, and process management.
- Security controls: Dependency management, regular updates.
-
Element:
- Name: Update Checker
- Type: Container
- Description: Checks for application updates.
- Responsibilities: Connects to the update server, compares versions, downloads updates.
- Security controls: HTTPS communication.
-
Element:
- Name: Update Server (Optional)
- Type: Software System
- Description: A server that provides updates for Hyper and potentially for plugins.
- Responsibilities: Hosts update packages, provides metadata about updates.
- Security controls: HTTPS communication, code signing of updates.
Possible Deployment Solutions:
- Traditional Installers (DMG, EXE, DEB/RPM): Hyper is packaged into platform-specific installers. This is the most common approach for desktop applications.
- Package Managers (Homebrew, Chocolatey, apt/yum): Hyper is distributed through package managers, making installation and updates easier.
- App Stores (Mac App Store, Microsoft Store): Hyper is distributed through app stores, providing a centralized and trusted distribution channel.
Chosen Solution (Detailed Description): Traditional Installers (DMG, EXE, DEB/RPM)
Hyper is likely distributed primarily through traditional installers for each supported operating system. These installers are likely built using tools like electron-builder
, which can generate installers for multiple platforms from a single codebase.
graph LR
macOSUser["macOS User"] --> DMG["DMG Installer"]
DMG --> HyperApp["Hyper.app"]
WindowsUser["Windows User"] --> EXE["EXE Installer"]
EXE --> HyperExe["Hyper.exe"]
LinuxUser["Linux User"] --> DEB["DEB Package"]
LinuxUser --> RPM["RPM Package"]
DEB --> HyperBin["Hyper (Binary)"]
RPM --> HyperBin["Hyper (Binary)"]
Element Descriptions:
-
Element:
- Name: macOS User
- Type: Person
- Description: A user on macOS.
- Responsibilities: Downloads and runs the DMG installer.
- Security controls: N/A (External to the system)
-
Element:
- Name: DMG Installer
- Type: Container
- Description: A disk image containing the Hyper application for macOS.
- Responsibilities: Installs the Hyper.app bundle.
- Security controls: Code signing (by Vercel).
-
Element:
- Name: Hyper.app
- Type: Container
- Description: The installed Hyper application on macOS.
- Responsibilities: Runs the Hyper terminal.
- Security controls: macOS Gatekeeper, code signing.
-
Element:
- Name: Windows User
- Type: Person
- Description: A user on Windows.
- Responsibilities: Downloads and runs the EXE installer.
- Security controls: N/A (External to the system)
-
Element:
- Name: EXE Installer
- Type: Container
- Description: An executable installer for Hyper on Windows.
- Responsibilities: Installs the Hyper.exe and related files.
- Security controls: Code signing (by Vercel).
-
Element:
- Name: Hyper.exe
- Type: Container
- Description: The installed Hyper application on Windows.
- Responsibilities: Runs the Hyper terminal.
- Security controls: Windows SmartScreen, code signing.
-
Element:
- Name: Linux User
- Type: Person
- Description: A user on Linux.
- Responsibilities: Downloads and installs the DEB or RPM package.
- Security controls: N/A (External to the system)
-
Element:
- Name: DEB Package
- Type: Container
- Description: A Debian package for Hyper on Debian-based Linux distributions.
- Responsibilities: Installs the Hyper binary and related files.
- Security controls: Package signing (by Vercel).
-
Element:
- Name: RPM Package
- Type: Container
- Description: An RPM package for Hyper on Red Hat-based Linux distributions.
- Responsibilities: Installs the Hyper binary and related files.
- Security controls: Package signing (by Vercel).
-
Element:
- Name: Hyper (Binary)
- Type: Container
- Description: The installed Hyper application on Linux.
- Responsibilities: Runs the Hyper terminal.
- Security controls: Linux distribution's package management system.
The build process for Hyper likely involves the following steps:
- Code Checkout: The source code is checked out from the GitHub repository.
- Dependency Installation: Dependencies are installed using
npm
oryarn
. - Linting: Code is linted using tools like ESLint to enforce code style and identify potential errors.
- Testing: Unit tests and integration tests are run.
- Building: The Electron application is built using
electron-builder
. This process compiles the code, packages it with the Electron runtime, and creates platform-specific installers. - Code Signing: The built installers are code-signed to ensure their authenticity and integrity.
- Publishing: The installers are published to a distribution channel (e.g., GitHub Releases, a website, or an update server).
graph LR
Developer["Developer"] --> GitHub["GitHub Repository"]
GitHub --> BuildServer["Build Server (e.g., GitHub Actions)"]
BuildServer --> Linting["Linting (ESLint)"]
BuildServer --> Testing["Testing (Jest, etc.)"]
BuildServer --> Building["Building (electron-builder)"]
Building --> Installers["Installers (DMG, EXE, DEB/RPM)"]
Installers --> CodeSigning["Code Signing"]
CodeSigning --> PublishedInstallers["Published Installers"]
PublishedInstallers --> DistributionChannel["Distribution Channel (GitHub Releases, etc.)"]
Security Controls in Build Process:
- security control: Dependency Management: Using
npm
oryarn
to manage dependencies and keep them up-to-date. - security control: Linting: Using ESLint to identify potential code quality and security issues.
- security control: Testing: Running automated tests to catch bugs and regressions.
- security control: Code Signing: Signing the installers to ensure their authenticity and integrity.
- security control: Build Automation: Using a CI/CD system (like GitHub Actions) to automate the build process and ensure consistency.
- security control: Supply Chain Security: Reviewing and auditing third-party dependencies for known vulnerabilities. (Recommended)
- security control: SAST Scanning: Integrating static application security testing (SAST) tools into the build pipeline to identify potential vulnerabilities in the code. (Recommended)
Critical Business Processes:
- Providing a functional and reliable terminal emulator.
- Maintaining a secure application to protect user data and systems.
- Supporting and growing the user and developer community.
Data to Protect:
- User's file system (High sensitivity): Hyper has access to the user's file system, making it a high-value target for attackers.
- User's shell environment (High sensitivity): Hyper executes commands within the user's shell environment, which could contain sensitive information (e.g., environment variables, command history).
- Plugin data (Variable sensitivity): Plugins may store data locally or communicate with external services, and the sensitivity of this data depends on the specific plugin.
- Configuration data (Medium sensitivity): Hyper's configuration files may contain user preferences and potentially sensitive information (e.g., custom themes, keybindings).
Questions:
- What specific Electron security best practices are currently implemented? (e.g., Node integration, context isolation, CSP)
- Is there a formal process for reviewing and approving third-party plugins?
- What is the update mechanism for Hyper and its plugins?
- Are there any plans to integrate with other Vercel services?
- What are the specific security requirements for any potential cloud-based features (e.g., configuration syncing)?
- Does Hyper use any native Node.js modules that might introduce additional security risks?
- What kind of testing (unit, integration, end-to-end) is performed?
Assumptions:
- BUSINESS POSTURE: Assumes that Vercel prioritizes security and is willing to invest in security measures.
- SECURITY POSTURE: Assumes that basic security best practices are followed, given Vercel's reputation. Assumes that the plugin ecosystem is a known risk.
- DESIGN: Assumes that the architecture is relatively standard for an Electron application. Assumes that
electron-builder
is used for packaging and distribution. Assumes that GitHub Actions (or a similar CI/CD system) is used for build automation.