Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update element-android
Library
-
Description:
- Monitor Release Channels: Subscribe to the
element-hq/element-android
GitHub repository's release notifications or watch for announcements on relevant developer channels for Element. - Check for Updates Regularly: Periodically (e.g., weekly or bi-weekly) check for new releases of
element-android
on GitHub or through your dependency management tool (like Gradle in Android Studio). - Review Release Notes: Carefully read the release notes for each new version to understand bug fixes, new features, and, most importantly, security patches specifically for
element-android
. - Update Dependency Version: Modify your project's
build.gradle
file to update theelement-android
dependency to the latest stable version. - Test Thoroughly: After updating, perform comprehensive testing of your application to ensure compatibility with the new library version and to catch any regressions introduced by the update in the context of
element-android
usage.
- Monitor Release Channels: Subscribe to the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
element-android
(High Severity): Exploits targeting publicly disclosed security flaws within theelement-android
library code itself. - Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies used by
element-android
(Medium Severity): Security issues in libraries thatelement-android
depends on, which can indirectly affect your application through the library.
- Known Vulnerabilities in
-
Impact:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
element-android
: High Reduction. Updating directly patches identified vulnerabilities withinelement-android
, eliminating the exploit vector. - Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies used by
element-android
: Medium Reduction. Updatingelement-android
often includes updates to its dependencies, indirectly addressing some transitive vulnerabilities. However, direct dependency scanning is still recommended for comprehensive coverage.
- Known Vulnerabilities in
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented: Dependency management systems like Gradle make updating dependencies technically straightforward. GitHub release notifications are available for
element-android
.
- Partially Implemented: Dependency management systems like Gradle make updating dependencies technically straightforward. GitHub release notifications are available for
-
Missing Implementation:
- Proactive Monitoring and Regular Updates: Teams may not have a dedicated process for regularly checking for and applying
element-android
updates. Manual review of release notes and thorough testing after updates specific toelement-android
functionality might be skipped due to time constraints.
- Proactive Monitoring and Regular Updates: Teams may not have a dedicated process for regularly checking for and applying
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Dependency Scanning
-
Description:
- Choose a Dependency Scanning Tool: Select a suitable dependency scanning tool (e.g., OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, Sonatype Nexus Lifecycle, GitHub Dependency Scanning) that can analyze Android projects and Gradle dependencies, including
element-android
. - Integrate into Development Pipeline: Configure the chosen tool to scan your project's dependencies, specifically including
element-android
and its transitive dependencies, during the build process (e.g., as part of your CI/CD pipeline or as a pre-commit hook). - Configure Vulnerability Thresholds: Set up vulnerability severity thresholds in the scanning tool to define what level of vulnerabilities reported for
element-android
or its dependencies should trigger alerts or build failures (e.g., only flag High and Critical vulnerabilities). - Review Scan Results: Regularly review the reports generated by the dependency scanning tool, focusing on vulnerabilities reported in
element-android
or its dependency tree. Investigate reported vulnerabilities, understand their potential impact on your application's use ofelement-android
, and prioritize remediation. - Remediate Vulnerabilities: Address identified vulnerabilities related to
element-android
by:- Updating
element-android
or the vulnerable dependency to a patched version (if available). - Applying workarounds or patches specific to the vulnerability in the context of
element-android
usage if a direct update is not possible. - Considering alternatives to using the vulnerable feature of
element-android
or its dependency if no other solution is feasible.
- Updating
- Choose a Dependency Scanning Tool: Select a suitable dependency scanning tool (e.g., OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, Sonatype Nexus Lifecycle, GitHub Dependency Scanning) that can analyze Android projects and Gradle dependencies, including
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
element-android
(High Severity): Proactively identifies known flaws inelement-android
before they can be exploited in your application. - Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies of
element-android
(High Severity): Crucially detects vulnerabilities in libraries indirectly used by your application throughelement-android
, which could still impact your application's security when usingelement-android
.
- Known Vulnerabilities in
-
Impact:
- Known Vulnerabilities in
element-android
: High Reduction. Early detection allows for patchingelement-android
before deployment, preventing exploitation of its vulnerabilities. - Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies of
element-android
: High Reduction. Provides critical visibility into the security posture of the entire dependency tree related toelement-android
, enabling timely mitigation of indirect vulnerabilities affecting your use of the library.
