Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
144 lines (120 loc) · 15.8 KB

sec-design-deep-analysis.md

File metadata and controls

144 lines (120 loc) · 15.8 KB

Deep Security Analysis of Video.js

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Objective: To conduct a thorough security analysis of the video.js library, focusing on its architecture, components, and data flow as outlined in the provided security design review. The analysis aims to identify potential security vulnerabilities and recommend specific, actionable mitigation strategies to enhance the security posture of video.js, ensuring it remains a robust and trusted HTML5 video player library.

Scope: The scope of this analysis includes: - The video.js library codebase and its core functionalities. - The ecosystem surrounding video.js, including its dependencies, build process, distribution via CDN and npm, and integration into websites. - The security controls and risks identified in the security design review document. - The C4 model diagrams (Context, Container, Deployment, Build) provided in the design review as a basis for architectural understanding.

Methodology: - Document Review: Analyze the provided security design review document to understand the business and security posture, existing and recommended security controls, and identified risks. - Architecture Inference: Based on the C4 model diagrams and the nature of a JavaScript video player library, infer the architecture, key components, and data flow of video.js. This will involve understanding how video.js interacts with the browser, video sources, and external services. - Threat Modeling: Identify potential security vulnerabilities and threats associated with each key component and data flow. This will consider common web application vulnerabilities (e.g., OWASP Top 10), JavaScript library specific risks, and the unique functionalities of a video player. - Mitigation Strategy Development: For each identified threat, develop specific and actionable mitigation strategies tailored to video.js and its development and deployment lifecycle. These strategies will focus on enhancing security controls and reducing identified risks. - Recommendation Prioritization: Prioritize recommendations based on their potential impact on security and the feasibility of implementation within the video.js project.

2. Security Implications of Key Components

Based on the C4 model and the nature of video.js, the key components and their security implications are analyzed below:

2.1 Video.js Library (JavaScript)

  • Component Description: The core JavaScript library responsible for video player functionality within the web browser. It manages the HTML5 video element, user interactions, UI, and video playback.
  • Security Implications:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS):
      • Threat: Vulnerabilities in the JavaScript code could allow attackers to inject malicious scripts. This could occur through improper handling of user inputs (e.g., video source URLs, player configuration options) or by manipulating the DOM in an unsafe manner.
      • Specific Video.js Context: If video.js doesn't properly sanitize URLs provided as video sources or configuration parameters, an attacker could inject malicious JavaScript by crafting a URL that, when processed by video.js, executes script in the user's browser within the context of the embedding website.
    • DOM-based Vulnerabilities:
      • Threat: Improper manipulation of the Document Object Model (DOM) can lead to vulnerabilities. If video.js dynamically creates or modifies DOM elements based on untrusted data without proper sanitization, it could introduce DOM-based XSS or other DOM manipulation vulnerabilities.
      • Specific Video.js Context: Video.js heavily relies on DOM manipulation to build the player UI and handle video elements. If UI components are built using unsanitized data, it could be exploited.
    • Prototype Pollution:
      • Threat: JavaScript prototype pollution vulnerabilities can occur if an attacker can modify the prototype of built-in JavaScript objects. This can lead to unexpected behavior and potentially bypass security mechanisms.
      • Specific Video.js Context: If video.js uses or processes user-provided configuration objects without strict validation, it might be vulnerable to prototype pollution attacks if attackers can inject malicious properties into these objects.
    • Logic Flaws and Unexpected Behavior:
      • Threat: Bugs in the JavaScript logic can lead to unexpected behavior that attackers can exploit. This could include denial-of-service (DoS) conditions, information disclosure, or other security issues.
      • Specific Video.js Context: Complex logic for handling different video formats, streaming protocols, and browser APIs within video.js could contain logic flaws that are exploitable. For example, improper error handling or resource management could lead to DoS.
    • Dependency Vulnerabilities:
      • Threat: Video.js relies on third-party JavaScript libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can directly impact video.js security.
      • Specific Video.js Context: As a JavaScript library, video.js likely uses npm packages. Unpatched vulnerabilities in these packages could be exploited through video.js.

