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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for airbnb/mvrx

Attack Surface: State Injection/Manipulation via Debugger (Development Builds)

  • Description: Attackers can exploit the MvRx debugger tool, if inadvertently enabled in production builds, to inspect and directly modify the application's state. This allows for runtime manipulation of application logic and data.
  • How MvRx contributes: MvRx provides a powerful debugger specifically designed to inspect and alter the application state, a central component of MvRx architecture.
  • Example: In a production app with the debugger enabled, an attacker with physical device access uses the debugger to change a user's "isAdmin" state variable to true, granting them administrative privileges without proper authentication.
  • Impact: Critical. Complete compromise of application logic, unauthorized access to sensitive data and functionalities, privilege escalation, and potential for data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if debugger is enabled in production).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Strictly disable the MvRx debugger in release builds. Implement robust build configurations and automated checks to ensure it's disabled for production.
      • Perform rigorous testing of build configurations to verify the debugger is effectively removed from production builds.
      • Educate development teams on the severe risks of enabling debug tools in production environments.

Attack Surface: State Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Parcelization/Serialization)

  • Description: Maliciously crafted parcelized data, when used to restore MvRx state, can exploit deserialization vulnerabilities. This could lead to arbitrary code execution or severe data corruption within the application.
  • How MvRx contributes: MvRx relies on parcelization (or serialization) for saving and restoring state, particularly across configuration changes and process restarts. Vulnerabilities in this process directly impact MvRx applications.
  • Example: An attacker crafts a malicious Parcelable payload that, when deserialized by the application during state restoration, triggers a known deserialization vulnerability in the underlying Java/Kotlin libraries, leading to remote code execution within the application's context.
  • Impact: High. Remote code execution, significant data corruption, denial of service, and potential for complete application takeover.
  • Risk Severity: High (if custom parcelization is implemented insecurely or if underlying platform vulnerabilities exist).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Prefer using standard Android Parcelable implementation for MvRx state objects to minimize the risk of introducing custom deserialization flaws.
      • If custom parcelization is absolutely necessary, conduct thorough security audits and penetration testing of the implementation, specifically focusing on deserialization safety and input validation.
      • Keep dependencies and the Android platform updated to patch known deserialization vulnerabilities in underlying libraries and the operating system.
      • Avoid deserializing state data from untrusted or external sources where possible. If unavoidable, implement strict input validation and sanitization before deserialization.