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Attack Tree Analysis for ethereum-lists/chains

Objective: Compromise Application via Malicious/Incorrect Blockchain Interaction

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Application via Malicious/Incorrect Blockchain Interaction ├── 1. Supply Chain Attack on ethereum-lists/chains Repository │ ├── 1.1. Compromise GitHub Account of Maintainer/Contributor [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Phishing/Social Engineering of Maintainer │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Credential Stuffing/Password Reuse │ │ ├── 1.1.3. Malware on Maintainer's Device │ │ ├── 1.1.4 Session Hijacking │ ├── 1.2. Malicious Pull Request (PR) Accepted │ │ ├── 1.2.1. PR Appears Benign (Obfuscated Changes) │ │ ├── 1.2.2. Insufficient Review Process [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├── 1.2.2.1. Lack of Multiple Reviewers │ │ │ ├── 1.2.2.2. Reviewers Lack Expertise │ │ │ ├── 1.2.2.3. Automated Checks Bypassed │ ├── 1.3. Direct Modification of Repository (If Access Gained) │ │ ├── 1.3.1. Add Malicious Chain Data [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.3.2. Modify Existing Chain Data (e.g., RPC URL) [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Exploit Application's Handling of chains Data │ ├── 2.1. Insufficient Validation of Chain Data [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 2.1.1. No Checksum/Hash Verification [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 2.1.5. No Independent Verification of RPC URLs [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├── 2.1.5.1 No connection test │ │ │ ├── 2.1.5.2 No check against known good list │ ├── 2.2. Outdated chains Data │ │ ├── 2.2.1. Application Doesn't Auto-Update │ │ ├── 2.2.2. Infrequent Manual Updates ├── 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RPC Endpoints ├── 3.1. Malicious RPC Endpoint (Specified in chains Data) │ ├── 3.1.1. Returns Incorrect Blockchain Data [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 3.1.1.1. Fake Transaction Confirmations │ │ ├── 3.1.1.2. Incorrect Balances │ │ ├── 3.1.1.3. Manipulated Smart Contract State

Attack Tree Path: 1. Supply Chain Attack on ethereum-lists/chains Repository

  • 1.1. Compromise GitHub Account of Maintainer/Contributor [CRITICAL]:
    • Description: Gaining unauthorized access to a GitHub account with write permissions to the repository.
    • Likelihood: Medium - Depends on the security practices of the maintainers.
    • Impact: Very High - Allows complete control over the repository's contents.
    • Effort: Low to Medium - Depends on the attack method (phishing is easier than malware).
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced - Phishing can be intermediate; malware and session hijacking are more advanced.
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard - Detecting compromised accounts can be challenging without robust monitoring.
    • Sub-Steps:
      • 1.1.1. Phishing/Social Engineering: Tricking the maintainer into revealing credentials.
      • 1.1.2. Credential Stuffing/Password Reuse: Using credentials leaked from other breaches.
      • 1.1.3. Malware on Maintainer's Device: Installing keyloggers or other malware to steal credentials.
      • 1.1.4. Session Hijacking: Stealing an active session token to bypass authentication.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Malicious Pull Request (PR) Accepted

  • Description: Submitting a PR that contains malicious changes, disguised as legitimate updates.
    • Likelihood: Medium - Depends on the rigor of the review process.
    • Impact: Very High - Can introduce malicious chain data into the repository.
    • Effort: Medium - Requires crafting a convincing PR and potentially social engineering.
    • Skill Level: Advanced - Requires understanding of the codebase and how to obfuscate malicious changes.
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard - If the changes are well-obfuscated, detection is extremely difficult.
    • Sub-Steps:
      • 1.2.1. PR Appears Benign: The attacker makes the changes look like legitimate updates or bug fixes.
      • 1.2.2. Insufficient Review Process [CRITICAL]: This is the key weakness that enables this attack.
        • 1.2.2.1. Lack of Multiple Reviewers: Only one reviewer increases the chance of a malicious PR slipping through.
        • 1.2.2.2. Reviewers Lack Expertise: Reviewers may not have the necessary knowledge to identify subtle malicious changes.
        • 1.2.2.3. Automated Checks Bypassed: The attacker finds ways to circumvent any automated security checks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3. Direct Modification of Repository (If Access Gained)

