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Threat Model Analysis for insertkoinio/koin

  • Description: An attacker could inject malicious configurations by compromising external configuration sources used by Koin's property loading mechanism. This allows them to override application settings, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution if configurations control critical application behavior or dependency loading paths. For example, an attacker could modify a configuration property that dictates which class is instantiated for a specific service, replacing it with a malicious class. This can be achieved by compromising configuration files, environment variables, or remote configuration servers.
  • Impact: Critical. Arbitrary code execution, full application compromise, data exfiltration, denial of service.
  • Koin Component Affected: Property Loading (koinApplication { properties(...) }, loadPropertiesFrom... functions).
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Configuration Sources: Implement robust access controls and security measures for all external configuration sources (files, environment variables, remote servers).
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Strictly validate and sanitize all configuration values loaded from external sources before they are used by Koin or the application.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant minimal necessary permissions to processes accessing configuration sources.
    • Immutable Infrastructure: Consider using immutable infrastructure where configurations are baked into deployments to reduce runtime modification risks.
    • Secrets Management: Use dedicated secrets management solutions to handle sensitive configuration data instead of storing them in plain text.
  • Description: Incorrectly defined Koin modules, particularly scope misconfigurations, can lead to severe security vulnerabilities. For example, if a service intended to be scoped to a user session is accidentally defined as a singleton, data intended to be private to one user could become accessible to all users. An attacker could exploit this by understanding the module definitions (through reverse engineering or leaked information) and then performing actions that rely on the misconfigured, shared service to access or manipulate data across user sessions or contexts.
  • Impact: High. Privilege escalation (accessing resources or data of other users), data breach (exposure of sensitive user data), data corruption.
  • Koin Component Affected: Module Definitions (DSL, module function, scope definitions like single, factory, scoped).
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rigorous Code Reviews: Implement mandatory and thorough code reviews specifically focusing on Koin module definitions and scope configurations.
    • Comprehensive Testing: Develop comprehensive unit and integration tests that specifically validate dependency scopes and object lifecycles, ensuring intended isolation and data separation.
    • Static Analysis: Utilize static analysis tools capable of detecting potential scope misconfigurations in Koin modules.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Scopes): Default to the most restrictive scope possible (e.g., factory or scoped) and only use broader scopes like single when absolutely necessary and after careful security consideration.
    • Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of Koin module configurations and dependency injection logic.
  • Description: If sensitive internal components (e.g., classes handling authentication, authorization, or direct database access) are unintentionally made easily injectable dependencies through Koin, attackers could potentially gain unauthorized access to these components. This could bypass intended access control layers and directly expose sensitive functionalities or data. An attacker might exploit this by analyzing Koin modules (if accessible) or by probing the application's API or interfaces to identify and utilize these exposed internal components.
  • Impact: High. Bypass of security controls, direct access to sensitive internal functionalities, potential data breaches, privilege escalation.
  • Koin Component Affected: Module Definitions, Dependency Scopes, Visibility of Dependencies.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Exposure (Dependencies): Carefully consider which components are truly necessary to be exposed as injectable dependencies. Avoid making internal, sensitive components readily injectable unless absolutely required for the application's design.
    • Dependency Visibility Control: Utilize Koin's module structure and scoping to limit the visibility and accessibility of sensitive dependencies. Consider using internal modules or more restricted scopes for sensitive components.
    • API Design Review: Review the application's API and interfaces to ensure that exposed Koin dependencies do not inadvertently create new attack vectors or bypass existing security controls.
    • Abstraction and Interfaces: When exposing components as dependencies, prefer exposing interfaces or abstract classes rather than concrete implementations, especially for sensitive components. This can help limit the attack surface and allow for easier swapping of implementations if vulnerabilities are found.