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Threat Model Analysis for zenorocha/clipboard.js

Threat: T1: Clipboard Data Hijacking (Content Replacement)

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript into the same origin as the application using clipboard.js (e.g., through a successful XSS attack). Before the user initiates a paste operation, the attacker's script uses clipboard.js's API to actively overwrite the clipboard content with malicious data. For example, replacing a copied cryptocurrency address with the attacker's address, or replacing a copied command with a malicious one. This relies on the attacker's ability to call clipboard.js functions.

    • Impact:

      • Financial loss (cryptocurrency address swapping).
      • System compromise (execution of malicious commands).
      • Data breach (sensitive data replaced with attacker-controlled data).
      • Loss of user trust.

    • Affected clipboard.js Component:

      • ClipboardJS constructor (instantiation, setting up the mechanism).
      • Any methods or event handlers that result in writing to the clipboard (implicitly through the library's core functionality).
      • DOM elements used as triggers, if the attacker can manipulate them to trigger unintended copies.

    • Risk Severity: Critical

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Primary: Robust XSS prevention (CSP, input sanitization, output encoding, secure frameworks). This is the most critical mitigation, as it prevents the attacker from injecting the malicious script in the first place.
      • Secondary: Validate data before writing it to the clipboard using clipboard.js. Ensure it conforms to expected formats and doesn't contain malicious patterns.
      • Secondary: Implement a "copy confirmation" mechanism (visual preview) to allow the user to verify the content before it's placed on the clipboard.
      • Secondary (User Education): Educate users about the risks of pasting into untrusted applications.

Threat: T2: Clipboard Data Leakage (Event Sniffing)

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript into the same origin. The attacker's script actively attaches a listener to the clipboard.js success event. When the user copies something using clipboard.js, the attacker's listener captures the e.text property (the copied data) and exfiltrates it. This relies on the attacker leveraging clipboard.js's event system.

    • Impact:

      • Data breach (sensitive information copied by the user is stolen).
      • Loss of privacy.
      • Potential for further attacks based on the stolen data.

    • Affected clipboard.js Component:

      • .on('success', ...) event handler. Specifically, the attacker exploits the e.text property of the event object provided by clipboard.js.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Primary: Robust XSS prevention (CSP, input sanitization, output encoding, secure frameworks).
      • Secondary: Avoid using the e.text property within the success event handler if it's not absolutely necessary. If you only need to know that something was copied, but not what, don't access the text. This limits the attacker's ability to exploit the event.
      • Secondary: Audit all code that uses clipboard.js event listeners to ensure they are legitimate and do not leak sensitive data.

Threat: T4: Security Mechanism Bypass (Clipboard as a Vector) - Modified for Direct Involvement

  • Description: The application is designed to use clipboard.js for a security-related purpose (e.g., copying a one-time token). An attacker, through injected JavaScript, leverages clipboard.js's API to intercept and modify the clipboard content before it's used by the application's security logic. The key difference here is that clipboard.js is intended to be part of the security flow, making its misuse a direct threat.

    • Impact:

      • Compromise of the security mechanism (e.g., unauthorized access, account takeover).
      • Severity depends on the specific security mechanism.

    • Affected clipboard.js Component:

      • Any component of clipboard.js that writes to the clipboard, as the attacker is actively manipulating the library's intended functionality.

    • Risk Severity: Critical (if the bypassed mechanism is critical) or High (if less critical)

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Primary: Do not use the clipboard for transferring security-critical data. This is a fundamental design flaw. Use secure, purpose-built mechanisms.
      • Secondary (If Clipboard Use is Unavoidable): Implement strong integrity checks (checksums, digital signatures) on the pasted data before using it. Verify the data hasn't been tampered with. This is crucial because the application expects to use clipboard.js.
      • Secondary: Combine clipboard-based input with other authentication factors (multi-factor authentication).