Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User Input Displayed in Dialogs
Mitigation Strategy: Input Sanitization for Dialog Display
Description:
- Identify all locations in the application where user-provided data or external data is displayed within
material-dialogs
(e.g., insetContent
,setMessage
, list items, custom views). - For each identified location, implement input sanitization before passing the data to
material-dialogs
methods for display. - Choose the appropriate sanitization method based on the context where the dialog content is rendered. For example, if the dialog content might be interpreted as HTML (even indirectly), use HTML escaping. For plain text, ensure proper encoding to prevent control character interpretation.
- Test the sanitization by displaying various types of potentially malicious input within the dialog to confirm effective mitigation.
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (High Severity): If
material-dialogs
is used in a context where content could be interpreted as HTML (e.g., if custom views within the dialog render web content, or if the underlying platform has HTML rendering capabilities in text views), unsanitized input can lead to XSS.
Impact:
- XSS: High reduction in risk. Effective sanitization prevents XSS attacks originating from displayed user input within
material-dialogs
.
Currently Implemented:
- Implemented in
UserProfileDialog.java
where user's "About Me" text is displayed usingsetMessage()
.StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml4()
is used to sanitize the text before setting it as the message in thematerial-dialogs
.
Missing Implementation:
- Missing in
CommentDisplayDialog.java
where user comments are displayed in aRecyclerView
within a custommaterial-dialogs
. Comments are currently passed directly to theRecyclerView
adapter without sanitization before being rendered in the dialog.
Mitigation Strategy: Validate User Input Received from Dialogs
Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation for Dialog Input
Description:
- Identify all dialogs created using
material-dialogs
that accept user input (e.g., usinginput()
, custom views with input fields integrated intomaterial-dialogs
). - Implement input validation immediately after receiving input from
material-dialogs
through its callbacks or listeners (e.g., in thepositiveButton
click listener of aninput()
dialog). - Validate the input data based on expected data type, format, range, and application-specific business rules.
- Provide user-friendly error messages within the dialog context or through other appropriate UI feedback if validation fails, guiding the user to correct their input before proceeding.
- Consider disabling the positive button or preventing dialog dismissal until valid input is provided to enforce validation directly within the
material-dialogs
interaction flow.
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Data Injection (Medium to High Severity): Insufficient validation of input received from
material-dialogs
can lead to data injection vulnerabilities in backend systems if this data is subsequently used in database queries or system commands. - Business Logic Bypass (Medium Severity): Lack of validation on dialog inputs can allow users to bypass intended application logic or constraints enforced through dialog interactions.
- Application Errors and Instability (Low to Medium Severity): Invalid input from dialogs can cause unexpected application behavior or errors if not properly handled after being received from
material-dialogs
.
Impact:
- Data Injection: Medium to High reduction in risk. Validation performed after receiving input from
material-dialogs
significantly reduces the risk of data injection. - Business Logic Bypass: High reduction in risk. Input validation within the dialog flow helps enforce business rules and prevents bypass attempts through dialog inputs.
- Application Errors and Instability: Medium reduction in risk. Validating dialog input helps prevent errors caused by malformed or unexpected data received from
material-dialogs
.
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented in
RegistrationDialog.java
which usesmaterial-dialogs
input()
for email and password. Basic client-side format validation using regular expressions is performed in thepositiveButton
listener before proceeding with registration.
Missing Implementation:
- Missing in
EditProfileDialog.java
which uses custom views withinmaterial-dialogs
for profile editing. Input fields like "Username" and "Phone Number" in these custom views lack validation logic implemented in the dialog's button click listeners. - Error messages for validation failures are not consistently displayed within the
material-dialogs
context itself, sometimes relying on separate UI elements for feedback.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Handling of Sensitive Input in Dialogs
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Sensitive Input Handling in Material Dialogs
Description:
- Identify all dialogs created with
material-dialogs
that are used to collect sensitive information (e.g., passwords, API keys, personal identification numbers). - When using
material-dialogs
input()
for password fields, always utilize the appropriateinputType
flag (InputType.TYPE_CLASS_TEXT | InputType.TYPE_TEXT_VARIATION_PASSWORD
) to ensure characters are masked as they are typed within the dialog. - When creating custom views for sensitive input within
material-dialogs
, ensure that the input fields within these custom views are also configured for secure input (e.g., usingandroid:inputType="textPassword"
in XML layouts for Android). - Avoid logging sensitive input values after they are retrieved from
material-dialogs
in application logs or debugging outputs. - When processing sensitive data obtained from
material-dialogs
, ensure it is handled securely in subsequent application logic (e.g., encrypted in transit and at rest if stored).