- Known Vulnerabilities in
-
Currently Implemented:
- Potentially Missing: Dependency scanning, especially focused on the specific dependencies of
element-android
, might not be implemented in all projects.
- Potentially Missing: Dependency scanning, especially focused on the specific dependencies of
-
Missing Implementation:
- Integration into CI/CD with focus on
element-android
: Dependency scanning might not be fully integrated into the automated build and deployment pipeline, specifically configured to monitorelement-android
and its dependencies. - Consistent Review and Remediation Process for
element-android
vulnerabilities: Even with scanning in place, a clear process for reviewing scan results related toelement-android
and systematically remediating identified vulnerabilities might be lacking.
- Integration into CI/CD with focus on
Mitigation Strategy: Monitor element-android
Security Advisories
-
Description:
- Watch GitHub Repository: "Watch" the
element-hq/element-android
GitHub repository and enable notifications specifically for security advisories related toelement-android
. - Subscribe to Mailing Lists/Forums: If available, subscribe to any official mailing lists or developer forums related to Element and
element-android
where security announcements specific to the library might be posted. - Follow Security News Sources: Keep an eye on general cybersecurity news sources and vulnerability databases (like CVE, NVD) for mentions of
element-android
vulnerabilities. - Establish Internal Communication Channel: Set up an internal communication channel (e.g., a dedicated Slack channel or email list) to disseminate security advisories related to
element-android
to the development and security teams promptly. - Act on Advisories: When a security advisory for
element-android
is released, immediately assess its impact on your application's usage of the library, prioritize mitigation efforts, and follow the recommended actions (e.g., update library, apply workaround specific toelement-android
).
- Watch GitHub Repository: "Watch" the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in
element-android
(Critical Severity): Provides early warning of newly discovered vulnerabilities inelement-android
before they are widely exploited. - Emerging Threats in Matrix Protocol impacting
element-android
(Medium to High Severity): Alerts to potential protocol-level weaknesses that might directly affectelement-android
's security.
- Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in
-
Impact:
- Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in
element-android
: Medium Reduction. Provides crucial time to react and prepare mitigations forelement-android
specific vulnerabilities, but complete protection depends on the availability of patches or workarounds from the Element team. - Emerging Threats in Matrix Protocol impacting
element-android
: Medium Reduction. Allows for proactive assessment and planning for protocol-level changes or mitigations that might be required in your application's integration withelement-android
.
- Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented: GitHub watching is a common practice for developers.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Formalized Monitoring Process for
element-android
Advisories: A dedicated and systematic process for monitoring advisories specifically forelement-android
and ensuring timely action might be missing. Relying solely on individual developers watching repositories might be insufficient. - Internal Communication and Response Plan for
element-android
Security Issues: A clear plan for communicating security advisories related toelement-android
internally and coordinating a response (patchingelement-android
, testing, deployment) might not be in place.
- Formalized Monitoring Process for
Mitigation Strategy: Pin Dependency Versions
-
Description:
- Specify Exact Versions: In your project's
build.gradle
file, instead of using version ranges (e.g.,implementation "org.matrix.android:element-android:1.x.x"
), specify exact versions forelement-android
and its critical dependencies that are directly managed by you (if any) (e.g.,implementation "org.matrix.android:element-android:1.2.3"
). Letelement-android
manage its own transitive dependencies as intended by its developers. - Regularly Review and Update: Periodically (e.g., quarterly or semi-annually), review your pinned
element-android
version. Check for newer stable versions that include security patches and bug fixes forelement-android
. - Controlled Updates: When updating the pinned
element-android
version, do so in a controlled manner. Updateelement-android
version, test thoroughly after the update, and monitor for any regressions or compatibility issues specifically related to your application's integration withelement-android
.
- Specify Exact Versions: In your project's
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unexpected Updates of
element-android
Introducing Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): Prevents automatic updates to newer versions ofelement-android
that might inadvertently introduce new vulnerabilities or break existing security features within the library itself. - Build Reproducibility Issues related to
element-android
(Low Severity - Security Related): Ensures consistent builds over time when usingelement-android
, which is important for security auditing and incident response related to issues potentially originating from the library.
