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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for android/sunflower

Attack Surface: Deep Linking and Intent Handling

  • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from how Sunflower handles incoming intents, particularly those triggered by deep links defined in nav_graph.xml. This is entirely within Sunflower's control.
    • Sunflower Contribution: Sunflower's use of the Navigation component and its handling of data passed via deep link intents creates this attack surface. The logic within Sunflower's activities/fragments that process intent extras is the key area.
    • Example:
      • Intent Spoofing: A malicious app sends a crafted intent mimicking a legitimate Sunflower deep link, attempting to navigate to a sensitive part of the app or pass malicious data (e.g., a negative plantId or an extremely long string) to trigger an error or unexpected behavior. If Sunflower doesn't validate the plantId or other intent data, it could crash, expose internal data, or perform unintended actions.
    • Impact: Application crash, unexpected navigation, potential data exposure (if internal data is leaked due to an error), potential for unintended actions (if the targeted activity performs actions based on unvalidated intent data).
    • Risk Severity: High (due to the potential for external control over application flow and the possibility of data exposure or unintended actions).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Implement strict input validation on all data received via intents, especially those from deep links. Validate data types, ranges, and expected values. Assume all intent data is potentially malicious.
        • Verify the calling package (if appropriate and feasible) to ensure the intent originates from a trusted source. This adds an extra layer of defense, but shouldn't be the only defense.
        • Avoid performing sensitive actions (database modifications, network requests) directly based on intent data without further authorization or validation. Sanitize and validate before using the data.
        • Use explicit intents whenever possible to limit the scope of potential attacks. This reduces the attack surface by specifying the exact component to handle the intent.
        • Thoroughly test all deep link handlers with various inputs, including malformed and unexpected data, using fuzzing techniques if possible.

Attack Surface: Third-Party Dependencies

  • Description: Vulnerabilities within the external libraries that Sunflower uses (e.g., Glide, Retrofit, Room, Hilt, Kotlin Coroutines, etc.). While not directly Sunflower's code, Sunflower's choice to use these libraries introduces this attack surface.
    • Sunflower Contribution: Sunflower's build.gradle file defines the specific dependencies and versions used. Sunflower's code then calls into these libraries, making it vulnerable to any flaws within them.
    • Example:
      • Vulnerable Library (Remote Code Execution): A hypothetical critical vulnerability in an older version of Retrofit (networking library) could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device if Sunflower makes a network request to a compromised server. Sunflower, by using this vulnerable Retrofit version, inherits this critical vulnerability.
    • Impact: Wide range of potential impacts, depending on the specific vulnerability. Could range from denial-of-service to remote code execution (complete device compromise).
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability; vulnerabilities in widely used libraries are often actively exploited, and RCE vulnerabilities are considered critical).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Regularly update all dependencies to their latest secure versions. This is the most crucial mitigation. Automate this process as much as possible.
        • Use dependency scanning tools (OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, GitHub's Dependabot) to automatically identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies. Integrate these tools into the CI/CD pipeline.
        • Implement a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track and manage dependencies effectively.
        • Consider using a private repository manager to control and vet the dependencies used in the project, adding an extra layer of supply chain security.
        • Pin dependencies to specific, known-good versions, but balance this with the need to update for security patches.