attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for jakewharton/timber

Objective: Compromise Application by Exploiting Timber Usage

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application using Timber [ROOT GOAL]
├─── Exploit Logging of Sensitive Data [CRITICAL_NODE] [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   ├─── Unintentional Logging of Sensitive Data [CRITICAL_NODE] [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │   └─── Developer Mistake in Logging Code [CRITICAL_NODE] [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │       ├─── Log PII (Personally Identifiable Information) [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │       ├─── Log Secrets (API Keys, Passwords) [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │       └─── Log Business Logic Secrets [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   └─── Intentional (but Misguided) Logging of Sensitive Data in Production [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│       └─── Developer Intends to Debug Production Issues [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│           └─── Enable verbose logging in production environment [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
├─── Exploit Custom Timber Trees [CRITICAL_NODE]
│   ├─── Malicious Custom Tree Implementation [CRITICAL_NODE]
│   │   ├─── Supply Chain Attack (Compromised Dependency) [CRITICAL_NODE]
│   │   └─── Insider Threat (Malicious Developer) [CRITICAL_NODE]
├─── Exploit Log Storage and Access [CRITICAL_NODE] [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   ├─── Insecure Log Storage Location [CRITICAL_NODE] [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │   └─── Logs are Stored in Accessible Location [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │       ├─── Logs Stored in Publicly Accessible Directory [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │       ├─── Logs Stored in Unprotected Cloud Storage [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   │       └─── Logs Stored on Shared File System with Weak Permissions [HIGH_RISK_PATH]
│   └─── Inadequate Access Control to Logs [CRITICAL_NODE]
│       ├─── Weak Authentication/Authorization for Log Access [CRITICAL_NODE]
│       └─── Lack of Auditing of Log Access [CRITICAL_NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. High-Risk Path: Exploit Logging of Sensitive Data

• Attack Vectors:
  • Unintentional Logging:
    • Developer Mistake in Logging Code:
      • Developers inadvertently include sensitive data (PII, secrets, business logic) in log messages during development or debugging.
      • Examples:
        • Logging request or response bodies without sanitization.
        • Logging user input directly.
        • Using verbose logging levels in production that expose internal variables.
    • Intentional (but Misguided) Logging in Production:
      • Developers enable verbose logging in production environments to troubleshoot issues.
      • They forget to disable verbose logging after debugging, leaving sensitive data exposed in production logs.
      • Example:
        • Temporarily enabling DebugTree in production to capture detailed logs for error analysis.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Critical Node: Exploit Logging of Sensitive Data

• Why Critical:
  • This is the primary attack vector related to Timber's core functionality - logging.
  • Successful exploitation can lead to direct exposure of sensitive information.
  • It is a root cause for multiple high-risk paths.
• Associated Attack Vectors:
  • All vectors listed under "High-Risk Path: Exploit Logging of Sensitive Data" are directly associated with this critical node.

Attack Tree Path: 3. High-Risk Path: Unintentional Logging of Sensitive Data

• Attack Vectors:
  • Developer Mistake in Logging Code (Detailed):
    • Lack of Awareness: Developers may not be fully aware of what constitutes sensitive data or the risks of logging it.
    • Copy-Paste Errors: Copying and pasting code snippets from debugging sessions into production code without removing verbose logging statements.
    • Insufficient Code Review: Code reviews may not specifically focus on identifying and removing sensitive data from log messages.
    • Dynamic Logging Configurations: Complex or poorly understood logging configurations can lead to unintended logging of sensitive data in certain scenarios.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Critical Node: Developer Mistake in Logging Code

• Why Critical:
  • This is the direct action that leads to unintentional logging of sensitive data.
  • It is a common human error and difficult to completely eliminate.
  • Mitigation strategies must focus on prevention, detection, and remediation of these mistakes.
• Associated Attack Vectors:
  • All vectors listed under "High-Risk Path: Unintentional Logging of Sensitive Data" and its detailed breakdown are associated with this critical node.

