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Attack Surface Analysis for cymchad/baserecyclerviewadapterhelper

  • Description: Injection of malicious scripts or content into displayed list items due to the developer directly binding unsanitized user input to views within the RecyclerView using the library's adapter mechanisms.
  • How BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper Contributes: The library's core function is to bind data to views in the RecyclerView. It provides the onBindViewHolder method and related helper functions. If a developer uses these to display unsanitized user input directly (without proper encoding or sanitization), XSS is possible. This is a direct misuse of the library's data-binding capabilities.
  • Example: A chat application uses BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper. The onBindViewHolder method directly sets the text of a TextView with a user-provided message: holder.messageTextView.setText(message.getText());. If message.getText() contains <script>alert('XSS')</script>, and no sanitization is performed, the script will execute.
  • Impact:
    • Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the user's context.
    • Theft of cookies and session tokens.
    • Redirection to malicious websites.
    • Defacement of the application.
    • Phishing attacks.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if user input is displayed) / High (if potentially controllable data is displayed).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Never Trust User Input: Treat all data from external sources (user input, network responses, etc.) as potentially malicious.
      • Context-Specific Output Encoding: Always encode data before displaying it in the RecyclerView using the library's binding methods. Use the correct encoding for the context (HTML encoding for TextViews, etc.). This is the primary defense.
      • Sanitization Libraries: Use a dedicated HTML sanitization library (e.g., OWASP Java Encoder, jsoup) to remove dangerous HTML tags and attributes. This is stronger than simple encoding.
      • Input Validation: Validate input before it's even stored, rejecting anything that doesn't conform to expected formats.
    • User: (No direct mitigation; relies entirely on the developer's secure implementation).
  • Description: Launching malicious Intents due to the developer using unvalidated data from the RecyclerView items within the library's OnItemClickListener (or similar callbacks) to construct Intents.
  • How BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper Contributes: The library provides callbacks like OnItemClickListener that give the developer access to the data associated with the clicked item. If the developer uses this data directly and without validation to construct an Intent, this creates a vulnerability. This is a direct misuse of the library's event handling mechanism.
  • Example: A list displays URLs. The OnItemClickListener in BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper is used: adapter.setOnItemClickListener((adapter, view, position) -> { String url = getItem(position).getUrl(); startActivity(new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, Uri.parse(url))); });. If getItem(position).getUrl() returns a malicious Intent URI (e.g., intent://...), it will be launched.
  • Impact:
    • Launching arbitrary activities (potentially with elevated privileges).
    • Accessing protected components.
    • Data leakage or modification.
    • Potentially arbitrary code execution (depending on the Intent target).
  • Risk Severity: High / Critical (depending on the potential targets).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Never Construct Intents from Unvalidated Data: This is the most crucial point. Do not use raw data from the item directly in the Intent.
      • Whitelist Allowed Actions: Use a whitelist of allowed actions and components for Intents.
      • Explicit Intents: Use explicit Intents (specifying the target component by class name) whenever possible.
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: If data from the item must be included, rigorously validate and sanitize it before adding it to the Intent.
    • User: (No direct mitigation).