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Threat Model Analysis for jakewharton/timber

Threat: Over-logging of Sensitive Data

Description: An attacker, gaining access to log files or a centralized logging system, could discover sensitive information inadvertently logged by developers using Timber. This includes passwords, API keys, PII, session tokens, or internal system details. This is possible because developers might use Timber logging functions (like Timber.d(), Timber.e(), etc.) to log sensitive data without proper sanitization or filtering.

Impact: Confidentiality breach, regulatory compliance violations, potential account compromise, further attacks using exposed credentials, reputational damage.

Timber Component Affected: Timber.d(), Timber.e(), Timber.w(), Timber.i(), Timber.v(), Custom Tree implementations, potentially all logging calls throughout the application.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement rigorous code reviews focusing on log statements to identify and remove sensitive data logging.
  • Develop and enforce clear logging policies and guidelines for developers, specifying what data is permissible to log.
  • Utilize custom Tree implementations to filter, redact, or mask sensitive data before logging.
  • Employ static analysis security testing (SAST) tools to automatically detect potential logging of sensitive information.
  • Configure appropriate logging levels for different environments (e.g., less verbose and sanitized in production).

Threat: Exposure of Debug Logs in Production

Description: An attacker, by observing application behavior or gaining access to production log outputs, could discover verbose debug logs generated by DebugTree or similar verbose custom Tree implementations mistakenly left active in production. This can reveal internal application logic, code paths, variable values, and potentially sensitive information intended only for development. Developers might incorrectly configure Timber to use DebugTree in production builds, or fail to properly manage Tree registration based on build environments.

Impact: Information disclosure, insights for attackers into application internals aiding in reverse engineering and vulnerability identification, increased attack surface.

Timber Component Affected: DebugTree, Timber.plant() configuration, build variant configuration.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Ensure DebugTree and other verbose Tree implementations are exclusively registered in debug builds and not in release/production builds.
  • Utilize build variant aware Timber configuration mechanisms to automatically manage Tree registration based on the build environment.
  • Implement automated checks in the build pipeline to verify that DebugTree is not included in production builds.
  • Regularly audit Timber configuration in production deployments to confirm only necessary and secure Tree implementations are active.
  • Use environment variables or build flags to conditionally plant Tree instances, ensuring debug trees are disabled in production.