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Attack Tree Analysis for google/ksp

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code / Inject Malicious Code via KSP

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code / Inject Malicious Code via KSP

├── 1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in a Custom KSP Processor │ ├── 1.1 Code Injection in Processor Logic │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Unvalidated Input to CodeGenerator │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1 Craft malicious symbol data (e.g., class names, annotations) that, when processed, results in writing arbitrary code to generated files. [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.2 Exploit string formatting vulnerabilities within the processor when generating code (e.g., using String.format with user-controlled input). [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.3 Path Traversal in CodeGenerator │ │ │ ├── 1.1.3.1 Craft malicious symbol data that manipulates the output file path to write outside the intended generated sources directory (e.g., overwrite system files, build scripts). [CRITICAL] └── 3. Social Engineering / Configuration Errors ├── 3.2 Exploit Misconfigured Processor Options ├── 3.2.1 If the processor accepts configuration options, exploit insecure defaults or misconfigurations to enable malicious behavior. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1: Craft malicious symbol data (Code Injection via Unvalidated Input)

  • Description: The attacker crafts malicious input to the KSP processor in the form of specially constructed symbol data (e.g., class names, annotation values, method names, etc.). This input is designed to exploit a lack of input validation within the processor's code that handles the CodeGenerator. When the processor processes this malicious input, it generates code that includes the attacker's payload.
  • Example:
    • The processor generates a class with a name derived directly from a user-provided annotation value. The attacker provides an annotation value like: MyClass"; System.exit(1); //. If the processor doesn't sanitize this input, the generated code might become: class MyClass"; System.exit(1); // { ... }, causing the build to terminate (or worse, execute arbitrary code).
    • Another example could involve injecting code into generated logging statements, error messages, or other parts of the generated code that are not intended to be executable.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Hard without thorough code review)

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2: Exploit string formatting vulnerabilities (Code Injection via String Formatting)

  • Description: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities in how the KSP processor uses string formatting functions (like String.format in Java/Kotlin) to generate code. If the processor uses user-controlled input (e.g., symbol data) directly within the format string, the attacker can inject malicious code.
  • Example:
    • The processor uses String.format("val x = %s", userInput) to generate code, where userInput comes from an annotation value. The attacker provides a value like 0; Runtime.getRuntime().exec("malicious_command"); //. This would result in the generated code: val x = 0; Runtime.getRuntime().exec("malicious_command"); //, executing the attacker's command.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Static analysis can often detect this)

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3.1: Craft malicious symbol data (Path Traversal)

  • Description: The attacker crafts malicious symbol data (e.g., a class name) that, when used to construct the output file path for generated code, results in writing the file outside the intended directory. This could overwrite system files, build scripts, or other critical files.
  • Example:
    • The processor uses the class name directly to create the file path: generatedSourcesDir + className + ".kt". The attacker provides a class name like ../../../../etc/passwd. If the processor doesn't sanitize the class name, it might attempt to write to /etc/passwd (on a Unix-like system), potentially overwriting the system's password file.
    • Another example could involve writing to a directory that is later executed as part of the build process, injecting malicious code into the build pipeline.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Hard without file system monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.1: Exploit Misconfigured Processor Options

  • Description: The KSP processor accepts configuration options (e.g., through annotations, environment variables, or build system properties). The attacker exploits insecure default settings or provides malicious configuration values to enable harmful behavior within the processor.
  • Example:
    • The processor has a configuration option enableDangerousFeature=false by default. The attacker sets this option to true through an environment variable, enabling a feature that allows the processor to execute arbitrary system commands.
    • The processor has a configuration option to specify a template file for code generation. The attacker provides a path to a malicious template file that contains code to exfiltrate data or execute commands.
    • The processor might have an option to disable certain security checks. The attacker could enable this option to bypass input validation or other safeguards.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires configuration review)