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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for korlibs/korge

Attack Surface: Shader Exploits

  • Description: Malicious code injected into shaders used for rendering graphics.
    • How KorGE Contributes: KorGE provides the framework and API for using shaders. The vulnerability arises from KorGE's handling of shader code, particularly if it allows loading or processing of untrusted shader sources.
    • Example: An attacker uploads a custom shader (e.g., through a modding feature) that contains code to perform out-of-bounds memory reads or writes within the GPU context, leading to a crash or potentially further exploitation.
    • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), potential Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the GPU context, information disclosure, visual manipulation.
    • Risk Severity: High (Potentially Critical if ACE is achieved)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Strict Shader Validation: Implement a strict whitelist of allowed shader instructions, functions, and inputs. Reject any shader that doesn't perfectly conform to the whitelist. This is the most important mitigation.
        • No External Shader Loading (Ideal): If at all possible, embed all necessary shaders directly within the application's compiled code. Avoid loading shaders from external files, network sources, or user input.
        • Shader Sandboxing (If Possible): Explore techniques to isolate shader execution, limiting its access to system resources. This is often technically challenging and may not be fully reliable.
        • Shader Linting/Static Analysis: Use static analysis tools designed for shader code to automatically identify potential vulnerabilities before deployment.
        • Robust Error Handling: Ensure that shader compilation and execution errors are handled gracefully and securely, preventing crashes or information leaks that could be exploited.

Attack Surface: Malicious Image/Audio/Font File Loading

  • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in image, audio, or font parsing libraries through crafted input files.
    • How KorGE Contributes: KorGE provides the direct functionality (through its APIs) to load and process these file types. While the underlying vulnerability might reside in a dependency library, KorGE's code is the entry point for the attack.
    • Example: An attacker provides a specially crafted TTF font file that triggers a buffer overflow in the font rendering library used by KorGE, leading to a crash or potentially arbitrary code execution.
    • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), potential Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE).
    • Risk Severity: High (Potentially Critical if ACE is achieved)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Keep Libraries Updated: This is paramount. Ensure that all image, audio, and font parsing libraries used by KorGE (and transitively by Ktor) are kept up-to-date with the latest security patches. Automated dependency management and vulnerability scanning are crucial.
        • Input Validation (Pre-Parsing): Before passing any file data to the parsing libraries, perform thorough validation of file headers, dimensions, claimed formats, and other metadata. Reject files that don't match expected characteristics. This can prevent many exploits before they reach the vulnerable code.
        • Fuzzing: Employ fuzzing techniques specifically targeting the file loading and parsing routines within KorGE (and its dependencies) to proactively discover vulnerabilities.
        • Resource Limits: Impose strict limits on the size and complexity of files that can be loaded to mitigate resource exhaustion attacks and limit the impact of potential exploits.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal (via vfs)

  • Description: An attacker manipulates file paths provided to KorGE's vfs (Virtual File System) to access files outside of the intended, sandboxed directory.
    • How KorGE Contributes: KorGE's vfs API is the direct mechanism through which file system access is performed. The vulnerability arises from how vfs handles (or fails to handle) potentially malicious path strings.
    • Example: An attacker provides a file name like ../../../../etc/shadow (on a Linux system) to a function that uses vfs to read a configuration file, attempting to access the system's shadow password file.
    • Impact: Information disclosure (reading arbitrary files), arbitrary file access (potentially including writing or deleting files), potential code execution (if executable files can be accessed and overwritten).
    • Risk Severity: High (Potentially Critical depending on the accessed files and the system's configuration)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Strict Input Validation (Paramount): Never directly use user-provided input (or any untrusted input) in file paths passed to vfs. Implement extremely rigorous sanitization and validation to ensure that the input cannot contain path traversal sequences like .., /, or absolute paths.
        • Whitelist Approach: Define a strict whitelist of allowed directories and files that the application is permitted to access. Reject any attempt to access files outside of this whitelist. This is a crucial defense-in-depth measure.
        • Use Safe Abstractions: If possible, use higher-level APIs or data structures that abstract away the direct construction of file paths, reducing the risk of introducing path traversal vulnerabilities. For example, use a mapping of logical file names to safe, pre-defined paths.
        • Chroot/Jail (If Feasible): For high-security applications, consider running the application within a restricted environment (chroot jail or a similar containerization technique) to limit its access to the broader file system, even if a path traversal vulnerability exists.