Mitigation Strategy: Keep video.js Updated
Mitigation Strategy: Keep video.js Updated
Description:
- Step 1: Regularly check for new releases of video.js on the official GitHub repository (https://github.com/videojs/video.js/releases) or through package managers if used.
- Step 2: Review release notes for security fixes and vulnerability patches in new versions.
- Step 3: Test the new version in a staging environment for compatibility with your application and plugins.
- Step 4: Update video.js in production by replacing the old version with the new one. Update CDN version in
<script>
tag or package manager dependency. - Step 5: Monitor video.js security advisories for urgent updates and apply them immediately.
Threats Mitigated:
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in video.js - Severity: High
- Zero-day Exploits targeting outdated versions - Severity: Medium
Impact:
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in video.js: High Risk Reduction
- Zero-day Exploits targeting outdated versions: Medium Risk Reduction
Currently Implemented:
- Project Dependency Management (package.json/yarn.lock): Partially Implemented - Dependency versions are specified, but automatic updates are not in place.
- Development Environment: Partially Implemented - Developers are generally aware of updates but the process is not formalized.
Missing Implementation:
- Automated Dependency Update Checks: Missing - No automated system to check for and notify about new video.js releases.
- Formalized Update Procedure: Missing - No documented procedure for regularly checking, testing, and deploying video.js updates.
- Security Advisory Monitoring: Missing - No dedicated process to monitor video.js security advisories and proactively apply patches.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Subresource Integrity (SRI)
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Subresource Integrity (SRI)
Description:
- Step 1: Generate SRI hashes for the specific versions of video.js and any video.js plugins you are using (e.g., using
openssl dgst -sha384 video.min.js
). - Step 2: Add the
integrity
attribute with the generated hash andcrossorigin="anonymous"
to<script>
or<link>
tags when including video.js and plugins from CDNs.- Example:
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/video.min.js" integrity="sha384-YOUR_SRI_HASH_HERE" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
- Example:
- Step 3: Update SRI hashes whenever video.js or plugins are updated.
Threats Mitigated:
- Compromised CDN or External Source - Severity: High
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks injecting malicious code - Severity: High
Impact:
- Compromised CDN or External Source: High Risk Reduction
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks injecting malicious code: High Risk Reduction
Currently Implemented:
- CDN Usage: Partially Implemented - CDN is used for video.js delivery, but SRI is not currently implemented.
Missing Implementation:
- SRI Attributes in
<script>
tags: Missing -integrity
andcrossorigin
attributes are not added to video.js and plugin script tags. - SRI Hash Generation and Management Process: Missing - No process to generate, store, and update SRI hashes when dependencies are updated.
Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User-Provided URLs and Configuration Options
Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User-Provided URLs and Configuration Options
Description:
- Step 1: Identify where user input influences video.js configuration (video URLs, source URLs, plugin options).
- Step 2: Implement server-side validation and sanitization for user-provided URLs and configuration data before passing them to video.js.
- URL Validation: Validate URL format and scheme (whitelist allowed schemes like
http://
,https://
,blob:
,data:
). - Input Sanitization: Escape or remove harmful characters from user inputs to prevent JavaScript execution.
- Parameter Validation: Validate format and type of configuration options against expected values.
- URL Validation: Validate URL format and scheme (whitelist allowed schemes like
- Step 3: Implement client-side validation and sanitization as a secondary defense.
- Step 4: Avoid using user-provided strings directly in
eval()
or similar JavaScript execution functions when configuring video.js.
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via URL injection - Severity: High
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Configuration Injection - Severity: High
Impact:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via URL injection: High Risk Reduction
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Configuration Injection: High Risk Reduction
Currently Implemented:
- Server-Side URL Validation (Basic): Partially Implemented - Basic URL format validation might be in place, but comprehensive sanitization and scheme whitelisting are likely missing.
- Client-Side Validation (Basic): Partially Implemented - Some basic client-side validation might exist, but it's not robust enough for security purposes.
Missing Implementation:
- Robust Server-Side URL Sanitization and Whitelisting: Missing - Comprehensive sanitization and whitelisting of URL schemes and components are not implemented.
- Configuration Option Validation: Missing - Validation of video.js configuration options based on expected types and values is not implemented.
- Prevention of User Input in
eval()
: Missing - Code review needed to ensure user input is never directly used ineval()
or similar dangerous functions.
Mitigation Strategy: Carefully Vet and Select video.js Plugins
Mitigation Strategy: Carefully Vet and Select video.js Plugins
Description:
- Step 1: Research plugin source, maintainers, and community reputation before integration.
- Step 2: Prioritize plugins from the official video.js organization or reputable developers.
- Step 3: Review plugin code for potential security vulnerabilities, especially XSS, prototype pollution, or insecure API usage.
- Step 4: Check plugin update history and issue tracker for maintenance and security responsiveness.
- Step 5: Test plugin in development and monitor for unexpected behavior or browser console warnings.
- Step 6: Only use necessary plugins to minimize the attack surface.
Threats Mitigated:
- Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Plugins - Severity: High
- Malicious Plugins - Severity: High
- Supply Chain Attacks via compromised plugins - Severity: High
Impact:
- Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Plugins: High Risk Reduction
- Malicious Plugins: High Risk Reduction
- Supply Chain Attacks via compromised plugins: High Risk Reduction
Currently Implemented:
- Plugin Usage: Partially Implemented - Plugins are used, but the selection process might not include rigorous security vetting.
