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Attack Tree Analysis for airbnb/mavericks

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to application data/functionality or cause DoS via Mavericks

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker's Goal: Gain unauthorized access to application data/functionality or cause DoS via Mavericks

  1. Manipulate State (Unauthorized State Modification) [HIGH-RISK] 1.1 Bypass State Validation [HIGH-RISK] 1.1.1 Exploit Weaknesses in copy() Method (if custom and flawed) [CRITICAL] 1.1.2 Exploit Missing or Incorrect validateState Implementation [CRITICAL] 1.2 Inject Malicious State via External Sources [HIGH-RISK] 1.2.1 Exploit Unvalidated Input from Arguments/Intents [CRITICAL]

  2. Bypass Security Mechanisms Implemented with Mavericks [HIGH-RISK] 2.1 Manipulate State to Bypass Authentication/Authorization [HIGH-RISK] 2.1.1 Modify User Authentication State [CRITICAL] 2.1.2 Modify User Role/Permission State [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Manipulate State (Unauthorized State Modification) [HIGH-RISK]

  • Overall Description: This is the core high-risk path, focusing on the attacker's ability to directly alter the application's state in ways that are not intended or authorized. Mavericks, by its nature, relies heavily on state management, making this a central point of vulnerability.
  • Sub-Paths:
    • 1.1 Bypass State Validation [HIGH-RISK]: This sub-path focuses on circumventing any checks or validations that are in place to ensure the integrity and validity of the state.
    • 1.2 Inject Malicious State via External Sources [HIGH-RISK]: This sub-path focuses on introducing malicious data into the state through external inputs, such as arguments, intents, or data loaded from persistent storage.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Bypass State Validation [HIGH-RISK]

  • Overall Description: This path represents the attacker's attempt to bypass any mechanisms designed to ensure that the state remains in a valid and consistent configuration. This could involve exploiting flaws in custom validation logic or finding ways to circumvent the validation process entirely.

    • 1.1.1 Exploit Weaknesses in copy() Method (if custom and flawed) [CRITICAL]

      • Description: If a developer overrides the default copy() method in a MavericksState subclass and introduces a vulnerability (e.g., insufficient validation, incorrect handling of sensitive data, improper cloning), an attacker could craft a malicious payload to modify state in an unintended way. This is critical because the copy() method is fundamental to how Mavericks manages state updates.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Thoroughly review and test any custom copy() implementations.
        • Ensure proper validation and sanitization of all input data within the copy() method.
        • Use static analysis tools to identify potential vulnerabilities in the custom code.
        • Follow secure coding practices for object cloning and data handling.

    • 1.1.2 Exploit Missing or Incorrect validateState Implementation [CRITICAL]

      • Description: If the validateState function (if used) is missing, weakly implemented (e.g., incomplete checks, easily bypassed logic), or bypassed entirely, an attacker could set the state to an invalid or malicious value. This is critical because validateState is a primary mechanism for enforcing state integrity.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low-Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement robust validateState functions for all state properties that require validation.
        • Ensure that the validation logic is comprehensive and covers all possible invalid or malicious inputs.
        • Regularly review and test the validateState implementations to ensure their effectiveness.
        • Consider using a schema validation library to enforce stricter data type and format constraints.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Inject Malicious State via External Sources [HIGH-RISK]

  • Overall Description: This path focuses on the attacker's ability to introduce malicious data into the application's state through external inputs. This is a common attack vector in many applications, and Mavericks' reliance on external data for state initialization makes it particularly relevant.

    • 1.2.1 Exploit Unvalidated Input from Arguments/Intents [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Mavericks uses arguments (passed to Fragments/Activities) and Intents to initialize the state of components. If these arguments/Intents are not properly validated and sanitized, an attacker could inject malicious data that corrupts the initial state. This is critical because it allows an attacker to control the state from the very beginning of a component's lifecycle.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Strictly validate and sanitize all input received from arguments/Intents before using them to initialize state.
        • Treat all external input as untrusted.
        • Use a whitelist approach to validation, allowing only known-good values and rejecting everything else.
        • Consider using a type-safe approach to passing arguments (e.g., using a data class with defined types).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Bypass Security Mechanisms Implemented with Mavericks [HIGH-RISK]

  • Overall Description: This high-risk path targets scenarios where security features (like authentication or authorization) are implemented using Mavericks state. If an attacker can manipulate this state, they can bypass these security controls.

  • Sub-Paths:

    • 2.1 Manipulate State to Bypass Authentication/Authorization [HIGH-RISK]: This sub-path focuses specifically on altering state variables related to user authentication and authorization.

    • 2.1.1 Modify User Authentication State [CRITICAL]

      • Description: If the user's authentication status (e.g., "logged in," "logged out," a session token indicator) is stored directly in the Mavericks state, an attacker could attempt to modify this state to bypass authentication checks. This is critical because it could grant the attacker unauthorized access to the application.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low-Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Never store sensitive authentication data (e.g., tokens, passwords) directly in the Mavericks state.
        • Use secure storage mechanisms (e.g., Android Keystore, encrypted SharedPreferences) for sensitive authentication data.
        • Implement authentication checks that are not solely dependent on the Mavericks state. Verify authentication status with a trusted source (e.g., a backend server) whenever possible.
        • Use a well-vetted authentication library instead of rolling your own solution.

    • 2.1.2 Modify User Role/Permission State [CRITICAL]

      • Description: If user roles or permissions (e.g., "admin," "user," "read-only") are stored in the Mavericks state, an attacker could attempt to modify this state to gain elevated privileges. This is critical because it could allow the attacker to perform actions they are not authorized to do.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low-Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement authorization checks that are not solely dependent on the Mavericks state.
        • Validate user roles and permissions from a trusted source (e.g., a backend server) whenever possible, especially before performing sensitive actions.
        • Use a robust authorization library or framework to manage user roles and permissions.
        • Follow the principle of least privilege, granting users only the minimum necessary permissions.