2.2 HTML5 Video Element & Browser APIs

  • Component Description: The HTML5 <video> element and browser-provided Media APIs are used by video.js to render and control video playback.
  • Security Implications:
    • Browser Vulnerabilities:
      • Threat: Video.js relies on the security of the underlying web browser. Vulnerabilities in the browser's HTML5 video element implementation or Media APIs could be exploited when playing video through video.js.
      • Specific Video.js Context: Video.js is directly affected by browser security flaws. If a browser has a vulnerability in its video decoding or rendering engine, it could be exploited through video.js. This is an accepted risk as mentioned in the security design review.
    • Media Format Vulnerabilities:
      • Threat: Vulnerabilities in video codecs or media container formats could be exploited by serving maliciously crafted video files.
      • Specific Video.js Context: While video.js itself doesn't decode video, it triggers the browser's video decoding process. If a browser is vulnerable to a specific video format, playing such a video through video.js could trigger the vulnerability. This is related to the accepted risk of reliance on browser security.

2.3 CDN & Distribution

  • Component Description: CDNs are used to distribute the video.js library files to website visitors.
  • Security Implications:
    • Compromised CDN:
      • Threat: If the CDN serving video.js is compromised, attackers could replace legitimate video.js files with malicious versions. This is a supply chain attack.
      • Specific Video.js Context: If a CDN serving video.js is compromised, all websites using video.js from that CDN could be serving a malicious version of the player, leading to widespread attacks on website visitors.
    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (without HTTPS):
      • Threat: If video.js is served over HTTP instead of HTTPS, attackers could intercept the connection and inject malicious code or replace the library files during transit.
      • Specific Video.js Context: While HTTPS for distribution is listed as a security control, ensuring it is consistently enforced and properly configured is crucial.

2.4 Build Process & Dependencies

  • Component Description: The build process involves developers, source code repositories, CI/CD systems, dependency management (npm), and artifact publishing.
  • Security Implications:
    • Compromised Dependencies:
      • Threat: Dependencies used in the build process or included in the final video.js library could contain vulnerabilities. Supply chain attacks targeting npm packages are a significant risk.
      • Specific Video.js Context: Video.js relies on npm packages for development and potentially for runtime. Vulnerabilities in these packages could be introduced into video.js.
    • Compromised Build Pipeline:
      • Threat: If the CI/CD pipeline is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code into the build artifacts, leading to the distribution of a backdoored video.js library.
      • Specific Video.js Context: Securing the GitHub Actions workflows and build environment is critical to prevent malicious code injection during the build process.
    • Compromised Developer Workstations:
      • Threat: If developer workstations are compromised, attackers could inject malicious code into the source code repository.
      • Specific Video.js Context: While harder to directly control, promoting secure development practices and workstation security among developers is important.

3. Actionable and Tailored Mitigation Strategies

Based on the identified threats, here are actionable and tailored mitigation strategies for video.js:

3.1 For Video.js Library (JavaScript) Security:

  • Input Validation and Sanitization:
    • Strategy: Implement rigorous input validation and sanitization for all user-provided inputs, including video source URLs, configuration options, and any data processed by video.js.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • URL Validation: Strictly validate video source URLs against allowed schemes (e.g., http://, https://, data:, blob:) and potentially domain whitelists if applicable. Sanitize URLs to prevent injection attacks.
      • Configuration Validation: Define a strict schema for player configuration options and validate all provided configurations against this schema. Sanitize configuration values to prevent injection or unexpected behavior.
      • Output Encoding: When dynamically generating HTML or manipulating the DOM based on user inputs, use proper output encoding (e.g., HTML entity encoding) to prevent XSS. Utilize browser APIs for safe DOM manipulation where possible.
  • Secure DOM Manipulation Practices:
    • Strategy: Adopt secure DOM manipulation practices to prevent DOM-based vulnerabilities.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • Minimize Dynamic DOM Creation: Reduce the amount of dynamic DOM creation based on user inputs. Prefer using templating engines with built-in sanitization or safe DOM APIs.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP) Enforcement: Provide clear guidance and examples for developers on how to configure CSP headers to mitigate XSS risks when embedding video.js. Encourage the use of strict CSP directives.
  • Prototype Pollution Prevention:
    • Strategy: Implement measures to prevent prototype pollution vulnerabilities.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • Avoid Deep Merging of User-Controlled Objects: If merging user-provided configuration objects, avoid deep merging or use safe merging techniques that prevent prototype pollution.
      • Object.freeze or Object.seal: Consider using Object.freeze or Object.seal on configuration objects where appropriate to prevent modification of their properties.
  • Code Reviews and Security Testing:
    • Strategy: Implement regular code reviews and security testing to identify and address vulnerabilities.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits, including penetration testing and code reviews, by security experts. Focus on areas identified as high-risk, such as input handling and DOM manipulation.
      • Static Application Security Testing (SAST): Integrate SAST tools into the development pipeline to automatically identify potential security flaws in the codebase during development. Configure SAST tools to detect common JavaScript vulnerabilities like XSS, prototype pollution, and DOM manipulation issues.
      • Automated Testing with Security Focus: Expand automated testing to include security-focused test cases, such as testing input validation, error handling, and resistance to common attack vectors.