  • Description: Directly modifying the repository files after gaining write access (e.g., through a compromised account).
    • Likelihood: Low - Requires successful account compromise (1.1).
    • Impact: Very High - Allows complete control over the repository's contents.
    • Effort: Very Low - Once access is gained, modification is trivial.
    • Skill Level: Novice - Basic file editing skills are sufficient.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Changes will be visible in the commit history, but might be missed without careful monitoring.
    • Sub-Steps:
      • 1.3.1. Add Malicious Chain Data [CRITICAL]: Adding entirely new, malicious chain entries.
      • 1.3.2. Modify Existing Chain Data (e.g., RPC URL) [CRITICAL]: Changing the details of existing chains to point to malicious endpoints.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Application's Handling of chains Data

  • 2.1. Insufficient Validation of Chain Data [CRITICAL]:
    • Description: The application does not adequately verify the integrity and authenticity of the chain data it retrieves.
    • Likelihood: High - Many applications may not implement sufficient validation.
    • Impact: Very High - Allows the application to be tricked into connecting to malicious blockchains.
    • Effort: Very Low - The attacker doesn't need to do anything; the vulnerability is in the application's code.
    • Skill Level: Novice - No attacker skill is required; this is an application vulnerability.
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Easy (if validation mechanisms were in place) / Very Hard (if no validation exists) - Depends on whether the application should be performing validation.
    • Sub-Steps:
      • 2.1.1. No Checksum/Hash Verification [CRITICAL]: The application doesn't check if the downloaded data has been tampered with. This is the most critical missing validation.
      • 2.1.5. No Independent Verification of RPC URLs [CRITICAL]: The application doesn't verify that the RPC URLs are legitimate and trustworthy.
        • 2.1.5.1. No connection test: The application doesn't attempt to connect to the RPC URL to see if it's reachable and responsive.
        • 2.1.5.2. No check against known good list: The application doesn't compare the RPC URL against a list of known-good or known-bad endpoints.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2. Outdated chains Data

  • Description: The application uses an old version of the chain data, missing important updates or security fixes.
    • Likelihood: Medium to High - Depends on the application's update mechanism.
    • Impact: Medium - Could lead to using deprecated chains or missing information about malicious chains.
    • Effort: Very Low - The attacker doesn't need to do anything.
    • Skill Level: Novice - No attacker skill is required.
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Can be detected by checking the version of the chain data.
    • Sub-Steps:
      • 2.2.1. Application Doesn't Auto-Update: The application has no mechanism to automatically update the chain data.
      • 2.2.2. Infrequent Manual Updates: The application relies on manual updates, which may be infrequent or forgotten.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RPC Endpoints

  • 3.1. Malicious RPC Endpoint (Specified in chains Data) * Description: The chains data includes a URL for a malicious RPC endpoint controlled by the attacker. * Likelihood: Medium - Depends on the success of a supply chain attack (1) or application misconfiguration. * Impact: Very High - Allows the attacker to control the blockchain data the application receives. * Effort: Medium - Requires setting up and maintaining a malicious RPC server. * Skill Level: Advanced - Requires knowledge of blockchain technology and RPC protocols. * Detection Difficulty: Hard - Requires analyzing the behavior of the RPC endpoint. * Sub-Steps:
    • 3.1.1. Returns Incorrect Blockchain Data [CRITICAL]: The malicious RPC endpoint provides false information to the application.
      • 3.1.1.1. Fake Transaction Confirmations: The endpoint falsely reports that transactions have been confirmed.
      • 3.1.1.2. Incorrect Balances: The endpoint reports incorrect account balances.
      • 3.1.1.3. Manipulated Smart Contract State: The endpoint returns manipulated data about the state of smart contracts.