attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for afollestad/material-dialogs

Objective: To manipulate or exfiltrate data, or to execute arbitrary code within the context of the application, specifically by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations related to the material-dialogs library.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [Attacker's Goal: Manipulate/Exfiltrate Data or Execute Code via material-dialogs]
                                                        |
                                                        |
                      [[1. Input Validation/Sanitization Bypass]]
                                      |
                                      |
                      -----------------------------------
                      |
    <<1.1 Unsanitized Input to Dialog Content>>
                      |
    -----------------------------------
    |                 |
[[1.1.1 XSS]]  [[1.1.2 HTML Injection]]
[[via title]] [[via message]]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Input Validation/Sanitization Bypass

• Description: This represents the overarching attack vector where the application fails to properly sanitize user-provided input before it's passed to the material-dialogs library for display. This failure opens the door to various injection attacks.
• Why High-Risk: This is the most common point of failure in web applications dealing with user input. Developers often overlook or incorrectly implement sanitization, making this a highly probable attack path.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement robust server-side and client-side input validation and sanitization using a well-vetted library (e.g., DOMPurify).
  • Never trust user input. Always assume it's potentially malicious.
  • Use a "whitelist" approach, allowing only known-good characters and patterns, rather than trying to block known-bad ones.
  • Encode output appropriately for the context (e.g., HTML encoding for displaying data in HTML).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Unsanitized Input to Dialog Content

• Description: This is the specific point where unsanitized user input is passed to the material-dialogs library, typically to parameters like title or message.
• Why Critical: This is the root cause of the most likely and impactful vulnerabilities (XSS and HTML injection). If this node is compromised, the attacker gains a significant foothold.
• Mitigation: Same as above (for [[1. Input Validation/Sanitization Bypass]]). This node emphasizes the critical importance of sanitization.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 XSS via title

• Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the title parameter of a material-dialogs dialog. If the application doesn't properly escape or sanitize this input, the injected script will execute in the context of the victim's browser.
• Example: An attacker might provide a title like: <script>alert('XSS')</script> or a more sophisticated payload to steal cookies, redirect the user, or modify the page content.
• Impact:
  • High: XSS can lead to complete account takeover, session hijacking, data theft, and defacement of the application.
  • The attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser.
• Mitigation:
  • Strictly sanitize the title parameter using a robust HTML sanitization library.
  • Implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the sources from which scripts can be loaded.
  • Use output encoding (HTML encoding) when displaying the title.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 HTML Injection via message

• Description: Similar to XSS, but instead of injecting JavaScript, the attacker injects malicious HTML into the message parameter of a dialog. This can be used to create phishing forms, load external content (potentially malicious), or alter the appearance of the dialog.
• Example: An attacker might provide a message like: <iframe src="https://malicious.example.com"></iframe> or <a href="javascript:evilCode()">Click here</a>.
• Impact:
  • Medium: While generally less severe than XSS, HTML injection can still lead to phishing attacks, data breaches, and user deception.
  • The attacker can control the visual presentation of the dialog and potentially trick the user.
• Mitigation:
  • Sanitize the message parameter using a robust HTML sanitization library. Be particularly careful about allowing potentially dangerous HTML tags like <iframe>, <object>, <embed>, and <script>.
  • Consider using a more restrictive sanitization policy for the message than for the title, as the message is often intended to display richer content.
  • Use output encoding (HTML encoding) when displaying the message.