- Unexpected Updates of
-
Impact:
- Unexpected Updates of
element-android
Introducing Vulnerabilities: Medium Reduction. Provides control overelement-android
updates, allowing for testing and validation before adopting new versions, reducing the risk of regressions or new vulnerabilities in the library affecting your application. - Build Reproducibility Issues related to
element-android
: Low Reduction. Improves build consistency when usingelement-android
, which indirectly aids in security analysis and incident investigation related to the library.
- Unexpected Updates of
-
Currently Implemented:
- Common Practice: Pinning dependency versions, including
element-android
, is a generally recommended practice in software development for stability and reproducibility.
- Common Practice: Pinning dependency versions, including
-
Missing Implementation:
- Regular Review and Update Cadence for
element-android
: The process of regularly reviewing and updating the pinnedelement-android
version might be neglected, leading to projects running on outdated and potentially vulnerable versions ofelement-android
over time.
- Regular Review and Update Cadence for
Mitigation Strategy: Enforce End-to-End Encryption (E2EE)
-
Description:
- Enable E2EE by Default: Configure your application to enable E2EE by default for all private conversations initiated through
element-android
. This might involve setting specific configuration options within theelement-android
library initialization or user interface settings provided byelement-android
. - Educate Users on E2EE within
element-android
context: Provide clear and accessible information to users about the benefits of E2EE as implemented inelement-android
and how it protects their communication privacy within your application. Encourage them to keep E2EE enabled. - Promote Device Verification using
element-android
features: Guide users through the process of verifying their devices using cross-signing within the Element ecosystem, leveraging features provided byelement-android
. This strengthens E2EE by ensuring only trusted devices, as managed byelement-android
, have access to decryption keys. - Monitor E2EE Status using
element-android
APIs: Implement mechanisms within your application to visually indicate the E2EE status of conversations to users (e.g., using lock icons), potentially using APIs provided byelement-android
to determine E2EE status. Alert users if E2EE is not active in a conversation where it is expected within theelement-android
context.
- Enable E2EE by Default: Configure your application to enable E2EE by default for all private conversations initiated through
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Message Interception by Server Administrators (High Severity): Prevents server administrators or malicious actors who compromise the server from reading message content of conversations handled by
element-android
. - Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Server (High Severity): Protects message confidentiality of communications through
element-android
even if an attacker intercepts communication between the client and the Matrix homeserver. - Data Breaches on Server (High Severity): Limits the impact of server-side data breaches by ensuring message content handled by
element-android
remains encrypted even if the server database is compromised.
- Message Interception by Server Administrators (High Severity): Prevents server administrators or malicious actors who compromise the server from reading message content of conversations handled by
-
Impact:
- Message Interception by Server Administrators: High Reduction. E2EE, as implemented in
element-android
and Matrix, is designed to fundamentally prevent server-side decryption of messages. - Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Server: High Reduction. E2EE ensures that even if communication is intercepted, the attacker cannot decrypt the message content without the correct keys managed by
element-android
. - Data Breaches on Server: High Reduction. Significantly reduces the risk of sensitive message data being exposed in a server breach, as the data handled by
element-android
is encrypted at rest on the server.
- Message Interception by Server Administrators: High Reduction. E2EE, as implemented in
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented:
element-android
provides robust E2EE capabilities based on Matrix. However, enforcing it by default and user education are application-level responsibilities when integratingelement-android
.
- Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Default E2EE Configuration within Application using
element-android
: Applications might not explicitly configureelement-android
to enable E2EE by default for all private conversations. - User Education and Device Verification Promotion specific to
element-android
: Applications might lack clear user guidance and prompts to encourage device verification and understanding of E2EE within the context of usingelement-android
. - E2EE Status Monitoring and User Feedback within Application UI using
element-android
: Visual indicators and alerts about E2EE status, potentially leveragingelement-android
APIs, might not be consistently implemented in the application's UI.
- Default E2EE Configuration within Application using
Mitigation Strategy: Validate Server Certificates
-
Description:
- Use Secure Networking Libraries (likely used by
element-android
): Ensure your application andelement-android
(which likely uses them internally) rely on secure networking libraries (likeOkHttp
in Android) that perform TLS/SSL certificate validation by default. - Configure Certificate Validation (if configurable in
element-android
integration): If there are configuration options within your application's integration withelement-android
related to certificate validation, verify that certificate validation is enabled and properly configured. Avoid disabling certificate validation for convenience or testing purposes in production builds when usingelement-android
. - Consider Certificate Pinning (Optional but Recommended for High Security, if supported by
element-android
integration): For enhanced security, especially against sophisticated attacks or compromised Certificate Authorities, consider implementing certificate pinning if your integration withelement-android
allows for it. This would involve embedding the expected server certificate or its public key within your application and verifying that the Matrix server presented byelement-android
presents this pinned certificate during TLS handshake. - Handle Certificate Validation Errors (potentially exposed by
element-android
): Implement proper error handling for certificate validation failures that might be exposed or detectable through your application's interaction withelement-android
. Inform the user about the potential security risk and prevent connection establishment if certificate validation fails whenelement-android
attempts to connect. Allow users to report certificate issues encountered when usingelement-android
.
- Use Secure Networking Libraries (likely used by
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (High Severity): Prevents attackers from intercepting and eavesdropping on communication between the client (using
element-android
) and the Matrix homeserver by forging server certificates. - Impersonation of Matrix Homeserver (High Severity): Ensures the client (using
element-android
) is connecting to the legitimate Matrix homeserver and not a malicious server impersonating it.
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (High Severity): Prevents attackers from intercepting and eavesdropping on communication between the client (using
-
Impact:
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: High Reduction. Certificate validation is a fundamental defense against MITM attacks on TLS/SSL connections established by
element-android
. - Impersonation of Matrix Homeserver: High Reduction. Authenticates the server's identity, preventing connection to rogue or malicious servers through
element-android
.
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: High Reduction. Certificate validation is a fundamental defense against MITM attacks on TLS/SSL connections established by
-
Currently Implemented:
- Largely Implemented: Secure networking libraries in Android generally perform certificate validation by default, and
element-android
likely relies on these libraries.
- Largely Implemented: Secure networking libraries in Android generally perform certificate validation by default, and
-
Missing Implementation:
- Explicit Verification of Configuration related to
element-android
: Developers might not explicitly verify that certificate validation is enabled and correctly configured in their application's networking setup, especially in relation to howelement-android
handles connections. - Certificate Pinning for
element-android
connections: Certificate pinning, while highly recommended for sensitive applications, is often not implemented due to complexity and maintenance overhead, and might require specific integration points withelement-android
if supported. - Robust Error Handling and User Feedback for
element-android
certificate issues: Error handling for certificate validation failures encountered byelement-android
might be basic or insufficient from the application's perspective, and user feedback mechanisms for reporting certificate issues related toelement-android
connections might be lacking.
- Explicit Verification of Configuration related to
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Rate Limiting
-
Description:
- Identify Rate Limiting Points relevant to
element-android
usage: Determine the critical API endpoints or functionalities within your application that interact with the Matrix homeserver throughelement-android
and are susceptible to abuse (e.g., message sending, login attempts, room creation initiated viaelement-android
). - Implement Client-Side Rate Limiting (Basic) around
element-android
usage: Implement basic rate limiting on the client-side to prevent users from sending excessive requests throughelement-android
in a short period. This can be a simple delay or throttling mechanism applied to actions performed usingelement-android
. - Encourage Server-Side Rate Limiting (Crucial for Matrix Homeserver): Advise users or administrators deploying Matrix homeservers that will be used with your application and
element-android
to configure robust rate limiting on the server-side. This is the primary defense against DoS attacks targeting the homeserver from any client, including those usingelement-android
. - Communicate Rate Limits to Users interacting with
element-android
: If client-side rate limiting is implemented aroundelement-android
usage, provide clear feedback to users when they are being rate-limited, explaining the reason (related to excessive actions viaelement-android
) and suggesting they try again later.
- Identify Rate Limiting Points relevant to
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Client-Side Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks initiated via
element-android
(Medium Severity): Prevents a malicious or compromised client from overwhelming the Matrix homeserver with excessive requests throughelement-android
. - Resource Exhaustion on Homeserver due to clients using
element-android
(Medium Severity): Reduces the impact of DoS attacks on the homeserver, preventing resource exhaustion and service disruption for all users, including those using your application withelement-android
.
