Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
183 lines (122 loc) · 18.5 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

183 lines (122 loc) · 18.5 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for apollographql/apollo-android

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce HTTPS for GraphQL Endpoint

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Configure Apollo Client with HTTPS:** When initializing `ApolloClient` in your Android application, ensure the `serverUrl` is configured to use `https://` protocol. This is typically done during the `ApolloClient.builder()` setup.
    2.  **Verify Endpoint in Code:** Double-check the code where `ApolloClient` is instantiated to confirm that the URL string starts with `https://`. Avoid using variables that could potentially be set to `http://` in production builds.
    3.  **Build Configuration Checks:** If using `BuildConfig` or environment variables to define the GraphQL endpoint, ensure your build configurations strictly enforce `https://` for production builds.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks:** (Severity: High) -  Protects data transmitted by `apollo-android` from interception and modification by attackers positioned between the app and the GraphQL server.
    *   **Eavesdropping:** (Severity: Medium) - Prevents unauthorized parties from reading sensitive data sent and received by `apollo-android` over the network.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks:** Significantly reduces risk for data transmitted via `apollo-android`.
    *   **Eavesdropping:** Significantly reduces risk for data transmitted via `apollo-android`.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Yes, implemented in `AppModule.kt` where `ApolloClient` is initialized using `https` endpoint from `BuildConfig`.

*   **Missing Implementation:** No missing implementation related to `apollo-android` itself.  Ongoing vigilance is needed to ensure no accidental changes to `http` in configuration.

Mitigation Strategy: Validate GraphQL Endpoint Configuration used by Apollo Client

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Validate Endpoint Post-Initialization:** After initializing `ApolloClient` with the configured endpoint, add validation logic to check if the resolved URL is the expected production endpoint.
    2.  **Domain Verification:**  Implement checks to verify the domain part of the `ApolloClient`'s `serverUrl` against a list of allowed production domains.
    3.  **Fail-Fast on Invalid Endpoint:** If the validation fails (e.g., wrong domain, `http` instead of `https` in production), prevent the application from starting or using the `ApolloClient`. Log an error and potentially display an alert.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Accidental Exposure of Staging/Development Data via Apollo:** (Severity: Medium) - Prevents `apollo-android` from unintentionally connecting to a staging or development GraphQL endpoint in production, which could expose sensitive data through the production app using a less secure backend.
    *   **Configuration Errors in Apollo Client Setup:** (Severity: Medium) - Reduces the risk of misconfiguration in `ApolloClient` leading to communication with unintended servers.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Accidental Exposure of Staging/Development Data via Apollo:** Moderately reduces the risk by ensuring `apollo-android` connects to the correct backend.
    *   **Configuration Errors in Apollo Client Setup:** Moderately reduces risk by adding a validation step to `apollo-android`'s configuration.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Partially implemented. Endpoint is configured, but explicit validation of the configured endpoint *after* `ApolloClient` initialization is missing.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Add validation logic immediately after `ApolloClient` is built in `AppModule.kt` to verify the `serverUrl` used by the client.

Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Data Exposure in GraphQL Queries Sent by Apollo Client

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Query Design Review for Apollo Operations:** When designing GraphQL queries and mutations that will be used with `apollo-android`, specifically review them to ensure only necessary fields are requested.
    2.  **Field Selection in Apollo Operations:**  When writing GraphQL operations using Apollo's Kotlin DSL or GraphQL files, consciously select only the required fields. Avoid requesting entire objects or using wildcard selections.
    3.  **Apollo Fragments for Reusable Selections:** Utilize GraphQL fragments with `apollo-android` to reuse field selections, but ensure fragments themselves are designed to minimize data requested.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Data Breaches due to Over-fetching via Apollo:** (Severity: Medium) -  If there's a vulnerability in the app or server, limiting data requested by `apollo-android` reduces the potential scope of a data breach. Less data fetched means less data potentially exposed.
    *   **Unintentional Data Exposure in Apollo Logging/Debugging:** (Severity: Low) - Minimizing data in queries reduces the amount of potentially sensitive data that might be logged during debugging of `apollo-android` operations.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Data Breaches due to Over-fetching via Apollo:** Moderately reduces risk for data fetched using `apollo-android`.
    *   **Unintentional Data Exposure in Apollo Logging/Debugging:** Slightly reduces risk related to `apollo-android`'s logging.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Partially implemented. Developers are generally aware of field selection when writing Apollo operations, but a formal review process is missing.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Implement a formal query review process specifically for GraphQL operations used with `apollo-android`. This can be part of code review checklists.

Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize and Secure Logging of Apollo GraphQL Operations

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Identify Apollo Logging Points:** Locate where GraphQL queries, mutations, and responses from `apollo-android` are logged in the application (e.g., OkHttp interceptors used with `ApolloClient`, error handling around Apollo calls).
    2.  **Sanitize Data in Apollo Logs:** Implement sanitization logic specifically for logging related to `apollo-android`. This includes removing or masking sensitive data from GraphQL queries and responses *before* logging them.
    3.  **Control Logging Levels for Apollo:** Configure log levels to reduce verbosity of `apollo-android` related logging in production. Avoid `DEBUG` level logging of GraphQL operations in production.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Exposure of Sensitive Data in Apollo Operation Logs:** (Severity: High if sensitive data is logged, otherwise Medium) - Unsanitized logs of `apollo-android` operations can expose user credentials, personal information, or API keys if queries or responses contain them.
    *   **Compliance Violations from Apollo Logging:** (Severity: Medium) - Logging sensitive data from `apollo-android` operations might violate data privacy regulations.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Exposure of Sensitive Data in Apollo Operation Logs:** Significantly reduces risk if sanitization is effective for `apollo-android` logs.
    *   **Compliance Violations from Apollo Logging:** Moderately reduces risk by minimizing logging of sensitive data from `apollo-android`.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Partially implemented. Logging is used for debugging, but sanitization of Apollo operation logs is not consistently applied.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Implement data sanitization specifically for logging related to `apollo-android` operations, especially in network interceptors used with `ApolloClient`.

Mitigation Strategy: Handle GraphQL Errors from Apollo Client Gracefully and Securely

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Error Handling in Apollo Callbacks/Coroutines:** Implement robust error handling for GraphQL responses received by `apollo-android` in your application's code (e.g., in `execute()` callbacks, coroutine `catch` blocks).
    2.  **Generic User-Facing Errors for Apollo Operations:** Display user-friendly, generic error messages to users when `apollo-android` operations fail. Avoid showing raw GraphQL error details to end-users.
    3.  **Secure Logging of Apollo Errors (Internal):** Log detailed error information from `apollo-android` (including GraphQL error responses) for debugging, but ensure this logging is secure and sanitized as described in "Sanitize and Secure Logging".

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Information Disclosure through Apollo Error Messages:** (Severity: Medium) - Raw GraphQL error messages from `apollo-android` might reveal server-side implementation details if exposed to users.
    *   **User Experience Degradation due to Apollo Errors:** (Severity: Low to Medium) - Technical error messages from `apollo-android` are confusing for users.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Information Disclosure through Apollo Error Messages:** Moderately reduces risk by preventing direct exposure of server details via `apollo-android` errors.
    *   **User Experience Degradation due to Apollo Errors:** Significantly reduces risk by providing better error messages for `apollo-android` related failures.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Partially implemented. Basic error handling for network errors in Apollo calls exists, but specific handling of GraphQL error responses and sanitization in error logs is missing.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Enhance error handling around `apollo-android` calls to specifically process GraphQL error responses and sanitize error logs. Improve user-facing error messages for Apollo operation failures.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update Apollo Android and Dependencies

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Dependency Management for Apollo:** Use Gradle to manage the `apollo-android` dependency and its transitive dependencies.
    2.  **Regular Apollo Dependency Updates:** Periodically check for and apply updates to the `apollo-android` library and its dependencies using Gradle's dependency management features.
    3.  **Test Apollo Updates:** Thoroughly test the application after updating `apollo-android` to ensure compatibility and prevent regressions in GraphQL functionality.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Apollo Android or Dependencies:** (Severity: High to Critical) - Outdated versions of `apollo-android` or its dependencies may contain known security vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Updating patches these vulnerabilities.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Apollo Android or Dependencies:** Significantly reduces risk of exploiting known vulnerabilities in the `apollo-android` library itself and its dependencies.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Partially implemented. Dependencies are managed with Gradle, but a *regular* update schedule and automated scanning are missing.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Implement a regular schedule for checking and applying updates to `apollo-android` and its dependencies. Consider automated dependency scanning tools.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Proper Caching Strategies in Apollo Client with Security in Mind