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (High Severity): Insecure handling of sensitive input within
material-dialogs
can lead to accidental exposure of confidential data through logging or insecure display if not properly masked. - Credential Theft (High Severity): If password input fields in
material-dialogs
are not correctly configured for secure input, passwords might be displayed in plain text or logged, increasing the risk of credential theft.
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: High reduction in risk. Using secure input types within
material-dialogs
and avoiding logging minimizes the risk of sensitive data leaks directly related to dialog interactions. - Credential Theft: High reduction in risk. Properly configuring password input fields in
material-dialogs
significantly reduces the risk of password compromise during user input.
Currently Implemented:
- Password fields in
LoginDialog.java
andRegistrationDialog.java
which usematerial-dialogs
input()
correctly utilizeinputType(InputType.TYPE_CLASS_TEXT | InputType.TYPE_TEXT_VARIATION_PASSWORD)
.
Missing Implementation:
- When custom views are used within
material-dialogs
for collecting sensitive information (if any are planned in the future), ensure the input fields in these custom views are also explicitly configured for secure input. - Logging practices should be reviewed to ensure no sensitive data retrieved from
material-dialogs
is inadvertently logged during development or in production.
Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Information Disclosure in Material Dialog Content
Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Dialog Information Disclosure
Description:
- Review the content of all dialogs created using
material-dialogs
and identify any instances where potentially sensitive information, debug details, or overly verbose error messages are displayed within the dialog's title, message, or custom views. - Replace detailed technical error messages displayed by
material-dialogs
with generic, user-friendly messages that do not reveal internal system details or potential vulnerabilities. - Ensure that debug information or development-specific messages are not accidentally included in
material-dialogs
displayed in production builds. Use conditional logic to display more detailed information only in debug/development environments and generic messages in production. - Minimize the amount of information displayed in
material-dialogs
to only what is strictly necessary for the user to understand the context and take appropriate action. Avoid displaying unnecessary details that could be exploited by attackers.
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (Low to Medium Severity): Displaying excessive or sensitive information in
material-dialogs
, especially in error messages, can reveal internal system details, configuration information, or potential vulnerabilities to attackers.
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Medium reduction in risk. Minimizing information disclosure within
material-dialogs
reduces the attack surface and limits the information available to potential attackers through dialog interactions.
Currently Implemented:
- Generic error messages are used in network request failure dialogs created with
material-dialogs
(e.g., "Network error occurred. Please try again.").
Missing Implementation:
- Detailed error messages originating from backend validation failures might sometimes be directly passed to
material-dialogs
and displayed to the user. These should be replaced with more generic messages before being passed tomaterial-dialogs
for display. - Review all dialogs to ensure no debug-specific information is inadvertently included in production builds when using
material-dialogs
.
Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update material-dialogs
Library
Mitigation Strategy: Regular Material Dialogs Library Updates
Description:
- Establish a process for regularly checking for updates specifically to the
material-dialogs
library. - Monitor the
material-dialogs
library's GitHub repository, release notes, and any security advisories related to the library for announcements of new versions and security patches. - Utilize dependency management tools (e.g., Gradle in Android projects) to facilitate easy updating of the
material-dialogs
library version in the project. - Test updated versions of
material-dialogs
in a development or staging environment specifically focusing on dialog-related functionality to ensure compatibility and prevent regressions before deploying to production. - Prioritize applying security patches and updates for
material-dialogs
promptly to address any known vulnerabilities reported in the library itself.
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Material Dialogs (High Severity): Using outdated versions of the
material-dialogs
library can expose the application to publicly known security vulnerabilities within the dialog library itself that attackers could potentially exploit.
Impact:
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Material Dialogs: High reduction in risk. Regularly updating
material-dialogs
ensures that any known vulnerabilities within the library are patched, significantly reducing the risk of exploitation targeting the dialog functionality.
Currently Implemented:
- The project uses Gradle for dependency management, making library updates possible. Developers are generally aware of the need to update dependencies, including
material-dialogs
.
Missing Implementation:
- There is no automated system specifically tracking updates for the
material-dialogs
library and proactively notifying developers when new versions are available. Updates are currently performed manually and might be delayed. - Formalized testing focused specifically on dialog functionality after updating
material-dialogs
in a staging environment before production deployment is not consistently performed.