Attack Tree Path: 5. High-Risk Path: Intentional (but Misguided) Logging of Sensitive Data in Production

• Attack Vectors:
  • Emergency Debugging: In urgent situations, developers may resort to quick and dirty debugging methods, including enabling verbose logging in production without proper planning or security considerations.
  • Lack of Process: Absence of clear procedures for production debugging and logging management.
  • Forgotten Configurations: Temporary logging configurations enabled for debugging are not properly disabled or reverted after the issue is resolved.
  • Insufficient Monitoring: Lack of monitoring to detect when verbose logging is enabled in production or when sensitive data is being logged.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Critical Node: Exploit Custom Timber Trees

• Why Critical:
  • Custom Trees extend Timber's functionality but also introduce new attack surfaces.
  • Malicious or vulnerable custom Trees can bypass standard Timber security considerations.
  • Exploitation can lead to significant impact, including data exfiltration and system compromise.
• Associated Attack Vectors:
  • Malicious Custom Tree Implementation:
    • Supply Chain Attack (Compromised Dependency):
      • Attacker compromises a dependency used by a custom Tree.
      • The compromised dependency contains malicious code that is executed when the custom Tree is used.
      • Example: A logging library used for formatting within a custom Tree is backdoored.
    • Insider Threat (Malicious Developer):
      • A rogue developer intentionally creates a custom Tree with malicious functionality.
      • The malicious Tree could exfiltrate logs to an attacker-controlled server, inject malicious code, or perform other harmful actions.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Critical Node: Malicious Custom Tree Implementation

• Why Critical:
  • Represents a deliberate attempt to subvert the logging mechanism for malicious purposes.
  • Can be very difficult to detect if the malicious Tree is well-disguised.
  • Can have severe consequences, including complete system compromise.
• Associated Attack Vectors:
  • Supply Chain Attack (Compromised Dependency)
  • Insider Threat (Malicious Developer)

Attack Tree Path: 8. High-Risk Path: Exploit Log Storage and Access

• Attack Vectors:
  • Insecure Log Storage Location:
    • Logs Stored in Publicly Accessible Directory:
      • Logs are written to directories accessible via the web server (e.g., public_html, wwwroot).
      • Attackers can directly access log files by browsing to predictable URLs.
    • Logs Stored in Unprotected Cloud Storage:
      • Logs are sent to cloud storage services (e.g., AWS S3, Azure Blob Storage) with overly permissive access policies.
      • Attackers can enumerate and access these storage buckets if permissions are misconfigured.
    • Logs Stored on Shared File System with Weak Permissions:
      • Logs are written to network shares with weak access controls, allowing unauthorized users within the internal network to access them.
  • Inadequate Access Control to Logs:
    • Weak Authentication/Authorization for Log Access:
      • Log management systems or interfaces have weak passwords, default credentials, or easily bypassed authentication mechanisms.
      • Attackers can gain unauthorized access to the log management system and view all logs.
    • Lack of Auditing of Log Access:
      • No logging or monitoring of who accesses logs.
      • Makes it difficult to detect and investigate unauthorized log access or data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Critical Node: Insecure Log Storage Location

• Why Critical:
  • Direct exposure of logs if storage is misconfigured.
  • Relatively easy to exploit if logs are in publicly accessible locations.
  • Negates any security efforts made in logging practices if the storage itself is insecure.
• Associated Attack Vectors:
  • Logs Stored in Publicly Accessible Directory
  • Logs Stored in Unprotected Cloud Storage
  • Logs Stored on Shared File System with Weak Permissions

Attack Tree Path: 10. Critical Node: Inadequate Access Control to Logs

• Why Critical:
  • Allows unauthorized access to logs even if storage location is somewhat secure.
  • Weak access controls are a common vulnerability in many systems.
  • Lack of auditing hinders detection and response to log-related security incidents.
• Associated Attack Vectors:
  • Weak Authentication/Authorization for Log Access
  • Lack of Auditing of Log Access

Attack Tree Path: 11. Critical Node: Weak Authentication/Authorization for Log Access

• Why Critical:
  • A common and easily exploitable vulnerability.
  • Provides attackers with broad access to potentially all logs.
  • Can be exploited with relatively low skill and effort.

Attack Tree Path: 12. Critical Node: Lack of Auditing of Log Access

• Why Critical:
  • While not a direct attack vector itself, it significantly hinders security.
  • Makes it difficult to detect breaches, investigate incidents, and establish accountability.
  • Increases the overall risk by reducing visibility into log access activities.