- Client-Side Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks initiated via
-
Impact:
- Client-Side Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks initiated via
element-android
: Medium Reduction. Client-side rate limiting provides a basic level of protection but is easily bypassed if the attacker controls the client application usingelement-android
. - Resource Exhaustion on Homeserver due to clients using
element-android
: Medium Reduction. Server-side rate limiting is much more effective in protecting the homeserver, but client-side limits can contribute to reducing overall load originating from clients usingelement-android
.
- Client-Side Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks initiated via
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented:
element-android
itself might have some internal rate limiting mechanisms to prevent accidental abuse. Server-side rate limiting is a standard security practice for Matrix homeservers.
- Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Explicit Client-Side Rate Limiting Configuration around
element-android
usage: Applications usingelement-android
might not explicitly configure or customize client-side rate limiting beyond what is built into the library, specifically tailored to their usage patterns ofelement-android
. - User Communication about Rate Limits triggered by
element-android
actions: User feedback and clear communication about rate limiting events triggered by actions performed viaelement-android
might be lacking in the application's UI. - Guidance on Server-Side Rate Limiting for Homeservers used with
element-android
: Applications might not provide sufficient guidance or recommendations to users deploying Matrix homeservers that will be used with their application andelement-android
about the importance and configuration of server-side rate limiting.
- Explicit Client-Side Rate Limiting Configuration around
Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User Input and Output
-
Description:
- Input Sanitization for data passed to
element-android
: Sanitize any user input that is processed by your application before passing it toelement-android
APIs, especially if this input will be rendered or processed byelement-android
or the Matrix server. This includes escaping HTML, JavaScript, and other potentially malicious characters. - Output Encoding for data received from
element-android
: Properly encode any data received fromelement-android
(e.g., message content, user names, room names) before displaying it in your application's UI, especially if you are customizing the UI beyond standardelement-android
components. Use context-appropriate encoding (e.g., HTML encoding for web views, Markdown sanitization for text displays). - Content Security Policy (CSP) (If applicable - for web views displaying
element-android
content): If your application uses web views to display content originating fromelement-android
(e.g., rendered messages), implement a strict Content Security Policy to mitigate XSS risks. - Regular Security Audits focusing on
element-android
UI integration: Conduct regular security audits of your application's code, focusing on input and output handling related to your integration withelement-android
, to identify and fix potential XSS vulnerabilities, especially in custom UI components.
- Input Sanitization for data passed to
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities (Medium to High Severity): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious scripts into user interfaces by exploiting vulnerabilities in input sanitization or output encoding when handling data from or for
element-android
. This is especially relevant if you are customizing or extending the UI beyond standardelement-android
components.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities (Medium to High Severity): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious scripts into user interfaces by exploiting vulnerabilities in input sanitization or output encoding when handling data from or for
-
Impact:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities: High Reduction. Proper sanitization and encoding are fundamental defenses against XSS attacks when dealing with user-generated content displayed through or interacted with via
element-android
.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities: High Reduction. Proper sanitization and encoding are fundamental defenses against XSS attacks when dealing with user-generated content displayed through or interacted with via
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented:
element-android
likely performs some level of input and output handling internally for its own UI components. Android framework provides some built-in protections.
- Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Application-Specific Sanitization and Encoding around
element-android
integration: Applications that customize or extend the UI ofelement-android
need to implement their own input sanitization and output encoding logic to handle user-generated content safely within their custom components that interact with or display data fromelement-android
. - CSP for Web Views displaying
element-android
content: If web views are used to display content originating fromelement-android
, CSP might not be implemented or configured strictly enough. - Regular Security Audits for Input/Output Handling related to
element-android
: Specific security audits focusing on input and output handling vulnerabilities in the context ofelement-android
integration might not be conducted regularly.
- Application-Specific Sanitization and Encoding around
Mitigation Strategy: Review Customizations and Extensions
-
Description:
- Minimize Customizations of
element-android
: Strive to minimize customizations and extensions toelement-android
's core functionality. Rely on the library's built-in features as much as possible to reduce the attack surface introduced by custom code interacting withelement-android
. - Security Review of Custom Code interacting with
element-android
: If customizations are necessary, conduct thorough security reviews of all custom code that interacts withelement-android
APIs or modifies its behavior. Pay particular attention to areas that handle:- User input and output related to
element-android
data. - Data storage and retrieval of data managed by or related to
element-android
. - Network communication initiated or managed through
element-android
. - Cryptographic operations if you are extending or modifying E2EE aspects of
element-android
. - Interactions with Android system APIs from within your custom code that extends
element-android
.
