threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for vercel/hyper

Threat: Dependency Hijack (Supply Chain Attack)

• Description: An attacker compromises a legitimate package within Hyper's direct dependency tree (npm, Node.js modules specifically used by Hyper, or Electron itself). The attacker injects malicious code that is executed when Hyper is built or run. This is not a general npm vulnerability, but one specifically affecting a package Hyper uses.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution within the Hyper context, leading to complete system compromise. The attacker gains the same privileges as the user running Hyper. Data exfiltration, malware installation, and lateral movement are all possible.
  • Affected Component: Any direct dependency within Hyper's dependency graph, including Electron, Node.js modules, and Hyper-specific packages. This affects Hyper's build process and runtime environment.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Use dependency locking (e.g., package-lock.json, yarn.lock) to ensure consistent builds.
      • Employ Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools to scan for known vulnerabilities in direct dependencies.
      • Regularly audit direct dependencies and remove any unnecessary or outdated ones.
      • Consider using a private package registry to control the source of dependencies.
      • Implement code signing for Hyper releases.
    • Users:
      • Keep Hyper updated to the latest version.
      • Be cautious about installing unofficial builds or forks of Hyper.

Threat: Malicious Plugin Installation

• Description: An attacker tricks a user into installing a malicious Hyper plugin. The plugin contains code that performs malicious actions directly within the Hyper process.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, as the plugin runs with the same privileges as Hyper. Data theft, keylogging, remote access, and malware installation are all possible.
  • Affected Component: Hyper's plugin system (~/.hyper_plugins/, node_modules within the plugin directory). The PluginManager class and related loading mechanisms are the direct attack surface.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Implement a plugin vetting process for the official Hyper plugin repository.
      • Provide a mechanism for users to report malicious plugins.
      • Consider sandboxing plugins to limit their access to the system (if technically feasible). This is a direct mitigation for Hyper.
      • Implement code signing for plugins.
    • Users:
      • Install plugins only from the official Hyper plugin repository or trusted sources.
      • Carefully review the plugin's source code (if available) before installation.
      • Be wary of plugins with few downloads, recent creation dates, or overly broad permissions.
      • Regularly review and uninstall unnecessary plugins.

Threat: Vulnerable Plugin Exploitation (Directly Affecting Hyper)

• Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a legitimate Hyper plugin. The vulnerability allows for code execution within the Hyper process itself, not just within the plugin's isolated context (if any). This implies a vulnerability that breaks out of any plugin sandboxing.
  • Impact: Similar to a malicious plugin, this can lead to arbitrary code execution within the Hyper context and potentially full system compromise.
  • Affected Component: The vulnerable plugin itself (any part of its code that interacts with the Hyper API). The vulnerability must allow escaping any sandboxing provided by Hyper.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers (of Hyper):
      • Provide clear security guidelines and best practices for plugin developers, emphasizing secure interaction with the Hyper API.
      • Implement robust sandboxing for plugins (if technically feasible) to limit the impact of plugin vulnerabilities. This is a direct responsibility of the Hyper project.
      • Regularly audit the Hyper API for potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by plugins.
    • Developers (of Plugins):
      • Follow secure coding practices, especially when interacting with the Hyper API.
      • Use security linters and static analysis tools.
      • Regularly update dependencies and address reported vulnerabilities.
      • Perform security testing (e.g., fuzzing, penetration testing).
    • Users:
      • Keep all plugins updated to the latest versions.
      • Monitor security advisories related to Hyper plugins.
      • Prefer plugins with active maintenance and a good security track record.

Threat: XSS in Terminal Output (Renderer Exploit)

• Description: An attacker crafts malicious output that exploits a vulnerability in Hyper's specific rendering engine implementation (xterm.js and the Chromium components used by Hyper's Electron instance). This is not a general xterm.js or Chromium vulnerability, but one specific to how Hyper uses them.
  • Impact: Code execution within the Hyper context, potentially leading to data theft or further system compromise.
  • Affected Component: Hyper's rendering engine (specifically, the interaction between xterm.js and the Chromium components within Hyper's Electron instance). The Terminal component and its rendering logic are the key areas.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Ensure robust sanitization and escaping of terminal output specifically within Hyper's implementation to prevent the execution of malicious code.
      • Keep xterm.js and the specific Electron version used by Hyper updated to address known vulnerabilities.
      • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) within Hyper's renderer to restrict script execution. This is a direct responsibility.
      • Regularly perform security audits and penetration testing of Hyper's rendering engine integration.
    • Users:
      • Be cautious about connecting to untrusted servers or running commands that produce untrusted output.

Threat: Command Injection via Hyper's Shell Integration

• Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in how Hyper itself interacts with the underlying shell. This is not a general shell vulnerability, but a flaw in Hyper's code that spawns shell processes and handles input/output. The attacker crafts input within Hyper that, when passed to the shell by Hyper's code, executes unintended commands.
  • Impact: Arbitrary command execution on the user's system, with the privileges of the user.
  • Affected Component: Hyper's shell integration logic (the code that spawns shell processes and handles communication). This is internal to Hyper.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Use secure methods for spawning shell processes and passing arguments (e.g., using execFile instead of exec in Node.js, and properly escaping arguments within Hyper's code).
      • Avoid using shell interpolation or string concatenation to build commands within Hyper.
      • Implement robust input validation and sanitization within Hyper to prevent command injection.
      • Regularly review and audit Hyper's shell integration code.
    • Users:
      • Avoid using custom shell integrations or scripts from untrusted sources that interact with Hyper.

Threat: Electron Framework Vulnerability

• Description: A zero-day or unpatched vulnerability is discovered in the specific version of Electron used by Hyper. This is not a general Electron vulnerability, but one affecting the precise build Hyper incorporates.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution within the Hyper context, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
  • Affected Component: The specific Electron framework version bundled with Hyper.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Monitor security advisories for Electron and Chromium.
      • Update the Electron version used by Hyper to the latest stable version as soon as possible after security patches are released. This is a direct and crucial responsibility.
      • Consider contributing to Electron security efforts.
    • Users:
      • Keep Hyper updated.