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Understand Apollo Caching Mechanisms:**  Learn about `apollo-android`'s normalized cache and HTTP caching and how they are configured.
    2.  **Review Apollo Cache Configuration for Sensitive Data:** Review the default cache configuration in `apollo-android` and consider if it's appropriate for the sensitivity of data fetched via GraphQL.
    3.  **Disable or Limit Apollo Caching for Sensitive Data:** For highly sensitive data fetched using `apollo-android`, consider disabling caching for those specific queries or reducing the cache duration. Configure cache policies within `ApolloClient`.
    4.  **Apollo Cache Invalidation Strategies:** Implement cache invalidation strategies to ensure data cached by `apollo-android` remains fresh and doesn't become stale or insecure.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Exposure of Cached Sensitive Data from Apollo:** (Severity: Medium to High) - If a device is compromised, sensitive data cached by `apollo-android` could be exposed.
    *   **Stale Data Issues from Apollo Cache:** (Severity: Low to Medium) - While less directly a security vulnerability, stale data from `apollo-android`'s cache can lead to incorrect application behavior.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Exposure of Cached Sensitive Data from Apollo:** Moderately reduces risk of exposing cached data from `apollo-android`.
    *   **Stale Data Issues from Apollo Cache:** Slightly reduces risk of issues caused by stale data in `apollo-android`'s cache.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Default Apollo caching is used. Specific configuration for sensitive data or explicit invalidation strategies within `apollo-android` are not implemented.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Review and adjust `apollo-android`'s cache configuration, especially for queries fetching sensitive data. Implement cache invalidation strategies within the application logic using Apollo's cache API.

Mitigation Strategy: Be Aware of Potential Denial of Service (DoS) Risks related to Apollo Queries

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Apollo Query Complexity Awareness:** Be mindful that complex GraphQL queries constructed using `apollo-android` can contribute to server-side DoS risks if the server is not properly protected.
    2.  **Avoid Overly Complex Apollo Queries:**  When designing GraphQL operations in `apollo-android`, avoid creating unnecessarily complex or deeply nested queries that could strain server resources.
    3.  **Client-Side Timeouts for Apollo Requests:** Configure appropriate timeouts for GraphQL requests made by `apollo-android` to prevent the application from hanging indefinitely if the server becomes slow or unresponsive due to DoS attacks.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Client-Side Contribution to Server-Side Denial of Service (via Apollo):** (Severity: Low - Client-side impact is indirect) -  Poorly designed queries from `apollo-android` can exacerbate server-side DoS vulnerabilities.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Client-Side Contribution to Server-Side Denial of Service (via Apollo):** Slightly reduces risk by promoting responsible query design in `apollo-android`.

*   **Currently Implemented:** No specific client-side DoS mitigation related to `apollo-android` beyond standard network error handling and timeouts.

*   **Missing Implementation:**  While server-side protection is primary, educate developers about query complexity in `apollo-android` operations. Ensure reasonable timeouts are configured for `apollo-android`'s network requests.

Mitigation Strategy: Avoid Dynamic Query Construction with User Input in Apollo Operations (If Possible)

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Prefer Apollo Code Generation:**  Utilize Apollo Android's code generation to create type-safe GraphQL operations. This inherently uses parameterized queries and avoids manual string manipulation when using `apollo-android`.
    2.  **Parameterization in Apollo Operations:** When dynamic values are needed in `apollo-android` queries, use GraphQL variables and parameterized queries as provided by Apollo's API. Avoid string concatenation to build queries from user input within `apollo-android` code.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **GraphQL Injection Vulnerabilities in Apollo Operations:** (Severity: Medium to High) - Improper dynamic query construction in `apollo-android` could lead to GraphQL injection if user input is directly embedded in queries without sanitization.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **GraphQL Injection Vulnerabilities in Apollo Operations:** Significantly reduces risk by promoting the use of parameterized queries and code generation within `apollo-android`.

*   **Currently Implemented:** Code generation is used for most Apollo operations, minimizing dynamic query construction.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Audit codebase for any instances of dynamic GraphQL query construction within `apollo-android` usage and refactor to use parameterized queries and code generation.

Mitigation Strategy: Consider Certificate Pinning for Apollo Client's Network Communication (Advanced)

*   **Description:**
    1.  **Implement Certificate Pinning in OkHttp for Apollo:**  Apollo Android uses OkHttp. Implement certificate pinning by configuring OkHttp's `CertificatePinner` within the `ApolloClient.builder()` setup. This will apply certificate pinning to all network requests made by `apollo-android`.
    2.  **Pin Server Certificate used by Apollo:** Configure `CertificatePinner` with the expected certificate or public key of your GraphQL server's certificate, ensuring `apollo-android` only trusts connections to servers with the pinned certificate.

*   **List of Threats Mitigated:**
    *   **Advanced Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks against Apollo Client:** (Severity: High) - Certificate pinning for `apollo-android`'s network requests provides strong protection against advanced MITM attacks, even if certificate authorities are compromised.

*   **Impact:**
    *   **Advanced Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks against Apollo Client:** Significantly reduces risk of sophisticated MITM attacks targeting network communication initiated by `apollo-android`.

*   **Currently Implemented:** No, certificate pinning is not currently implemented for `apollo-android`'s network requests.

*   **Missing Implementation:** Implement certificate pinning by configuring OkHttp's `CertificatePinner` when building the `ApolloClient` in `AppModule.kt`.