Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
73 lines (60 loc) · 6.17 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

73 lines (60 loc) · 6.17 KB

Threat Model Analysis for android/nowinandroid

Threat: Data Leakage through Improper Local Data Storage

Description: An attacker could gain unauthorized access to the device and extract sensitive data stored by Nia locally, such as user preferences, cached data, or authentication tokens. This is relevant to Nia because it utilizes local storage for offline capabilities and performance, making improper storage a direct threat. Impact: Confidentiality breach, exposure of user preferences and potentially sensitive information, account takeover if authentication tokens are compromised. Affected Component: data module (specifically data storage mechanisms within repositories and data sources), potentially core-data module if used for shared data storage. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest using Android Keystore.
  • Implement proper file permissions to restrict access to application data.
  • Avoid storing highly sensitive data locally if possible.
  • Regularly audit data storage mechanisms for security vulnerabilities.

Threat: Exposure of API Keys or Secrets in the Client Application

Description: An attacker could reverse engineer the Nia Android application to extract embedded API keys or other secrets used to access backend services. This is a direct threat if Nia's developers mistakenly embed secrets within the application code, which is a common development error. Impact: Unauthorized access to backend services, potential data breaches on the backend, service disruption, financial costs associated with compromised API keys. Affected Component: app module (specifically code that handles API requests and potentially configuration files), potentially remote data sources within data module. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:

  • Never embed API keys or secrets directly in the application code.
  • Utilize a Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) pattern to handle API key management on the server-side.
  • Use secure configuration mechanisms to retrieve secrets at runtime from a secure source.
  • Implement API key rotation and monitoring.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Libraries

Description: Nia relies on external Android libraries. Attackers could exploit known vulnerabilities in these libraries to compromise the application. This is a relevant threat because modern Android development, including Nia, heavily relies on third-party libraries, increasing the attack surface. Impact: Application crash, data breach, remote code execution, denial of service, compromised application functionality. Affected Component: All modules that depend on third-party libraries, primarily app module and feature modules. Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability) Mitigation Strategies:

  • Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for all dependencies.
  • Regularly scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities using dependency-check tools or similar.
  • Keep all third-party libraries updated to their latest secure versions.
  • Implement a process for promptly patching or mitigating identified vulnerabilities.

Threat: Data Deserialization Vulnerabilities

Description: If Nia uses data deserialization to process data from the backend API (e.g., JSON), attackers could exploit vulnerabilities in the deserialization process. This is relevant as Nia likely communicates with a backend API and processes data, making deserialization a potential attack vector. Impact: Remote code execution, denial of service, application crash. Affected Component: remote data sources within data module, network communication layers in core-network module. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:

  • Use secure deserialization libraries and practices.
  • Avoid deserializing untrusted data directly.
  • Implement input validation and sanitization before deserialization.

Threat: Insecure API Communication (Beyond Standard HTTPS)

Description: While HTTPS encrypts data in transit, attackers could exploit weaknesses in other aspects of API communication such as weak authentication/authorization. This is directly relevant to Nia as it interacts with a backend API to fetch content, and weaknesses in API security beyond HTTPS can be exploited. Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access to backend resources, service disruption, account takeover. Affected Component: core-network module, backend API infrastructure, potentially auth module if authentication is handled within Nia. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement robust API authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., OAuth 2.0, JWT).
  • Enforce rate limiting on API endpoints to prevent abuse and denial-of-service attacks.
  • Carefully design API responses to minimize data exposure.
  • Regularly audit API security configurations and access controls.

Threat: Compromised Build Pipeline Dependencies

Description: Attackers could compromise dependencies used in the Nia build pipeline. This is a relevant threat to any modern software project, including Nia, as build pipelines rely on numerous dependencies, creating a potential supply chain attack vector. Impact: Distribution of malware through the official Nia application, compromised user devices, reputational damage, legal liabilities. Affected Component: Build pipeline infrastructure, dependency management system (e.g., Gradle), potentially all modules as the malicious code could be injected into the final application package. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement supply chain security best practices.
  • Use dependency pinning and integrity checks.
  • Regularly audit build pipeline dependencies for vulnerabilities and malicious code.
  • Use trusted and reputable dependency repositories.