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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for videojs/video.js

Attack Surface: Video Source URL Injection

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious URLs as video sources, leading to the player loading and potentially executing content from attacker-controlled domains.
  • video.js Contribution: video.js processes and loads video sources provided through configuration or HTML attributes. If the application passes unsanitized user input to configure these sources, video.js will load the potentially malicious URL.
  • Example: An application uses JavaScript to dynamically set the video source based on a URL parameter: player.src(getParameterByName('videoUrl'));. If getParameterByName('videoUrl') retrieves an attacker-controlled URL like https://malicious.example.com/evil.mp4, video.js will attempt to load and play content from this malicious URL.
  • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Redirection to malicious sites, potentially exposing user information if the malicious URL attempts data exfiltration.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user-provided input before using it to construct video source URLs. Implement allowlists for trusted domains and URL schemes.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a robust CSP that restricts the domains from which the browser can load media resources. This limits the impact of injected malicious URLs.
    • URL Sanitization Libraries: Utilize URL sanitization libraries to properly encode and escape user-provided URLs before using them in video.js configurations.

Attack Surface: Plugin Configuration Injection

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious plugin URLs or configurations by manipulating user input that is used to dynamically configure video.js plugins.
  • video.js Contribution: video.js allows loading and configuring plugins via URLs and configuration objects. If the application dynamically constructs plugin URLs or configurations from unsanitized user input, video.js will load and execute potentially malicious plugins.
  • Example: An application dynamically loads plugins based on user selections: player.videoJsPlugin(getParameterByName('pluginUrl'));. If getParameterByName('pluginUrl') retrieves an attacker-controlled URL like https://malicious.example.com/evil-plugin.js, video.js will load and execute this malicious plugin, granting it access to the player and potentially the application context.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) within the browser context, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), arbitrary actions depending on the malicious plugin's capabilities.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Plugin Whitelisting: Maintain a strict whitelist of allowed plugins and their URLs. Only load plugins from trusted, known, and verified sources.
    • Static Plugin Loading: Prefer loading plugins statically during application initialization rather than dynamically based on user input.
    • Configuration Sanitization: Sanitize any user-provided input used in plugin configurations. Avoid dynamically constructing plugin URLs from user input entirely.

Attack Surface: DOM-based XSS through Player Configuration

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious HTML or JavaScript code through video.js configuration options, especially those related to UI customization, leading to DOM-based XSS.
  • video.js Contribution: video.js provides extensive configuration options for UI customization. If the application uses user-provided input to directly set HTML-related configuration options without proper sanitization, video.js will render this potentially malicious HTML into the DOM.
  • Example: An application allows users to customize control bar buttons and uses user input to define button HTML: player.controlBar.addChild('button', { el: { innerHTML: getParameterByName('buttonHTML') } });. If getParameterByName('buttonHTML') contains malicious JavaScript within HTML tags, video.js will render this HTML, leading to DOM-based XSS.
  • Impact: DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configuration Sanitization: Sanitize all user-provided input used in video.js configuration options, especially those involving HTML or JavaScript injection. Use secure methods for UI customization provided by video.js API instead of direct HTML injection.
    • Avoid Dynamic HTML Injection: Minimize or completely avoid dynamically injecting HTML based on user input into video.js configurations. Utilize video.js's API for UI customization which is designed to be safer.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): A strong CSP can help mitigate the impact of DOM-based XSS by restricting the actions malicious scripts can perform, even if injected.

Attack Surface: Third-Party Plugin Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Vulnerabilities present in third-party video.js plugins can be exploited, compromising the security of the application using these plugins.
  • video.js Contribution: video.js's plugin architecture facilitates the use of third-party plugins. While video.js itself might be secure, vulnerabilities in plugins directly extend the attack surface of applications using video.js.
  • Example: An application uses a popular but poorly maintained video.js plugin for analytics. This plugin contains an XSS vulnerability. Attackers exploit this vulnerability through the plugin, gaining XSS within the application context.
  • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Remote Code Execution (RCE), or other vulnerabilities depending on the specific flaws within the third-party plugin.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on the specific plugin vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rigorous Plugin Auditing: Conduct thorough security audits of the code of all third-party plugins before deployment. Look for known vulnerabilities and insecure coding practices.
    • Trusted Plugin Sources: Prioritize using plugins from reputable and trusted sources with a proven track record of security and active maintenance.
    • Regular Plugin Updates: Maintain a process for regularly updating all third-party plugins to the latest versions to benefit from security patches and bug fixes.
    • Minimize Plugin Dependency: Carefully evaluate the necessity of each plugin. Reduce the number of third-party plugins used to minimize the overall attack surface.

Attack Surface: Outdated video.js Version

  • Description: Using an outdated version of video.js exposes the application to known vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed and patched in newer releases.
  • video.js Contribution: The application's dependency on video.js means that using an outdated version directly introduces known vulnerabilities into the application's codebase.
  • Example: A critical XSS vulnerability is discovered and patched in video.js version 7.19.0. An application still using version 7.18.0 remains vulnerable to this publicly known and easily exploitable XSS attack.
  • Impact: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities, potentially leading to XSS, RCE, or other security breaches depending on the severity of the vulnerability present in the outdated version.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Consistent Updates: Implement a robust and consistent process for regularly updating video.js to the latest stable version.
    • Dependency Management Tools: Utilize dependency management tools (like npm, yarn, or similar) to effectively track and manage video.js and its dependencies, facilitating timely updates.
    • Security Monitoring and Alerts: Subscribe to security advisories and release notes for video.js to proactively stay informed about newly discovered vulnerabilities and available security updates. Regularly check for and apply updates as soon as they are released.