- User input and output related to
- Follow Secure Coding Practices in Custom
element-android
Extensions: Ensure custom code adheres to secure coding practices (e.g., input validation, output encoding, least privilege, secure error handling) specifically in the context of interacting withelement-android
and its data. - Penetration Testing of Custom Features built around
element-android
: Specifically target custom features and extensions built aroundelement-android
during penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities introduced by these modifications.
- Minimize Customizations of
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Vulnerabilities Introduced by Custom Code interacting with
element-android
(High Severity): Custom code, if not developed securely, can introduce new vulnerabilities that bypass the security measures built intoelement-android
itself. - Logic Bugs in Custom Features extending
element-android
(Medium Severity): Logic errors in custom features can lead to unintended security consequences, such as data leaks or access control bypasses in your application's integration withelement-android
.
- Vulnerabilities Introduced by Custom Code interacting with
-
Impact:
- Vulnerabilities Introduced by Custom Code interacting with
element-android
: High Reduction. Thorough security reviews and secure coding practices significantly reduce the risk of introducing vulnerabilities in custom code that extends or interacts withelement-android
. - Logic Bugs in Custom Features extending
element-android
: Medium Reduction. Code reviews and testing help identify and fix logic errors that could have security implications in your application's usage ofelement-android
.
- Vulnerabilities Introduced by Custom Code interacting with
-
Currently Implemented:
- Variable Implementation: The extent of security reviews for custom code interacting with
element-android
varies greatly depending on the development team's security awareness and resources.
- Variable Implementation: The extent of security reviews for custom code interacting with
-
Missing Implementation:
- Dedicated Security Review Process for
element-android
Customizations: A formal and documented security review process specifically for customizations and extensions toelement-android
might be lacking. - Penetration Testing Focused on Custom Features built around
element-android
: Penetration testing might not specifically target and assess the security of custom features and integrations built on top of or aroundelement-android
.
- Dedicated Security Review Process for
Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Secure Storage for Keys and Sensitive Data
-
Description:
- Android Keystore System for
element-android
keys: Ensureelement-android
is configured and utilizes the Android Keystore system to securely store cryptographic keys used by it for E2EE and other security-sensitive operations. The Keystore provides hardware-backed security on supported devices, which is crucial for keys managed byelement-android
. - Avoid Plain Text Storage of sensitive data related to
element-android
: Never store encryption keys, access tokens, passwords, or other sensitive data managed by or used in conjunction withelement-android
in plain text in shared preferences, internal storage, or external storage. - Encrypt Sensitive Data at Rest related to
element-android
(If not using Keystore for all data): If you need to store sensitive data beyond keys that is related to yourelement-android
integration (and cannot use Keystore for all of it), encrypt it at rest using appropriate encryption algorithms and securely managed keys (ideally stored in Keystore). - Principle of Least Privilege for Storage Access to data used by
element-android
: Restrict access to secure storage locations containing data used by or managed byelement-android
to only the necessary components of your application.
- Android Keystore System for
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Key Extraction from Device Storage (High Severity): Prevents attackers from extracting encryption keys or other sensitive data managed by
element-android
from device storage if the device is compromised or rooted. - Data Breaches due to Insecure Storage of
element-android
related data (High Severity): Reduces the risk of sensitive data managed by or used withelement-android
being exposed in case of device loss, theft, or malware infection.
- Key Extraction from Device Storage (High Severity): Prevents attackers from extracting encryption keys or other sensitive data managed by
-
Impact:
- Key Extraction from Device Storage: High Reduction. Android Keystore provides strong protection against key extraction, especially on hardware-backed Keystore implementations, which is vital for keys used by
element-android
. - Data Breaches due to Insecure Storage of
element-android
related data: High Reduction. Secure storage significantly reduces the risk of data exposure in various device compromise scenarios for data managed by or used withelement-android
.
