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Attack Surface Analysis for mikepenz/materialdrawer

Attack Surface: Indirect Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Facilitation via User-Controlled URLs in Drawer Items

  • Description: MaterialDrawer provides a mechanism to associate data with drawer items, including the ability to easily handle URLs for icons or other purposes. If application developers use user-controlled or untrusted data to populate these URLs and subsequently use these URLs in backend requests without proper validation, it can create an indirect Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the application. MaterialDrawer itself doesn't cause the SSRF, but it facilitates the easy integration of user-influenced URLs into the UI, which can be a stepping stone to SSRF if application logic is flawed.

  • MaterialDrawer Contribution: MaterialDrawer simplifies the process of associating data, including URLs, with drawer items and handling user interactions with these items. This ease of use can inadvertently encourage developers to directly use data from drawer items (which might be populated from untrusted sources) in backend requests without sufficient security considerations.

  • Example: An attacker manipulates data that populates a drawer item's URL field (e.g., via a compromised profile or malicious data synchronization). When a user interacts with this drawer item, the application uses the associated URL to fetch data from a server without validating the URL. The attacker could provide a URL pointing to an internal resource, allowing them to bypass firewalls and access sensitive internal services or data.

  • Impact: Critical. Successful SSRF can lead to:

    • Unauthorized access to internal systems and data.
    • Data exfiltration from internal networks.
    • Remote code execution on internal servers (in severe cases).
    • Denial of service of internal services.

  • Risk Severity: Critical (Due to the potential for severe compromise of backend systems and sensitive data).

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Strict URL Validation and Whitelisting (Application Level): Crucially, the application must implement robust validation and whitelisting of all URLs before using them in backend requests. Do not directly use URLs sourced from drawer item data without thorough security checks.
    • Input Sanitization (Application Level): Sanitize any data used to construct URLs, even if indirectly sourced from drawer items.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Backend): Limit the permissions of backend services making requests initiated by the application.
    • Network Segmentation (Backend): Isolate internal networks and services to minimize the impact of SSRF attacks.
    • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct security audits and penetration testing to identify and remediate potential SSRF vulnerabilities in the application's interaction with MaterialDrawer and backend systems.