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Attack Tree Analysis for google/accompanist

Objective: Degrade User Experience or Obtain Unauthorized Access/Data by Exploiting Accompanist

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Degrade User Experience or Obtain Unauthorized Access/Data by Exploiting Accompanist
├── 1. Exploit Permissions Library (accompanist-permissions)
│   ├── 1.2  Incorrect Permission Handling
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  Bypass Permission Checks [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── Exploit:  If the application incorrectly uses the Accompanist `rememberPermissionState`...
├── 3. Exploit System UI Controller (accompanist-systemuicontroller)
│   ├── 3.1  UI Spoofing/Phishing [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── Exploit:  An attacker could potentially use the System UI Controller to manipulate the appearance...
├── 7. Exploit WebView (accompanist-webview) [HIGH RISK]
│    ├── 7.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [CRITICAL]
│    │    └── Exploit: If the WebView loads content from untrusted sources...
│    ├── 7.2  Content Spoofing
│    │    └── Exploit: An attacker could potentially manipulate the content displayed...
│    ├── 7.3  JavaScript Bridge Exploitation [CRITICAL]
│    │    └── Exploit: If the WebView uses a JavaScript bridge...
│    └── 7.4  File Access [CRITICAL]
│        └── Exploit: If not configured correctly, the WebView might allow access to local files...
└── 8. Exploit Drawable Painter (accompanist-drawablepainter)
    └── 8.2. Malformed Drawable Injection [CRITICAL]
        └── Exploit: If the application loads drawables from external sources...

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Bypass Permission Checks (Permissions Library)

  • Exploit: The application incorrectly uses Accompanist's rememberPermissionState or related APIs. It might appear to check for a permission but proceed with a privileged operation even if the permission is denied. This could be due to incorrect logic, improper state management, or a misunderstanding of the API.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires developer error)
  • Impact: High (Unauthorized access to data or functionality)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Requires code review or dynamic analysis)
  • Mitigation:
    • Thoroughly review the code that handles permissions, ensuring that the rememberPermissionState is used correctly and that the application logic correctly checks the permission state before performing any privileged operation.
    • Write unit and integration tests to specifically verify that permission checks are enforced correctly in all scenarios, including when permissions are denied.
    • Use static analysis tools to identify potential issues with permission handling.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1 UI Spoofing/Phishing (System UI Controller)

  • Exploit: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in Accompanist's System UI Controller (or a vulnerability in the underlying Android system that Accompanist exposes) to manipulate the appearance of the status bar or navigation bar. They could make the UI mimic a trusted application or system component, tricking the user into entering credentials or performing actions they wouldn't normally do.
  • Likelihood: Very Low (Requires a significant bug in Accompanist or the Android system)
  • Impact: Very High (Credential theft, sensitive data exposure, potential for complete device compromise)
  • Effort: Very High
  • Skill Level: Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Minimize the use of the System UI Controller. Only use it when absolutely necessary.
    • Avoid displaying sensitive information or performing security-critical actions while using the System UI Controller.
    • Educate users about the possibility of UI spoofing and encourage them to be cautious when interacting with applications that modify the system UI.
    • Regularly update Accompanist and the Android System WebView to get the latest security patches.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Exploit WebView (accompanist-webview) [HIGH RISK]

This entire branch is high risk.

Attack Tree Path: 7.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (WebView)

  • Exploit: The WebView loads content from untrusted sources (e.g., user-generated content, external websites) and does not have proper security configurations. An attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the WebView. This code can then steal cookies, session tokens, user data, or redirect the user to a phishing site.
  • Likelihood: High (If untrusted content is loaded without proper precautions)
  • Impact: High (Data theft, session hijacking, account takeover)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the resources the WebView can load and the actions it can perform.
    • Disable JavaScript entirely if it's not absolutely required.
    • Sanitize all user input that is used to construct URLs or content loaded into the WebView. Use a robust HTML sanitization library.
    • Avoid loading content from untrusted sources. If you must, load it in a sandboxed iframe with limited privileges.
    • Regularly update the Android System WebView to the latest version.

Attack Tree Path: 7.2 Content Spoofing (WebView)

  • Exploit: An attacker manipulates the content displayed in the WebView to mislead the user. This could involve injecting fake login forms, displaying false information, or redirecting the user to malicious websites. This is often a precursor to, or combined with, XSS.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Phishing, misinformation, leading to credential theft or other harmful actions)
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Same mitigations as for XSS (CSP, input sanitization, avoid untrusted content).
    • Implement certificate pinning to ensure the WebView is communicating with the intended server.
    • Visually differentiate WebView content from native app content to help users identify potential spoofing attempts.

Attack Tree Path: 7.3 JavaScript Bridge Exploitation (WebView)

  • Exploit: The WebView uses a JavaScript bridge to communicate with the native Android application code. If this bridge is not properly secured, an attacker can inject JavaScript code that calls methods in the native code with malicious parameters. This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the device.
  • Likelihood: Medium (If a JavaScript bridge is used and not carefully secured)
  • Impact: Very High (Arbitrary code execution, complete device compromise)
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Minimize the use of JavaScript bridges. If possible, use alternative communication mechanisms.
    • If a bridge is necessary, expose only the absolute minimum required functionality to the WebView.
    • Use the @JavascriptInterface annotation only on methods that are explicitly intended to be called from JavaScript.
    • Thoroughly validate all input received from the WebView through the bridge. Treat it as untrusted data. Use strong type checking and input validation.
    • Consider using a message-passing approach instead of directly exposing methods.

Attack Tree Path: 7.4 File Access (WebView)

  • Exploit: The WebView is misconfigured and allows access to local files on the device. An attacker can craft a malicious webpage that attempts to read sensitive files from the device's storage.
  • Likelihood: Low (Requires explicit misconfiguration)
  • Impact: High (Sensitive data exposure, potential for information leakage)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Disable file access by default: webView.settings.allowFileAccess = false.
    • If file access is absolutely necessary, be extremely careful about which files are accessible. Use the most restrictive settings possible.
    • Never allow access to the entire file system.
    • Consider using a content provider to serve files to the WebView instead of granting direct file access.

Attack Tree Path: 8.2. Malformed Drawable Injection (Drawable Painter)

  • Exploit: The application loads drawables from external sources (user uploads, remote URLs) and does not properly validate them. An attacker provides a specially crafted, malformed drawable file that exploits a vulnerability in the underlying image parsing library (e.g., a buffer overflow).
  • Likelihood: Very Low (Requires a vulnerability in a well-maintained image parsing library)
  • Impact: Very High (Potential for arbitrary code execution, although less likely with modern libraries)
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • If possible, avoid loading drawables from untrusted sources.
    • If you must load drawables from external sources, use a well-vetted and up-to-date image loading library (e.g., Glide, Coil). These libraries often have built-in protections against malformed images.
    • Validate the dimensions and format of the drawable before loading it.
    • Consider using a sandboxed process to handle image decoding.
    • Keep the underlying Android system and any image parsing libraries up-to-date.