- Description: Injection of malicious scripts or content into displayed list items due to the developer directly binding unsanitized user input to views within the
RecyclerView
using the library's adapter mechanisms. - How BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper Contributes: The library's core function is to bind data to views in the
RecyclerView
. It provides theonBindViewHolder
method and related helper functions. If a developer uses these to display unsanitized user input directly (without proper encoding or sanitization), XSS is possible. This is a direct misuse of the library's data-binding capabilities. - Example: A chat application uses
BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper
. TheonBindViewHolder
method directly sets the text of aTextView
with a user-provided message:holder.messageTextView.setText(message.getText());
. Ifmessage.getText()
contains<script>alert('XSS')</script>
, and no sanitization is performed, the script will execute. - Impact:
- Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the user's context.
- Theft of cookies and session tokens.
- Redirection to malicious websites.
- Defacement of the application.
- Phishing attacks.
- Risk Severity: Critical (if user input is displayed) / High (if potentially controllable data is displayed).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer:
- Never Trust User Input: Treat all data from external sources (user input, network responses, etc.) as potentially malicious.
- Context-Specific Output Encoding: Always encode data before displaying it in the
RecyclerView
using the library's binding methods. Use the correct encoding for the context (HTML encoding forTextViews
, etc.). This is the primary defense. - Sanitization Libraries: Use a dedicated HTML sanitization library (e.g., OWASP Java Encoder, jsoup) to remove dangerous HTML tags and attributes. This is stronger than simple encoding.
- Input Validation: Validate input before it's even stored, rejecting anything that doesn't conform to expected formats.
- User: (No direct mitigation; relies entirely on the developer's secure implementation).
- Developer:
Attack Surface: Improper Intent Handling (via Unvalidated Data in Callbacks)
- Description: Launching malicious
Intents
due to the developer using unvalidated data from theRecyclerView
items within the library'sOnItemClickListener
(or similar callbacks) to constructIntents
. - How BaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper Contributes: The library provides callbacks like
OnItemClickListener
that give the developer access to the data associated with the clicked item. If the developer uses this data directly and without validation to construct anIntent
, this creates a vulnerability. This is a direct misuse of the library's event handling mechanism. - Example: A list displays URLs. The
OnItemClickListener
inBaseRecyclerViewAdapterHelper
is used:adapter.setOnItemClickListener((adapter, view, position) -> { String url = getItem(position).getUrl(); startActivity(new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, Uri.parse(url))); });
. IfgetItem(position).getUrl()
returns a maliciousIntent
URI (e.g.,intent://...
), it will be launched. - Impact:
- Launching arbitrary activities (potentially with elevated privileges).
- Accessing protected components.
- Data leakage or modification.
- Potentially arbitrary code execution (depending on the
Intent
target).
- Risk Severity: High / Critical (depending on the potential targets).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer:
- Never Construct Intents from Unvalidated Data: This is the most crucial point. Do not use raw data from the item directly in the
Intent
. - Whitelist Allowed Actions: Use a whitelist of allowed actions and components for
Intents
. - Explicit Intents: Use explicit
Intents
(specifying the target component by class name) whenever possible. - Input Validation and Sanitization: If data from the item must be included, rigorously validate and sanitize it before adding it to the
Intent
.
- Never Construct Intents from Unvalidated Data: This is the most crucial point. Do not use raw data from the item directly in the
- User: (No direct mitigation).
- Developer: