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Attack Tree Analysis for jetbrains/compose-multiplatform

Objective: Compromise Compose Multiplatform Application (Critical Node)

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Attack Goal: Compromise Compose Multiplatform Application (Critical Node)
      1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Compose Multiplatform Framework (Critical Node)
      • 1.1.3. Security Bugs in Skia (Underlying Graphics Engine) (Critical Node)
      • 1.2. State Management Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)
        • 1.2.1. Data Binding Issues leading to Information Disclosure (High-Risk Path)
        • 1.2.2. State Injection/Manipulation via Interop Bridges (High-Risk Path)
      • 1.3. Build and Compilation Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)
        • 1.3.1. Gradle Plugin Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)
        • 1.3.2. Kotlin Compiler Vulnerabilities (Compose-Specific) (Critical Node)
      • 1.4. Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirect via Compose) (Critical Node)
        • 1.4.1. Vulnerable Kotlin Libraries Used by Compose (High-Risk Path)
      1. Exploit Developer Misuse of Compose Multiplatform (Critical Node)
      • 2.1. Insecure Data Handling in UI Code (Critical Node)
        • 2.1.1. Hardcoding Secrets in Compose UI (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)
        • 2.1.2. Logging Sensitive Data in UI Components (High-Risk Path)
        • 2.1.3. Client-Side Data Validation Weaknesses (High-Risk Path)
      • 2.2. Improper Interop with Platform APIs (Critical Node)
        • 2.2.1. Unsafe Platform API Calls from Compose (High-Risk Path)
      • 2.3. Logic Errors in UI Code leading to Security Flaws
        • 2.3.1. Business Logic Vulnerabilities in UI State Management (High-Risk Path)
      1. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Compose Multiplatform Ecosystem (Critical Node)
      • 3.1. Compromised Compose Multiplatform Libraries/Dependencies (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)
      • 3.2. Malicious Gradle Plugins in Compose Ecosystem (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Data Binding Issues leading to Information Disclosure (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Incorrect data binding configurations or bugs in Compose's state management.
  • Insight: Unintentionally exposing sensitive data in the UI or logs due to flaws in data binding logic.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium/High (Data exposure)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low/Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Careful review of data binding logic, avoid logging sensitive data, use proper data masking/redaction in UI, thorough testing of data flow.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2. State Injection/Manipulation via Interop Bridges (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities in interop bridges between Compose and platform-specific code (e.g., using Platform.current).
  • Insight: Attackers manipulate application state from outside the Compose framework by exploiting weaknesses in interop code.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (State manipulation, logic bypass)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Secure interop design, input validation at interop boundaries, principle of least privilege for platform API access, code reviews of interop code.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1. Gradle Plugin Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Gradle plugins used by Compose Multiplatform.
  • Insight: Compromising the build process and injecting malicious code through vulnerable or malicious Gradle plugins.
  • Likelihood: Low/Medium
  • Impact: Critical (Supply chain compromise, code injection)
  • Effort: Medium/High
  • Skill Level: Medium/High
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation: Use reputable and updated Gradle plugins, dependency vulnerability scanning, build process integrity checks, secure build environment.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4.1. Vulnerable Kotlin Libraries Used by Compose (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in transitive Kotlin libraries used by Compose Multiplatform.
  • Insight: Leveraging known vulnerabilities in dependencies to compromise the application.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium/High (Depends on vulnerability and library)
  • Effort: Low (Using known exploits)
  • Skill Level: Low/Medium (Using known exploits)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Dependency scanning tools, regular dependency updates, SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) management, vulnerability monitoring.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Hardcoding Secrets in Compose UI (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector: Developers mistakenly hardcoding API keys, passwords, or other secrets in Compose UI code.
  • Insight: Secrets become easily discoverable in compiled applications.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: High/Critical (Credential compromise)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy
  • Mitigation: Secure secret management practices (environment variables, key vaults), avoid hardcoding secrets, code reviews, secret scanning tools.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Logging Sensitive Data in UI Components (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Unintentionally logging sensitive user data or application internals within Compose UI components.
  • Insight: Sensitive information is exposed in logs or debugging outputs.
  • Likelihood: Medium/High
  • Impact: Medium/High (Data exposure)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Secure logging practices, avoid logging sensitive data in UI, use structured logging with appropriate levels, log redaction/masking.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3. Client-Side Data Validation Weaknesses (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Relying solely on client-side (Compose UI) validation for security-critical inputs.
  • Insight: Attackers bypass client-side validation and manipulate requests or application state.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Medium/High (Logic bypass, data manipulation)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy
  • Mitigation: Server-side validation as primary security measure, robust client-side validation for UX only, input sanitization, secure data handling practices.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1. Unsafe Platform API Calls from Compose (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Developers using platform-specific APIs (via Platform.current or similar mechanisms) in an insecure manner.
  • Insight: Platform-specific vulnerabilities like file system access issues, process execution flaws, or permission bypasses are introduced.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High (Platform-specific compromise)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Secure coding practices for platform interop, principle of least privilege for API access, input validation for platform API calls, code reviews focusing on interop code.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1. Business Logic Vulnerabilities in UI State Management (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Flaws in the business logic implemented within Compose UI state management.
  • Insight: Incorrect access control checks, flawed authorization logic, or other business logic errors in the UI are exploited.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium/High (Logic bypass, unauthorized access)
  • Effort: Low/Medium
  • Skill Level: Low/Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation: Secure coding practices for business logic in UI, thorough testing of UI logic, separation of concerns (move critical logic to backend), security reviews of UI logic.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1. Compromised Compose Multiplatform Libraries/Dependencies (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers compromise official or third-party Compose Multiplatform libraries or their dependencies.
  • Insight: Malicious code is injected into libraries and distributed to applications using them.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Critical (Widespread compromise, code injection)
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation: Use official repositories, verify library integrity (checksums, signatures), dependency scanning, SBOM management, monitor security advisories for Compose and its dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2. Malicious Gradle Plugins in Compose Ecosystem (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers create or compromise Gradle plugins commonly used in Compose Multiplatform projects.
  • Insight: Malicious code is injected during the build process via compromised Gradle plugins.
  • Likelihood: Low/Medium
  • Impact: Critical (Build process compromise, code injection)
  • Effort: Medium/High
  • Skill Level: Medium/High
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation: Use reputable Gradle plugins, plugin vulnerability scanning, build process integrity checks, secure build environment, plugin code reviews.