- Key Extraction from Device Storage: High Reduction. Android Keystore provides strong protection against key extraction, especially on hardware-backed Keystore implementations, which is vital for keys used by
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented:
element-android
likely utilizes Android Keystore for key management internally. However, applications need to ensure they are correctly leveraging these secure storage mechanisms and not inadvertently storing sensitive data related toelement-android
insecurely elsewhere.
- Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- Explicit Verification of Keystore Usage by
element-android
: Developers might not explicitly verify thatelement-android
and their application are correctly utilizing Android Keystore for all relevant key storage related toelement-android
operations. - Secure Storage for Application-Specific Sensitive Data related to
element-android
: Applications might need to handle additional sensitive data beyond whatelement-android
directly manages, but that is still related to the integration, and secure storage practices for this application-specific data in conjunction withelement-android
might be overlooked. - Regular Audits of Data Storage Practices related to
element-android
: Audits specifically focused on reviewing data storage practices for data managed by or used withelement-android
and ensuring no sensitive data is stored insecurely might not be conducted regularly.
- Explicit Verification of Keystore Usage by
Mitigation Strategy: Respect User Privacy Settings
-
Description:
- Adhere to Matrix Privacy Features exposed by
element-android
: Respect and correctly implement Matrix protocol's privacy features within your application, as exposed and managed byelement-android
. This includes features like:- Data retention policies (allowing users to control message history retention within
element-android
). - Read receipts and typing indicators (allowing users to disable them through
element-android
settings). - Profile information visibility (allowing users to control who can see their profile as managed by
element-android
).
- Data retention policies (allowing users to control message history retention within
- Expose Privacy Settings in UI using
element-android
features: Provide clear and accessible user interface elements within your application to allow users to configure and manage their privacy settings related to Matrix andelement-android
, ideally using UI components or APIs provided byelement-android
itself. - Do Not Override User Choices made in
element-android
: Ensure your application does not override or bypass user-configured privacy settings made withinelement-android
or exposed through its APIs. Respect user preferences for data retention, sharing, and visibility as configured within theelement-android
context. - Transparency about Data Handling in relation to
element-android
: Be transparent with users about how their data is handled by your application in conjunction withelement-android
and in its interaction with the Matrix homeserver. Provide clear privacy policies and information about data collection and usage related to your application's use ofelement-android
.
- Adhere to Matrix Privacy Features exposed by
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Privacy Violations (Medium to High Severity): Prevents unintended or unauthorized disclosure of user information due to misconfiguration or disregard for privacy settings within the
element-android
integration. - Data Minimization Failures (Medium Severity): Ensures that only necessary data is collected and retained by your application in its use of
element-android
, respecting user preferences and minimizing privacy risks. - Reputational Damage (Medium Severity): Maintaining user trust and avoiding privacy violations related to your application's use of
element-android
is crucial for application reputation and user adoption.
- Privacy Violations (Medium to High Severity): Prevents unintended or unauthorized disclosure of user information due to misconfiguration or disregard for privacy settings within the
-
Impact:
- Privacy Violations: High Reduction. Respecting privacy settings exposed by
element-android
is fundamental to preventing privacy breaches and maintaining user trust in your application's integration with the library. - Data Minimization Failures: Medium Reduction. Adhering to privacy settings helps ensure data minimization in your application's use of
element-android
and reduces the overall privacy risk. - Reputational Damage: High Reduction. Demonstrating respect for user privacy within your application's
element-android
integration enhances application reputation and user confidence.
- Privacy Violations: High Reduction. Respecting privacy settings exposed by
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially Implemented:
element-android
likely exposes APIs to access and manage Matrix privacy settings. However, the application needs to build UI and logic to properly expose and respect these settings in its own UI and workflows.
- Partially Implemented:
-
Missing Implementation:
- User Interface for Privacy Settings within Application UI using
element-android
: Applications might not provide a comprehensive and user-friendly UI for managing all relevant Matrix privacy settings exposed byelement-android
. - Consistent Enforcement of Privacy Settings from
element-android
: Application logic might not consistently enforce user-configured privacy settings fromelement-android
in all relevant areas of the application's functionality. - Transparency and Privacy Policies specific to
element-android
integration: Clear and accessible privacy policies and information about data handling specifically related to your application's integration withelement-android
might be lacking.
- User Interface for Privacy Settings within Application UI using