Mitigation Strategy: Image Source Validation and Restrictions (Coil-Specific)
-
Description:
- Create a Custom Fetcher Factory: Extend Coil's
Fetcher.Factory
to intercept image requests before Coil attempts to fetch them. This is the core Coil-specific part.class ValidatingFetcherFactory : Fetcher.Factory<Uri> { override fun create(data: Uri, options: Options, imageLoader: ImageLoader): Fetcher? { if (!ImageSourceValidator.isAllowed(data.toString())) { return null // Prevent loading // OR throw InvalidImageSourceException("URL not allowed: $data") } // Delegate to the default HTTP fetcher if allowed. return HttpUriFetcher.Factory().create(data, options, imageLoader) } }
- Integrate into ImageLoader: Build a custom
ImageLoader
and add theValidatingFetcherFactory
. This is how you tell Coil to use your custom validation logic.val imageLoader = ImageLoader.Builder(context) .components { add(ValidatingFetcherFactory()) } // ... other configurations ... .build()
- Use the Custom ImageLoader: Use this
imageLoader
instance exclusively throughout your application when loading images with Coil. This ensures all image loads go through your validation.
- Create a Custom Fetcher Factory: Extend Coil's
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (High Severity): Prevents Coil from loading images from arbitrary, potentially malicious sources.
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Critical Severity): Reduces the attack surface for exploiting decoder vulnerabilities by limiting the origin of images.
- Data Leakage (Medium to High Severity): Prevents Coil from accessing unauthorized resources.
- Phishing/Malware Delivery (High Severity): Reduces the risk of Coil loading images from malicious sites.
-
Impact:
- All listed threats: Risk significantly reduced. This is a fundamental mitigation for using Coil securely.
-
Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. The
ImageSourceValidator
(allowlist logic) exists, but the customFetcher.Factory
and customImageLoader
are not implemented. The defaultImageLoader
is being used. -
Missing Implementation: The
ValidatingFetcherFactory
needs to be created and integrated into a customImageLoader
. The application needs to be refactored to use this customImageLoader
.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Image Decoding (Coil Configuration)
-
Description:
- Robust Error Handling (Coil's Listeners): Within your
ImageRequest
listeners (or a customEventListener
), handleErrorResult
and other error states gracefully. This is done directly within your Coil usage.val request = ImageRequest.Builder(context) .data("https://example.com/image.jpg") .listener( onError = { _, errorResult -> Log.e("Coil", "Image loading failed: ${errorResult.throwable.message}", errorResult.throwable) // Display a user-friendly error (no sensitive details). // Potentially retry with a backoff strategy. } ) .build()
- Limit Image Size (Coil's
size
method): Set maximum dimensions using thesize()
method in yourImageRequest.Builder
. This is a direct Coil configuration.val request = ImageRequest.Builder(context) .data("https://example.com/image.jpg") .size(1024, 768) // Limit dimensions to 1024x768 .build()
- Configure Memory and Disk Cache Sizes (Coil's
ImageLoader
Builder): Set maximum sizes for the memory and disk caches within yourImageLoader.Builder
.val imageLoader = ImageLoader.Builder(context) .memoryCache { MemoryCache.Builder(context) .maxSizeBytes(10 * 1024 * 1024) // 10MB max memory cache .build() } .diskCache { DiskCache.Builder() .directory(context.cacheDir.resolve("image_cache")) .maxSizeBytes(50 * 1024 * 1024) // 50MB max disk cache .build() } .build()
- Robust Error Handling (Coil's Listeners): Within your
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Critical Severity): While this doesn't prevent RCE, robust error handling helps contain the damage and provides valuable debugging information.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (High Severity): Limiting image size and handling errors prevents crashes and resource exhaustion.
- Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Proper error handling prevents leaking sensitive information through error messages.
-
Impact:
- RCE: Impact is primarily on containment and debugging, not prevention.
- DoS: Risk significantly reduced.
- Information Disclosure: Risk reduced.
-
Currently Implemented: Minimal error handling is in place, but it's not comprehensive. Image size limits are not implemented. Cache size limits are not implemented.
-
Missing Implementation: Comprehensive error handling needs to be implemented in
ImageRequest
listeners. Image size limits need to be added toImageRequest.Builder
calls. Cache size limits need to be configured in theImageLoader.Builder
.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Caching (Coil's Cache Policies)
-
Description:
- Choose Appropriate Cache Policies (Coil's
CachePolicy
): UseCachePolicy
strategically within yourImageRequest.Builder
. This is a direct Coil configuration.val request = ImageRequest.Builder(context) .data("https://example.com/sensitive_image.jpg") .diskCachePolicy(CachePolicy.READ_ONLY) // Or DISABLED .memoryCachePolicy(CachePolicy.DISABLED) .build() val request2 = ImageRequest.Builder(context) // For less sensitive images .data("https://example.com/public_image.jpg") .diskCachePolicy(CachePolicy.ENABLED) .memoryCachePolicy(CachePolicy.ENABLED) .build()
- Clear the cache programmatically (Coil API): Use Coil's API to clear the cache.
// In your settings activity or a utility class: fun clearImageCache(context: Context) { val imageLoader = context.imageLoader // Get your ImageLoader instance imageLoader.memoryCache?.clear() imageLoader.diskCache?.clear() }
- Choose Appropriate Cache Policies (Coil's
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Data Leakage (Medium to High Severity): Using appropriate cache policies and providing a clearing mechanism reduces the risk.
-
Impact:
- Data Leakage: Risk reduced.
-
Currently Implemented: Default cache policies (
CachePolicy.ENABLED
) are being used for all images. There is no programmatic cache clearing. -
Missing Implementation: Cache policies need to be reviewed and adjusted on a per-request basis using
ImageRequest.Builder
. A function to clear the cache using Coil's API needs to be implemented.
Mitigation Strategy: Network Security (Coil + OkHttp Configuration)
-
Description:
- Implement Certificate Pinning (Using OkHttp with Coil): This involves configuring OkHttp, which Coil uses under the hood.
- Configure CertificatePinner:
val certificatePinner = CertificatePinner.Builder() .add("example.com", "sha256/your_pin_here") // Replace .add("cdn.example.com", "sha256/your_cdn_pin_here") .build()
- Create a Custom OkHttpClient:
val okHttpClient = OkHttpClient.Builder() .certificatePinner(certificatePinner) // ... other OkHttp configurations ... .build()
- Use the Custom OkHttpClient with Coil: This is the crucial Coil-specific step.
val imageLoader = ImageLoader.Builder(context) .okHttpClient(okHttpClient) // Tell Coil to use your OkHttpClient // ... other ImageLoader configurations ... .build()
- Configure CertificatePinner:
- Implement Certificate Pinning (Using OkHttp with Coil): This involves configuring OkHttp, which Coil uses under the hood.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (Critical Severity): Certificate pinning prevents attackers from using compromised CAs.
- Data Tampering (High Severity): Ensures image integrity.
- Data Leakage (High Severity): Prevents interception of image data.
-
Impact:
- MitM Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.
- Data Tampering/Leakage: Risk significantly reduced.
-
Currently Implemented: Certificate pinning is not implemented. The default
OkHttpClient
is being used. -
Missing Implementation: A custom
OkHttpClient
withCertificatePinner
needs to be created and then passed to theImageLoader.Builder
usingokHttpClient()
.