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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for liujingxing/rxhttp

Attack Surface: URL Injection

  • Description: Attackers can manipulate the URL of an HTTP request by injecting malicious code or characters into URL components, leading to redirection to malicious sites, SSRF, or bypassing security controls.
  • RxHttp Contribution: RxHttp's url() method, when used with unsanitized user input, directly constructs URLs, creating a direct vulnerability point within RxHttp usage.
  • Example:
    • Scenario: An application uses user input to build a URL: rxHttp.url("https://" + userInput + "/api/data").
    • Attack: An attacker provides userInput as malicious.example.com. The resulting URL becomes https://malicious.example.com/api/data, redirecting the request to an attacker-controlled server via RxHttp.
  • Impact:
    • Redirection to malicious websites (phishing, malware distribution).
    • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - accessing internal resources or performing actions on behalf of the server through RxHttp's request.
    • Bypassing security controls or firewalls using manipulated URLs via RxHttp.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization and Validation: Thoroughly sanitize and validate user-provided input before using it in the url() method of RxHttp. Use allowlists for allowed characters and patterns.
    • URL Encoding: Properly URL encode user input before incorporating it into the URL used with RxHttp.
    • Parameterized URLs: Prefer using parameterized URLs where data is passed as parameters rather than directly embedded in the URL path within RxHttp calls.
    • Avoid Direct User Input in URL Construction with RxHttp: Minimize or eliminate the use of direct user input in constructing URLs within RxHttp calls. If necessary, use secure URL building libraries or functions before passing to RxHttp.

Attack Surface: Header Injection (High Severity Case: HTTP Response Splitting)

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious headers into HTTP requests by manipulating header values, specifically to achieve HTTP response splitting. This allows attackers to inject arbitrary content into the HTTP response stream.
  • RxHttp Contribution: RxHttp's addHeader() and similar methods allow adding custom headers. Unsanitized user input used as header values in RxHttp directly enables header injection vulnerabilities.
  • Example:
    • Scenario: An application sets a custom header using user input via RxHttp: rxHttp.addHeader("Custom-Header", userInput).
    • Attack: An attacker provides userInput as Value\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<html><body><h1>Injected Content</h1></body></html>. If the backend is vulnerable, this can lead to HTTP response splitting through RxHttp.
  • Impact:
    • HTTP Response Splitting - injecting malicious content into the response delivered via RxHttp, potentially leading to XSS or other client-side attacks.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Sanitization and Validation: Rigorous sanitization and validation of user input before setting it as header values using RxHttp. Restrict allowed characters and patterns to prevent control characters like \r and \n.
    • Predefined Header Values: Favor using predefined, safe header values instead of user-provided input when using RxHttp's header methods.
    • Secure Header Handling Libraries: Consider using libraries or functions designed for secure HTTP header handling before setting headers with RxHttp.

Attack Surface: Parameter Injection (High Severity Case: Backend Injection Vulnerabilities)

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious parameters into HTTP requests (query, path, or body parameters) by manipulating parameter values. This can lead to severe backend vulnerabilities like SQL Injection or Command Injection if these parameters are unsafely processed on the server-side.
  • RxHttp Contribution: RxHttp's methods like addQueryParam(), addPathParam(), and addBodyParam() are used to add parameters. Unsanitized user input passed to these RxHttp methods directly contributes to the risk of parameter injection leading to backend exploits.
  • Example:
    • Scenario: An application uses user input for a search query parameter via RxHttp: rxHttp.addQueryParam("search", userInput).
    • Attack: An attacker provides userInput as '; DROP TABLE users; --. If the backend directly uses this parameter in a SQL query without sanitization, RxHttp's parameter passing facilitates SQL injection.
  • Impact:
    • SQL Injection (backend vulnerability) - database manipulation, data breaches, achieved through parameters passed by RxHttp.
    • Command Injection (backend vulnerability) - execution of arbitrary commands on the server, triggered by parameters sent via RxHttp.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization and Validation (RxHttp Side): Sanitize and validate user input before using it as parameter values in RxHttp methods. Use appropriate encoding (e.g., URL encoding for query parameters).
    • Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements (Backend): Crucially, on the backend, use parameterized queries or prepared statements to prevent SQL injection, regardless of how parameters are passed from the client (including via RxHttp).
    • Input Validation on Backend: Implement robust input validation on the backend as a defense-in-depth measure against malicious parameters, even if passed through RxHttp.

Attack Surface: Insecure Interceptor Implementation (High Severity Case: Denial of Service or Data Manipulation)

  • Description: Poorly implemented interceptors in RxHttp can introduce vulnerabilities leading to Denial of Service (DoS) due to performance bottlenecks or data manipulation that compromises application logic or security.
  • RxHttp Contribution: RxHttp's interceptor mechanism, while powerful, becomes a direct attack surface if interceptors are not implemented securely and efficiently. Insecure interceptors within RxHttp directly impact request/response processing.
  • Example:
    • Scenario: An interceptor in RxHttp performs a computationally expensive operation on every request, or modifies request data in a way that bypasses security checks.
    • Attack: An attacker can trigger numerous requests, causing the inefficient interceptor to consume excessive resources, leading to DoS. Alternatively, manipulated request data via a flawed interceptor could bypass security measures.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) - application becomes unavailable due to resource exhaustion caused by inefficient RxHttp interceptors.
    • Data Manipulation - interceptors altering requests or responses in ways that compromise application integrity or security.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Coding Practices for Interceptors: Adhere to secure coding practices when developing RxHttp interceptors. Ensure efficiency and avoid resource-intensive operations within interceptors.
    • Thorough Testing and Performance Profiling of Interceptors: Rigorous testing and performance profiling of interceptor implementations are crucial to identify and resolve performance bottlenecks and logic flaws.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Interceptors: Design interceptors to perform only necessary actions and avoid overly complex or broad modifications of requests/responses.

Attack Surface: Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Custom Deserializers)

  • Description: If custom deserializers are used with RxHttp to process untrusted data (especially from responses), critical deserialization vulnerabilities can arise, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • RxHttp Contribution: RxHttp's flexibility in allowing custom deserialization directly introduces the risk of deserialization vulnerabilities if developers use insecure deserialization practices when integrating libraries like Gson or Jackson within RxHttp's data handling.
  • Example:
    • Scenario: An application uses a custom deserializer with Gson within RxHttp to process JSON responses without proper input validation.
    • Attack: An attacker crafts a malicious JSON response that, when deserialized by the custom deserializer in RxHttp, executes arbitrary code on the application server. RxHttp's deserialization process becomes the entry point for this attack.
  • Impact:
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) - attackers gain the ability to execute arbitrary code on the server through RxHttp's deserialization process.
    • Data Breaches - complete access to sensitive data on the server due to RCE via RxHttp.
    • System Compromise - full control over the application server resulting from RCE initiated through RxHttp.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Deserializing Untrusted Data (RxHttp Context): Minimize or completely avoid deserializing untrusted data within RxHttp's data processing pipeline, especially when using custom deserializers.
    • Secure Deserialization Practices: If deserialization is unavoidable, implement secure deserialization practices. Carefully review and harden custom deserialization logic used with RxHttp.
    • Input Validation Before Deserialization (RxHttp Context): Validate data before it is passed to deserialization processes within RxHttp to ensure it conforms to expected formats and does not contain malicious payloads.
    • Use Libraries with Deserialization Protection: If possible, utilize deserialization libraries that offer built-in protection against deserialization attacks or configure them for maximum security when used with RxHttp.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Server-Side): Run the application with minimal necessary privileges on the server to limit the potential damage from RCE vulnerabilities exploited through RxHttp's deserialization.