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Attack Tree Analysis for korlibs/korge

Objective: Arbitrary Code Execution on Client Running Korge Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Arbitrary Code Execution on Client Running Korge Application
├── 1. Exploit Korge Rendering Vulnerabilities  [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 1.1  Shader Injection
│   │   └── 1.1.1  Malicious Shader Code via Input [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.2  Texture/Image Manipulation  [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  Crafted Image Files (e.g., buffer overflows) [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.2.3  Resource Exhaustion via Large Textures [HIGH-RISK]
├── 2. Exploit Korge Input Handling
│   └── 2.2  Exploit Korge's Event Handling System
│       └── 2.2.2  Denial of Service via Event Flooding [HIGH-RISK]
├── 3. Exploit Korge's Networking Capabilities (if used) [HIGH-RISK]
│   └── 3.1  Insecure Communication [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]
├── 4. Exploit Korge's File System Access (if used) [HIGH-RISK]
│   └── 4.1  Path Traversal Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]
└── 5. Exploit Korge's Plugin/Extension System (if used) [HIGH-RISK]
    └── 5.1  Malicious Plugins [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Korge Rendering Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

  • 1.1 Shader Injection

    • 1.1.1 Malicious Shader Code via Input [CRITICAL]
      • Description: An attacker provides malicious shader code through user input (e.g., a custom level editor, configuration files, or network messages) that is then executed by the Korge rendering engine. This could lead to arbitrary code execution within the rendering context.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Strictly sanitize and validate all user-provided data used in shader creation or loading.
        • Implement a whitelist of allowed characters, functions, and shader features.
        • Use a secure shader compiler and consider sandboxing the compilation process.
        • Regularly audit Korge's shader handling code.

  • 1.2 Texture/Image Manipulation [HIGH-RISK]

    • 1.2.1 Crafted Image Files (e.g., buffer overflows) [CRITICAL]

      • Description: An attacker provides a specially crafted image file (e.g., PNG, JPG, or a custom format) that exploits a vulnerability in Korge's image parsing or handling code. This could lead to a buffer overflow or other memory corruption, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Use secure image loading libraries (potentially external to Korge).
        • Implement fuzz testing on image loading routines.
        • Validate image dimensions, formats, and headers before processing.
        • Ensure proper bounds checking and memory safety in Korge's image handling code.

    • 1.2.3 Resource Exhaustion via Large Textures [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: An attacker provides excessively large texture files or a large number of textures, causing the application to consume excessive memory or GPU resources. This can lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) condition, making the application unresponsive or crashing it.
      • Likelihood: High
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict limits on texture sizes and the number of textures loaded.
        • Monitor resource usage (memory, GPU memory) and gracefully handle resource exhaustion scenarios.
        • Implement timeouts for texture loading operations.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Korge Input Handling

  • 2.2 Exploit Korge's Event Handling System
    • 2.2.2 Denial of Service via Event Flooding [HIGH-RISK]
      • Description: An attacker sends a large number of input events (e.g., keyboard, mouse, touch) to the Korge application, overwhelming the event handling system. This can lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) condition, making the application unresponsive.
      • Likelihood: High
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement rate limiting on input events.
        • Monitor event queues and gracefully handle overload situations.
        • Consider using a separate thread for event processing to avoid blocking the main application thread.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Korge's Networking Capabilities (if used) [HIGH-RISK]

  • 3.1 Insecure Communication [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]
    • Description: The Korge application communicates with a server or other clients without proper encryption or with weak encryption protocols. This allows an attacker to intercept and potentially modify the communication, leading to data breaches or man-in-the-middle attacks.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation:
      • Use strong encryption (TLS/SSL) for all network communication.
      • Enforce strong cipher suites and avoid using deprecated protocols.
      • Validate server certificates properly.
      • Consider certificate pinning to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Korge's File System Access (if used) [HIGH-RISK]

  • 4.1 Path Traversal Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]
    • Description: An attacker provides a malicious file path that attempts to access files or directories outside of the intended scope. This could allow the attacker to read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the system.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Sanitize all file paths provided by the user or from external sources.
      • Use a whitelist of allowed directories and file names.
      • Avoid using relative paths; use absolute paths based on a secure root directory.
      • Validate that the resulting file path is within the intended directory.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Korge's Plugin/Extension System (if used) [HIGH-RISK]

  • 5.1 Malicious Plugins [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]
    • Description: An attacker provides a malicious plugin or extension that is loaded by the Korge application. This plugin could contain arbitrary code that is executed with the privileges of the application, leading to complete system compromise.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement a secure plugin loading mechanism.
      • Verify the integrity and authenticity of plugins before loading them (e.g., using code signing).
      • Use sandboxing to isolate plugins and limit their access to system resources.
      • Implement a strict plugin API that minimizes the privileges granted to plugins.
      • Regularly audit the plugin API and any loaded plugins.