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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for google/ksp

Objective: Compromise Application using KSP vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via KSP Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
├── Exploit KSP Processor Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├── Input Validation Flaws in Processor Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── Malicious Input Data Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── Inject Malicious Data via Annotations [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── Inject Malicious Data via Code Structure [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └── Logic Errors Leading to Code Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├── Dependency Vulnerabilities in Processor Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Processor Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── Identify Vulnerable Dependencies used by Processor [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── Trigger Vulnerability in Dependency via Processor Execution [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └── Dependency Confusion Attack [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └── Introduce Malicious Dependency with Same Name as Processor Dependency [HIGH RISK PATH]
├── Dependency Vulnerabilities in Processor Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] (Redundant, already under "Exploit KSP Processor Vulnerabilities")
├── Supply Chain Attack on Processor Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] (Redundant, already under "Dependency Vulnerabilities...")
├── Exploit Build Environment to Influence KSP Execution [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├── Compromise Build Server/Developer Machine [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── Gain Access to Build Server [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └── Exploit Vulnerabilities in Build Server Infrastructure [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └── Gain Access to Developer Machine [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └── Exploit Vulnerabilities in Developer's System [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   └── Manipulate Build Scripts [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       └── Modify Gradle Build Scripts [HIGH RISK PATH]
│           └── Inject Malicious Code into build.gradle.kts files [HIGH RISK PATH]
└── Supply Chain Attack on KSP Plugin [CRITICAL NODE] (Less Likely for Google-Owned, but Consider Third-Party Plugins)

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via KSP Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • This is the root goal and represents the ultimate objective of the attacker. Success here means the attacker has achieved control or significant impact on the application through exploiting KSP.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit KSP Processor Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • This is a critical node because KSP processors are custom code and a direct point of interaction with the application's build process. Vulnerabilities here can lead to code injection, DoS, or information disclosure.
  • High-Risk Path Justification: Processors are often developed with less security scrutiny than core libraries, making them a potentially weaker link.

Attack Tree Path: Input Validation Flaws in Processor Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Processors might not properly validate inputs like annotation values or code structures.
  • Malicious Input Data Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Inject Malicious Data via Annotations [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers craft annotations with malicious payloads that are processed without proper sanitization, leading to code injection or other vulnerabilities.
    • Inject Malicious Data via Code Structure [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers structure Kotlin code in a way that exploits weaknesses in the processor's parsing or processing logic, leading to unintended and potentially malicious code generation.

Attack Tree Path: Logic Errors Leading to Code Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Flaws in the processor's code generation logic itself can be exploited to manipulate the output code in a malicious way. This is a more subtle form of code injection where the vulnerability is in the processor's algorithm.

Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities in Processor Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Critical Node Justification: Processors rely on external libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies are common and can be easily exploited through the processor.
  • High-Risk Path Justification: Dependency vulnerabilities are a well-known and frequently exploited attack vector in software development.
  • Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Processor Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit publicly known vulnerabilities in libraries used by the KSP processor.
    • Identify Vulnerable Dependencies used by Processor [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers first identify vulnerable dependencies by analyzing the processor's dependencies.
    • Trigger Vulnerability in Dependency via Processor Execution [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers craft inputs or trigger processor actions that specifically invoke the vulnerable code paths within the identified dependency.
  • Dependency Confusion Attack [HIGH RISK PATH]::
    • Attack Vector: Attackers upload a malicious package to a public repository with the same name as a private dependency used by the processor, hoping the build system will mistakenly download the malicious package.
    • Introduce Malicious Dependency with Same Name as Processor Dependency [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers successfully introduce a malicious dependency into the build process through dependency confusion.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Build Environment to Influence KSP Execution [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Critical Node Justification: The build environment is the foundation upon which the application is built. Compromising it grants broad control.
  • High-Risk Path Justification: Build environments are often complex and can have security weaknesses if not properly hardened.
  • Compromise Build Server/Developer Machine [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Attackers gain unauthorized access to the build server or a developer's machine, allowing them to manipulate the build process directly.
    • Gain Access to Build Server [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Build Server Infrastructure [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the build server's operating system, network services, or build tools to gain access.
    • Gain Access to Developer Machine [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Developer's System [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in a developer's operating system, applications, or through social engineering to gain access to their machine.
  • Manipulate Build Scripts [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Attackers modify build scripts (like build.gradle.kts) to inject malicious code or alter the build process to their advantage.
    • Modify Gradle Build Scripts [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Inject Malicious Code into build.gradle.kts files [HIGH RISK PATH]: Attackers directly modify the Gradle build scripts to include malicious tasks, dependencies, or code that will be executed during the build process, potentially compromising the application.

Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Attack on KSP Plugin [CRITICAL NODE] (Less Likely for Google-Owned, but Consider Third-Party Plugins):

  • Critical Node Justification: If using third-party plugins, a supply chain attack on a plugin can have widespread impact on all users of that plugin.
  • Attack Vector: Attackers compromise the repository or update mechanism of a KSP plugin to distribute a malicious version of the plugin. This is more relevant if using third-party KSP plugins, as Google-owned KSP is less likely to be targeted in this way.