Missing Implementation:
- Formal Plugin Vetting Process: Missing - No documented process for security review and vetting of video.js plugins before integration.
- Plugin Security Audits: Missing - No regular security audits of used video.js plugins.
- Plugin Minimization: Missing - No review to minimize the number of plugins used and remove unnecessary ones.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)
Description:
- Step 1: Define a restrictive Content Security Policy (CSP) for your application.
- Step 2: Deliver CSP using the
Content-Security-Policy
HTTP header. - Step 3: Configure CSP directives relevant to video.js and media:
script-src
: Control JavaScript sources. Allow 'self', trusted CDNs, and 'unsafe-inline' (if needed and reviewed). Avoid 'unsafe-eval'.media-src
: Control media file sources. Allow 'self', trusted domains,blob:
ordata:
if needed.frame-ancestors
: Control embedding locations. Use'self'
or specific domains to prevent clickjacking.
- Step 4: Test CSP in report-only mode (
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only
header). - Step 5: Deploy CSP in enforcing mode (
Content-Security-Policy
header) after testing. - Step 6: Regularly review and refine CSP as the application evolves.
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Severity: High
- Clickjacking - Severity: Medium
Impact:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): High Risk Reduction
- Clickjacking: Medium Risk Reduction
Currently Implemented:
- CSP: Not Implemented - No Content Security Policy is currently configured for the application.
Missing Implementation:
- CSP Header Configuration: Missing - No
Content-Security-Policy
orContent-Security-Policy-Report-Only
headers are being sent by the web server. - CSP Policy Definition: Missing - No CSP policy has been defined for the application.
- CSP Testing and Deployment: Missing - No testing or deployment of CSP has been performed.
Mitigation Strategy: Limit JavaScript Execution Context for Video Player (Sandboxing)
Mitigation Strategy: Limit JavaScript Execution Context for Video Player (Sandboxing)
Description:
- Step 1: Explore isolating video.js player and JavaScript in a restricted environment.
- Step 2: Consider using
<iframe>
with thesandbox
attribute for a sandboxed video player.- Example:
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin" src="/video-player-page.html"></iframe>
- Choose sandbox attributes carefully (e.g.,
allow-scripts
,allow-same-origin
, avoidallow-top-navigation
,allow-forms
).
- Example:
- Step 3: Investigate Web Workers for video.js scripts in a separate thread (compatibility with video.js DOM manipulation needs evaluation).
- Step 4: If using iframes, ensure secure communication between main app and sandboxed iframe using message passing.
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Reduced Impact - Severity: High (Reduced to Medium impact within sandbox)
- Prototype Pollution - Reduced Impact - Severity: Medium (Reduced to Low impact within sandbox)
- Privilege Escalation from video.js vulnerabilities - Reduced Impact - Severity: Medium (Reduced to Low impact within sandbox)
Impact:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Medium Risk Reduction (Impact limited to sandbox)
- Prototype Pollution: Low Risk Reduction (Impact limited to sandbox)
- Privilege Escalation from video.js vulnerabilities: Low Risk Reduction (Impact limited to sandbox)
Currently Implemented:
- Sandboxing: Not Implemented - Video player is running in the main application context without sandboxing.
Missing Implementation:
- Iframe Sandboxing Implementation: Missing - No iframe sandboxing is used for the video player.
- Web Worker Investigation: Missing - No investigation into using Web Workers for video.js scripts has been conducted.
- Secure Communication Channel for Sandboxed Player: Missing - No secure communication channel is set up for potential sandboxed player scenarios.
Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Audit and Test for XSS Vulnerabilities
Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Audit and Test for XSS Vulnerabilities
Description:
- Step 1: Incorporate regular security audits and penetration testing.
- Step 2: Focus testing on Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities related to video.js usage and configuration.
- Step 3: Use automated security scanning tools (OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite Scanner, browser-based XSS scanners) and manual penetration testing.
- Step 4: Test user inputs influencing video.js configuration, URLs, and plugin options for XSS.
- Step 5: Simulate XSS attack scenarios by injecting malicious JavaScript code.
- Step 6: Remediate identified XSS vulnerabilities by sanitizing inputs, encoding outputs, and implementing security controls.
- Step 7: Retest after remediation to verify fixes.
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Detection and Remediation - Severity: High
- Unknown Vulnerabilities - Proactive Discovery - Severity: Medium
Impact:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): High Risk Reduction (Through detection and remediation)
- Unknown Vulnerabilities: Medium Risk Reduction (Proactive discovery reduces risk over time)
Currently Implemented:
- Security Audits/Testing: Partially Implemented - Some general security testing might be performed, but specific XSS testing related to video.js is likely not prioritized or systematic.
Missing Implementation:
- Dedicated XSS Testing for video.js: Missing - No specific testing strategy or procedures are in place to target XSS vulnerabilities related to video.js.
- Regular Security Audit Schedule: Missing - No defined schedule for regular security audits and penetration testing focusing on video.js security.
- Automated XSS Scanning Integration: Missing - Automated XSS scanning tools are not integrated into the development pipeline to continuously monitor for vulnerabilities.