Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
46 lines (41 loc) · 6.11 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

46 lines (41 loc) · 6.11 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for google/accompanist

Attack Surface: Permission Handling Issues

  • Description: Vulnerabilities related to requesting, granting, and revoking Android permissions, specifically stemming from the misuse or exploitation of the accompanist-permissions library.
    • Accompanist Contribution: The accompanist-permissions library provides utilities for managing permissions within Compose. Incorrect implementation or unexpected interactions with this library can lead directly to security issues.
    • Example: An app uses rememberPermissionState but fails to properly handle the PermissionStatus.Denied (and permanently denied) state. The app continues to attempt to use the permission-requiring functionality, leading to crashes or, worse, silently failing to protect user data if the permission was previously granted and then revoked.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive user data (contacts, location, camera, microphone, etc.), potentially leading to privacy violations or further exploitation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Thoroughly test all permission request/response flows, including denial, revocation (via system settings), and "Don't ask again" scenarios. This is crucial.
        • Strictly adhere to the principle of least privilege: request only the absolutely necessary permissions at the time they are actually needed.
        • Use the latest version of accompanist-permissions to benefit from bug fixes and security improvements.
        • Handle permission revocation gracefully. The app must function correctly (even in a degraded state) without the permission. Provide clear user feedback.
        • Provide clear and concise explanations to the user about why each permission is needed, before requesting it.
        • Consider using a more robust permission library if complex, multi-step, or conditional permission handling is required. Accompanist's library is a convenience, not a complete solution for all scenarios.
      • Users:
        • Review app permissions regularly in system settings and revoke any unnecessary or suspicious permissions.
        • Be cautious about granting permissions to apps, especially those from unknown or untrusted sources. Pay attention to the permissions requested.

Attack Surface: WebView Exploitation

  • Description: Vulnerabilities inherent in Android's WebView, directly exposed and made accessible through the accompanist-webview component. This is a major attack vector.
    • Accompanist Contribution: accompanist-webview provides a Compose wrapper around Android's WebView. While it simplifies integration, it directly inherits all of WebView's security risks. This is a direct contribution to the attack surface.
    • Example: An app uses accompanist-webview to display content from a third-party URL. The third-party site is compromised, and an attacker injects malicious JavaScript. This JavaScript can then:
      • Steal cookies and session tokens from the app.
      • Redirect the user to a phishing site designed to steal credentials.
      • Potentially execute arbitrary code within the app's context (depending on WebView settings and Android version), leading to a complete device compromise.
    • Impact: A wide range of severe impacts, from data theft and session hijacking to remote code execution (RCE) in the worst-case scenarios. This can lead to complete loss of control over the user's data and potentially the device.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • This is the most critical area to secure when using accompanist-webview.
        • Disable JavaScript unless absolutely, undeniably necessary. If JavaScript must be enabled, use extreme caution and consider sandboxing techniques (which are complex to implement correctly).
        • Always set WebSettings.setAllowFileAccess(false), WebSettings.setAllowContentAccess(false), WebSettings.setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(false), and WebSettings.setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(false). These settings restrict access to the local file system and content providers, significantly reducing the attack surface.
        • Implement a robust WebViewClient and WebChromeClient. These classes are crucial for controlling navigation, handling errors, and intercepting potentially malicious requests. Override methods like shouldOverrideUrlLoading, onReceivedError, and onJsAlert to implement security checks.
        • Sanitize and validate all data loaded into the WebView, regardless of the source. Assume all external content is potentially malicious. Use HTML sanitization libraries and consider Content Security Policy (CSP).
        • Use HTTPS for all external resources loaded into the WebView. Enforce HTTPS strictly.
        • Consider using a custom URL scheme and intercepting requests to prevent the loading of unexpected or untrusted URLs.
        • Regularly update the WebView component (and the underlying Android System WebView) to the latest version to benefit from security patches. This is crucial for mitigating known WebView vulnerabilities.
        • Strongly consider alternatives to WebView if at all possible, especially for displaying untrusted content. Native Compose UI elements are inherently much safer. If you must display web content, consider rendering only a very limited, trusted subset of HTML.
      • Users:
        • Keep your device's Android System WebView updated through the Google Play Store. This is the primary defense against WebView vulnerabilities.
        • Be extremely cautious about clicking links or interacting with web content within apps, especially if the app's source is unknown or untrusted. If an app displays web content unexpectedly, consider uninstalling it.