3.2 For Dependency Management and Build Process Security:

  • Dependency Scanning and Management:
    • Strategy: Implement robust dependency scanning and management practices to address vulnerabilities in third-party libraries.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • Automated Dependency Scanning: Integrate automated dependency scanning tools into the CI/CD pipeline to detect and remediate known vulnerabilities in third-party libraries used by video.js. Tools should check both direct and transitive dependencies.
      • Dependency Pinning and Version Control: Pin dependency versions in package.json and use version control to track dependency updates. Regularly review and update dependencies, prioritizing security patches.
      • Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Generate and maintain an SBOM for video.js to provide transparency into its dependencies and facilitate vulnerability management.
  • Secure Build Pipeline:
    • Strategy: Secure the CI/CD pipeline to prevent malicious code injection and ensure the integrity of build artifacts.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • Secure CI/CD Configuration: Harden the CI/CD pipeline configuration (e.g., GitHub Actions workflows) by following security best practices. Limit access to secrets and credentials.
      • Build Environment Security: Ensure the build environment is secure and isolated. Regularly update build tools and dependencies within the build environment.
      • Artifact Integrity Verification: Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity of build artifacts before publishing them to npm and CDN. Consider using code signing or checksums.
  • Subresource Integrity (SRI):
    • Strategy: Encourage and promote the use of Subresource Integrity (SRI) tags when including video.js from CDNs.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • Provide SRI Guidance: Clearly document and recommend the use of SRI tags in the video.js documentation and website. Provide examples of SRI usage for different CDN versions.
      • Generate SRI Hashes: Provide tools or scripts to easily generate SRI hashes for video.js library files for different versions and CDN locations.

3.3 For Distribution Security:

  • HTTPS Enforcement for Distribution:
    • Strategy: Strictly enforce HTTPS for all distribution channels, including CDN and npm.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • CDN HTTPS Configuration: Ensure CDN configurations are set to serve video.js files exclusively over HTTPS.
      • npm Package Security: While npm itself uses HTTPS, ensure that any links or instructions related to npm package installation also emphasize HTTPS.
  • CDN Security Hardening:
    • Strategy: Work with CDN providers to ensure robust security measures are in place for the CDN infrastructure.
    • Actionable Steps:
      • CDN Security Review: Periodically review the security posture of the CDN provider and their security controls.
      • Access Controls and Monitoring: Ensure appropriate access controls are in place for CDN management and content updates. Implement monitoring and logging for CDN activities.

4. Conclusion

This deep security analysis of video.js, based on the provided security design review, highlights key security considerations and provides actionable mitigation strategies. By focusing on input validation, secure DOM manipulation, dependency management, build process security, and secure distribution, the video.js project can significantly enhance its security posture. Implementing these tailored recommendations will contribute to maintaining video.js as a reliable, secure, and widely trusted HTML5 video player library for the web development community. Continuous security efforts, including regular audits and proactive vulnerability management, are crucial for the long-term security and success of the video.js project.