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Attack Tree Analysis for zenorocha/clipboard.js

Objective: [[Root: Execute Arbitrary JavaScript via clipboard.js]]

Attack Tree Visualization

[[Root: Execute Arbitrary JavaScript via clipboard.js]] / |
/ |
[1. Exploit Misconfig.] [3. Target Events] [1. Exploit Misconfig.] | |
| |
[1.2 Text Attribute] [3.1 'success'] [1.3 Custom Events] | | | | | | ==[[1.2.1]]== ==[[3.1.1]]== ==[1.3.1]== | ==[1.2.2]==

Attack Tree Path: [[1.2.1]] data-clipboard-text containing unsanitized user input

  • Description: This is the most direct and dangerous attack vector. If the data-clipboard-text attribute of a clipboard.js target element contains unsanitized user input, an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript. When a user clicks the element to copy the text, the injected code will be executed in the context of the application.
  • Example: An attacker might provide input like: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (XSS, leading to arbitrary code execution, data theft, session hijacking, etc.)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Always HTML-encode the content of data-clipboard-text if it originates from user input or any untrusted source. Use a robust HTML encoding library.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2] Dynamically generating data-clipboard-text from a complex data structure without proper serialization and escaping

  • Description: Similar to 1.2.1, but the vulnerability arises when the data-clipboard-text value is constructed from a complex object or data structure. If the serialization process doesn't properly escape characters that have special meaning in HTML or JavaScript, an attacker can inject malicious code.
  • Example: If the application constructs the text from a JSON object, and a field in that object contains <script>alert(1)</script>, and this isn't properly escaped during serialization and HTML encoding, the script will execute.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (XSS)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Use a well-tested serialization library (e.g., JSON.stringify for JSON) and then HTML-encode the result before assigning it to data-clipboard-text.

Attack Tree Path: [[3.1.1]] Insecure handling of e.text in the 'success' handler

  • Description: The success event in clipboard.js provides the copied text in the e.text property of the event object. If this value is used insecurely within the event handler (e.g., directly inserted into the DOM without sanitization), it creates an XSS vulnerability.
  • Example: clipboard.on('success', function(e) { document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = e.text; }); If e.text contains malicious HTML/JS, it will be executed.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (XSS)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Always treat e.text as potentially untrusted. Sanitize it (HTML-encode) before using it in any way that could lead to script execution, especially when inserting it into the DOM.

Attack Tree Path: [1.3.1] Overriding default event handling with insecure logic

  • Description: Developers can override the default clipboard.js event handling. If they introduce vulnerabilities in their custom code within these handlers, it can lead to security issues, most commonly XSS. This is a broader category than 3.1.1, encompassing any insecure custom event handling.
  • Example: A custom handler might take the copied text and use it in an AJAX request without proper encoding, or it might manipulate the DOM in an unsafe way based on the clipboard content.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Potential for XSS or other vulnerabilities)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Carefully review any custom event handlers. Ensure that any data received from clipboard.js events is treated as potentially untrusted and is properly sanitized before being used. Avoid using clipboard content directly in security-sensitive operations without thorough validation.