attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for mikepenz/android-iconics

Objective: To achieve arbitrary code execution or sensitive data access within the target Android application by exploiting vulnerabilities in the android-iconics library or its usage.

Attack Tree Visualization

• Attack Goal: Compromise Application via android-iconics (Critical Node - Root Goal)
  • Exploit Vulnerabilities in android-iconics Library (Critical Node - Primary Attack Vector)
    • 1. Exploit Font Loading/Parsing Vulnerabilities (Critical Node - High Risk Area)
      • 1.1. Malicious Font File Injection (High-Risk Path - Code Execution Potential)
        • 1.1.1. Replace Bundled Font File (App Tampering) (Critical Node - Feasible Injection Method)
          • Goal: Achieve Code Execution or DoS via Malformed Font
        • 1.1.2. Supply Chain Attack (Compromised Library) (Critical Node - High Impact, Low Likelihood but Severe)
          • Goal: Distribute Malicious Library Update with Malformed Fonts
      • 1.2. Font Parsing Vulnerabilities (Within Library Code) (Critical Node - High Risk of Exploitable Bugs) (High-Risk Path - Code Execution Potential)
        • 1.2.1. Buffer Overflow in Font Parsing (Critical Node - Classic High Impact Vulnerability)
          • Goal: Achieve Code Execution or DoS
        • 1.2.2. Integer Overflow/Underflow in Size Calculations (Critical Node - Memory Corruption Risk)
          • Goal: Achieve DoS or Unexpected Behavior, Potentially Memory Corruption

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Font Loading/Parsing Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vector: The android-iconics library loads and parses font files (likely TrueType or similar formats) to render icons. Vulnerabilities can exist in the code responsible for parsing these complex file formats.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Malicious Font File Injection (High-Risk Path - Code Execution Potential)

• Attack Vector: An attacker aims to introduce a specially crafted, malicious font file into the application's font loading process. If the library's font parsing code has vulnerabilities, processing this malicious font can trigger those vulnerabilities.

  • 1.1.1. Replace Bundled Font File (App Tampering) (Critical Node - Feasible Injection Method):
    • Attack Vector:
      • The attacker gains unauthorized access to the application's APK file (e.g., through device compromise, malware distribution targeting developer build environments, or compromised distribution channels).
      • The attacker modifies the APK by replacing one or more of the font files bundled within the application's assets or resources with a malicious font file.
      • When the application is installed or updated with the tampered APK, it will load and attempt to parse the malicious font file using android-iconics.
      • If font parsing vulnerabilities exist (like buffer overflows or integer overflows), parsing the malicious font can lead to code execution within the application's context or a denial of service (application crash).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Supply Chain Attack (Compromised Library) (Critical Node - High Impact, Low Likelihood but Severe)

    *   **Attack Vector:**
        *   The attacker compromises the development or distribution infrastructure of the `android-iconics` library itself (e.g., by compromising a maintainer's account, build servers, or repository access).
        *   The attacker injects malicious code or malicious font files into a legitimate update of the `android-iconics` library.
        *   Developers using dependency management tools (like Gradle in Android) automatically download and integrate the compromised library update into their applications.
        *   Applications built with the compromised library will now bundle the malicious font or vulnerable code.
        *   When these applications are distributed to users and run, the malicious font or code within the compromised library can be triggered, potentially leading to widespread compromise of applications using the updated library.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Font Parsing Vulnerabilities (Within Library Code) (Critical Node - High Risk of Exploitable Bugs) (High-Risk Path - Code Execution Potential)

• Attack Vector: The android-iconics library's code responsible for parsing font files contains inherent complexity. This complexity can lead to programming errors that manifest as security vulnerabilities.

  • 1.2.1. Buffer Overflow in Font Parsing (Critical Node - Classic High Impact Vulnerability):
    • Attack Vector:
      • The font parsing code in android-iconics might not correctly validate the size of data read from the font file.
      • A malicious font file can be crafted to contain data fields that exceed the expected buffer sizes in the parsing code.
      • When the library attempts to parse this oversized data, it can write beyond the allocated memory buffer, leading to a buffer overflow.
      • Attackers can carefully craft the malicious font to overwrite critical memory regions, potentially including program execution pointers.
      • By controlling the overwritten execution pointers, the attacker can redirect program flow to attacker-controlled code, achieving arbitrary code execution within the application's process.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2. Integer Overflow/Underflow in Size Calculations (Critical Node - Memory Corruption Risk)

    *   **Attack Vector:**
        *   The font parsing code might perform calculations related to font data sizes (e.g., glyph sizes, table offsets, memory allocation sizes) using integer arithmetic.
        *   A malicious font file can be crafted to cause integer overflows or underflows in these calculations. For example, providing extremely large values that wrap around when stored in integer variables.
        *   These overflows/underflows can lead to incorrect memory allocation sizes, incorrect loop bounds, or other unexpected behavior in the parsing code.
        *   This can result in memory corruption, denial of service (application crash due to invalid memory access), or potentially exploitable conditions that could be chained with other vulnerabilities to achieve code execution.