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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for afollestad/material-dialogs

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (Within Dialog Context)

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (Within Dialog Context)

  • Description:

    1. Identify Input Dialogs: Locate all instances where material-dialogs is used with the input() function to create input dialogs.
    2. Define Expected Input: For each input field within these dialogs, define the precise expected data type, allowed characters, length constraints, and any specific patterns (using regular expressions).
    3. Implement Validation Immediately After Input: Within the onPositive callback (or equivalent) of the MaterialDialog, immediately after retrieving the input string from the dialog, perform the validation:
      • Type Check: If a number is expected, attempt to parse it and handle potential exceptions.
      • Length Check: Enforce minimum and maximum length limits.
      • Character Whitelisting: Use regular expressions to allow only the defined set of characters. Prioritize whitelisting over blacklisting.
      • Pattern Matching: Use regular expressions to enforce specific formats (e.g., email addresses, dates).
    4. Error Handling (Within Dialog): If validation fails, display a clear, user-friendly error message within the dialog itself. Consider using material-dialogs to show the error, preventing the dialog from closing until valid input is provided. Do not proceed with using the invalid data.
    5. Sanitization (If Necessary): If the input must contain characters that are potentially dangerous in other contexts, consider encoding rather than removing them. Use appropriate encoding functions before passing the data out of the dialog's context.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Injection Attacks (Passed to Other Components) (Severity: High/Critical): Reduces the risk of SQL injection, XSS, and command injection if the dialog's output is later used insecurely. This mitigation focuses on preventing the dialog from producing malicious output.
    • Data Corruption (Passed to Other Components) (Severity: Medium): Prevents invalid data from being passed to other parts of the application.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) (Passed to Other Components) (Severity: Medium): Prevents excessively long input strings from being passed on.

  • Impact:

    • Significantly reduces the risk of the dialog being a source of malicious data. The effectiveness depends on how the data is used after leaving the dialog.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially. Basic length checks are in UserProfileActivity's dialog. Type checking for numeric inputs.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • FeedbackActivity: Feedback dialog lacks character whitelisting and pattern matching.
    • SearchActivity: Search dialog lacks comprehensive validation.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Custom View Handling (Within Dialog)

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Custom View Handling (Within Dialog)

  • Description:

    1. Identify customView Usage: Locate all instances where material-dialogs uses the customView option.
    2. Isolate and Secure: Treat the custom view within the dialog as a self-contained unit with its own security requirements.
    3. Apply Dialog-Specific Security:
      • Input Validation (Within Custom View): If the custom view contains input fields, implement input validation within the custom view's logic, before passing data back to the main dialog handler. Follow the same principles as strategy #1.
      • WebView Security (Within Custom View): If the custom view contains a WebView, apply all WebView security best practices within the context of the dialog:
        • Disable JavaScript if possible.
        • Enable Safe Browsing.
        • Use a strict Content Security Policy (CSP).
        • Be extremely cautious with addJavascriptInterface.
      • Intent Handling (Within Custom View): If the custom view launches Intents, validate those Intents before launching them from within the dialog.
      • Data Handling (Within Custom View): Avoid storing sensitive data directly within the custom view's state within the dialog.
    4. Minimize External Interactions: Limit the custom view's interactions with the rest of the application from within the dialog.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • XSS (Within Dialog's WebView) (Severity: High):
    • Intent Spoofing (From Dialog) (Severity: Medium):
    • Data Leakage (From Dialog) (Severity: Medium):
    • Other UI Vulnerabilities (Within Dialog) (Severity: Variable):

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of vulnerabilities within the custom view affecting the dialog itself or being passed to the rest of the application.

  • Currently Implemented: No. The project does not use customView.

  • Missing Implementation: Not applicable, but must be implemented if customView is used.

Mitigation Strategy: Clear Sensitive Data on Dialog Dismissal

Mitigation Strategy: Clear Sensitive Data on Dialog Dismissal

  • Description:

    1. Identify Sensitive Dialogs: Determine which material-dialogs instances contain or handle sensitive information.
    2. Implement onDismissListener: Add an onDismissListener (or onCancelListener) to the MaterialDialog instance.
    3. Clear Data Within the Listener: Inside the listener, explicitly clear any sensitive data held by the dialog:
      • Set text fields within the dialog to empty strings (editText.setText("") for input dialogs).
      • Nullify references to sensitive objects held by the dialog.
      • If using a customView, ensure the custom view's elements also clear sensitive data.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Data Leakage (From Dialog) (Severity: Medium to High): Prevents sensitive data from remaining in the dialog's memory after it's dismissed.

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of sensitive data being accessible after the dialog is no longer visible.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially. Login dialog clears the password field on dismissal.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • UserProfileActivity: User profile editing dialog should clear fields.
    • Any other dialogs handling sensitive data.

Mitigation Strategy: Validate Callback Data (Originating from Dialog)

Mitigation Strategy: Validate Callback Data (Originating from Dialog)

  • Description:

    1. Identify Dialog Callbacks: Locate all callbacks used with material-dialogs (e.g., onPositive, onNegative, onNeutral).
    2. Treat Dialog Data as Potentially Untrusted: Within each callback implementation, treat any data originating from the dialog as potentially untrusted. This is crucial even if basic validation was done within the dialog.
    3. Implement Validation Before Using Data: Before using the data passed to the callback, perform thorough validation:
      • Check for null or empty values.
      • Re-validate data types and formats (even if checked in the dialog – defense in depth).
      • If the data represents a selection from a list dialog, ensure the selected item is valid.
    4. Defensive Programming: Handle unexpected data gracefully within the callback.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Logic Errors (Due to Dialog Data) (Severity: Medium):
    • Injection Attacks (If Data Used Insecurely) (Severity: Variable): Reduces the risk, but relies on secure usage after the callback.

  • Impact:

    • Improves robustness and helps prevent unexpected behavior caused by potentially flawed data from the dialog.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially. Some callbacks have basic null checks.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • All callbacks should be reviewed for comprehensive validation of data originating from the dialog.
    • FeedbackActivity: onPositive callback needs more robust validation of the user's comment.