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Attack Tree Analysis for coil-kt/coil

Objective: To cause a denial-of-service (DoS) or execute arbitrary code within the application context by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Coil image loading library.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      **Compromise Application using Coil**
                                                  |
        -------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |                                                                       |
    **Denial of Service (DoS)**                                     **Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)**
        |                                                                       |
    ---------------------                                             --------------------------------
    |                                                                 |
1. **Resource Exhaustion**                                       5. **Vulnerability in**
    (Memory/CPU)  [HIGH RISK]                                     **Image Decoding**
        |                                                                 **(e.g., libpng,**
    =============                                                     **libjpeg-turbo)** [HIGH RISK]
    |           |                                                                 |
1a. **Large    1b. Many                                                         5a. **Known CVEs**
    Images**      Requests                                                     **in Dependencies**
    **(OOM)**       (CPU/                                                         **(e.g., CVE-2023-**
    [HIGH RISK]   Network)                                                       **XXXXX)**
    |||          |||
    |||          |||
    |||
    |||
    |||

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) - Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK]

  • Critical Nodes:

    • Resource Exhaustion (Memory/CPU): The overarching goal of the DoS attack, aiming to make the application or system unavailable.
    • Large Images (OOM): A specific and highly effective method to achieve resource exhaustion by causing an OutOfMemoryError.
    • Many Requests (CPU/Network): Another method, though slightly less direct, involving overwhelming the system with numerous requests.

  • High-Risk Path: Compromise Application using Coil -> Denial of Service (DoS) -> Resource Exhaustion -> Large Images (OOM)

  • Attack Vector Details:

    • 1a. Large Images (OOM):

      • Description: An attacker provides, either through direct upload or by referencing a URL, an extremely large image (e.g., in terms of dimensions or file size) to the application. Coil attempts to load this image into memory, exceeding available resources and leading to an OutOfMemoryError (OOM), crashing the application.
      • Likelihood: High (if no size limits are in place) / Medium (if basic client-side limits exist) / Low (if robust server-side limits are enforced)
      • Impact: High (application crash, service unavailability)
      • Effort: Very Low (finding or creating a large image is trivial)
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy (application crashes, monitoring alerts)
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict server-side image size and dimension limits before passing the image to Coil.
        • Utilize Coil's Downsampling feature to reduce image size before loading.
        • Monitor application memory usage and set alerts.
        • Configure resource limits (e.g., Docker, Kubernetes).
        • Use Bitmap.Config.HARDWARE judiciously, as it prevents downsampling.

    • 1b. Many Requests (CPU/Network):

      • Description: The attacker floods the application with a large number of image loading requests. This overwhelms the server's CPU, network bandwidth, or Coil's internal request handling, leading to performance degradation or complete service unavailability.
      • Likelihood: Medium (depends on existing rate limiting and infrastructure)
      • Impact: Medium to High (performance degradation, potential service unavailability)
      • Effort: Low to Medium (requires scripting or tools, but readily available)
      • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires monitoring of request rates and resource usage)
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement robust rate limiting (preferably at the network edge).
        • Configure Coil's request queue with reasonable limits.
        • Utilize HTTP caching (Cache-Control, ETag) and Coil's caching.
        • Ensure proper connection pooling in the underlying HTTP client.

Attack Tree Path: Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) - Vulnerability in Image Decoding [HIGH RISK]

  • Critical Nodes:

    • Vulnerability in Image Decoding (e.g., libpng, libjpeg-turbo): The core vulnerability that allows code execution, residing within the libraries Coil uses for image processing.
    • Known CVEs in Dependencies (e.g., CVE-2023-XXXXX): Specific, documented vulnerabilities in these libraries that can be exploited.

  • High-Risk Path: Compromise Application using Coil -> Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) -> Vulnerability in Image Decoding -> Known CVEs in Dependencies

  • Attack Vector Details:

    • 5a. Known CVEs in Dependencies:
      • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious image file that exploits a known vulnerability (identified by a CVE) in one of Coil's image decoding dependencies (e.g., libpng, libjpeg-turbo, OkHttp). When Coil attempts to decode this image, the vulnerability is triggered, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the application's context.
      • Likelihood: Medium (depends on the frequency of vulnerabilities in dependencies and update practices)
      • Impact: Very High (complete system compromise)
      • Effort: Low to Medium (exploit code may be publicly available)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (depends on the complexity of the exploit)
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (vulnerability scanners can detect known CVEs) / Hard (if the exploit is actively used in a sophisticated attack)
      • Mitigation:
        • Use Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools to scan for vulnerable dependencies.
        • Regularly update all dependencies, including Coil and its transitive dependencies.
        • Subscribe to security advisories for Coil and its key dependencies.
        • Consider image validation before passing to Coil (but don't rely solely on it).
        • For extremely high-security scenarios, isolate image processing.