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Attack Tree Analysis for yarnpkg/berry

Objective: Compromise application using Yarn Berry by exploiting weaknesses within Yarn Berry itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Yarn Berry CRITICAL NODE ├── Supply Chain Attacks CRITICAL NODE [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── Dependency Confusion Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── Register malicious package with same name as private dependency │ │ └── Yarn Berry resolves and installs malicious package instead of private one │ ├── Lockfile Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── Modify yarn.lock file to inject malicious or vulnerable dependencies │ │ └── Force installation of compromised packages during yarn install ├── Configuration Manipulation Attacks CRITICAL NODE [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── .yarnrc.yml Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── Modify .yarnrc.yml to alter Yarn Berry behavior │ │ ├── Change registry URL to malicious source │ │ ├── Disable security features (e.g., integrity checks - less impactful in Berry) │ │ └── Configure plugins to load malicious code ├── Workspace Specific Attacks (Monorepos) CRITICAL NODE [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── Workspace Dependency Hijacking [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── In a monorepo, compromise a less critical workspace │ │ └── Use compromised workspace to inject malicious code into shared dependencies or build process of other workspaces ├── Plugin Related Attacks CRITICAL NODE [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── Malicious Plugin Installation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── Socially engineer user to install a malicious Yarn Berry plugin │ │ └── Plugin executes malicious code during installation or runtime └── Implementation Bugs & Vulnerabilities in Yarn Berry Core (Less Likely, but impactful) CRITICAL NODE └── Discover and exploit vulnerabilities in Yarn Berry's core code ├── Vulnerabilities in dependency resolution logic (beyond PnP) ├── Vulnerabilities in installation process ├── Vulnerabilities in CLI parsing or execution └── Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in Yarn Berry itself

Attack Tree Path: 1. Supply Chain Attacks (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):

  • Dependency Confusion Attack (HIGH-RISK PATH):

    • Attack Vector: Attacker registers a malicious package on a public registry (like npmjs.com) with the same name as a private dependency used by the application.
    • Exploitation: If Yarn Berry is misconfigured or doesn't prioritize private registries correctly, it might resolve and install the attacker's malicious public package instead of the intended private one during yarn install.
    • Impact: Successful installation of the malicious package can lead to code execution within the application's environment, potentially resulting in data breaches, unauthorized access, or full system compromise.
    • Mitigation:
      • Configure Yarn Berry to explicitly prioritize private registries in .yarnrc.yml.
      • Utilize scoped packages for private dependencies to minimize naming collisions.
      • Implement dependency integrity checks and verify package origins.

  • Lockfile Poisoning (HIGH-RISK PATH):

    • Attack Vector: Attacker gains write access to the repository or CI/CD pipeline and modifies the yarn.lock file.
    • Exploitation: The attacker injects malicious or vulnerable dependency versions into the yarn.lock file. When yarn install is executed, Yarn Berry faithfully installs the compromised packages specified in the poisoned lockfile.
    • Impact: Installation of malicious dependencies can lead to code execution, supply chain compromise, and the establishment of persistent backdoors within the application.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement strict access control to the repository and CI/CD pipeline.
      • Utilize code review processes for all changes to yarn.lock.
      • Employ Git signing and verification to ensure commit integrity.
      • Regularly audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Configuration Manipulation Attacks (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):

  • .yarnrc.yml Manipulation (HIGH-RISK PATH):
    • Attack Vector: Attacker gains write access to the repository or server environment and modifies the .yarnrc.yml configuration file.
    • Exploitation: The attacker alters Yarn Berry's behavior by:
      • Changing the registry URL to a malicious source, redirecting package downloads.
      • Disabling security features (though less impactful in Berry's PnP model).
      • Configuring plugins to load malicious code or alter functionality.
    • Impact: Manipulation of .yarnrc.yml can lead to the installation of malicious packages, weakened security posture, and the execution of malicious code through plugins.
    • Mitigation:
      • Restrict write access to .yarnrc.yml and implement strict access controls.
      • Require code review for any modifications to .yarnrc.yml.
      • Consider using environment variables for sensitive configurations instead of hardcoding them in .yarnrc.yml.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Workspace Specific Attacks (Monorepos) (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):

  • Workspace Dependency Hijacking (HIGH-RISK PATH):
    • Attack Vector: In a monorepo setup, the attacker compromises a less critical or less secured workspace within the project.
    • Exploitation: Once a workspace is compromised, the attacker uses it as a launchpad to inject malicious code into dependencies shared across workspaces or into the build process that affects other, more critical workspaces. This is a form of lateral movement within the monorepo.
    • Impact: Compromising shared dependencies or the build process can lead to a supply chain compromise affecting multiple workspaces and potentially the entire application.
    • Mitigation:
      • Apply consistent and strong security measures across all workspaces in the monorepo, regardless of perceived criticality.
      • Implement robust access control within the monorepo to restrict lateral movement.
      • Carefully monitor dependencies shared between workspaces for any suspicious changes.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Plugin Related Attacks (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):

  • Malicious Plugin Installation (HIGH-RISK PATH):
    • Attack Vector: Attacker uses social engineering tactics to trick a developer or administrator into installing a malicious Yarn Berry plugin.
    • Exploitation: The malicious plugin, once installed, can execute arbitrary code during installation, runtime, or any plugin lifecycle event, gaining control over the application environment.
    • Impact: Installation of a malicious plugin can lead to code execution, full system compromise, and the establishment of persistent backdoors.
    • Mitigation:
      • Educate developers about the security risks associated with installing plugins from untrusted sources.
      • Establish a formal plugin vetting process to review and approve plugins before use.
      • Prefer plugins from official Yarn Berry repositories or reputable community sources.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Implementation Bugs & Vulnerabilities in Yarn Berry Core (CRITICAL NODE):

  • Attack Vector: Attacker discovers and exploits previously unknown vulnerabilities within the core code of Yarn Berry itself. These could be in dependency resolution logic, the installation process, CLI parsing, or other core functionalities.
  • Exploitation: Exploiting core vulnerabilities could lead to various severe outcomes, including Remote Code Execution (RCE), bypassing security mechanisms, or causing widespread instability.
  • Impact: Vulnerabilities in Yarn Berry core can have critical impact, potentially affecting all applications using the vulnerable version of Yarn Berry. RCE vulnerabilities are particularly severe, allowing attackers to gain full control over the system.
  • Mitigation:
    • Stay updated with Yarn Berry releases and apply security patches promptly.
    • Monitor Yarn Berry security advisories and mailing lists for vulnerability announcements.
    • Participate in the security community and report any potential vulnerabilities discovered to the Yarn Berry maintainers.