attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for mikepenz/materialdrawer

Objective: Compromise Application using MaterialDrawer

Attack Tree Visualization

• Attack Goal: Compromise Application using MaterialDrawer [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Exploit MaterialDrawer Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Client-Side Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Drawer Content [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Inject Malicious Script via Drawer Item Text/HTML
          • Application fails to sanitize user-controlled data used in Drawer items [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Dependency Vulnerabilities in MaterialDrawer [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Exploit Vulnerable Dependencies of MaterialDrawer [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Identify Outdated or Vulnerable Dependencies used by MaterialDrawer [HIGH-RISK PATH]
          • Analyze MaterialDrawer's build.gradle or similar dependency files [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in those Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]
          • Leverage public exploits for identified vulnerable dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • Misconfiguration/Misuse of MaterialDrawer in Application [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Insecure Implementation of Drawer Item Actions [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Application code handles Drawer item clicks insecurely [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Drawer item actions trigger vulnerable application functionalities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Lack of proper input validation or authorization in Drawer item action handlers [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Application doesn't validate user input or permissions when handling Drawer actions [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Insecure Deep Linking/Navigation via Drawer [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Drawer items trigger deep links or navigation actions [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Drawer is used as a navigation mechanism within the application [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Deep links/navigation actions are vulnerable to manipulation or injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Application's deep link handling or navigation logic is insecure and exploitable [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Attack Goal: Compromise Application using MaterialDrawer [CRITICAL NODE]

• This is the ultimate objective of the attacker. Success here means the attacker has achieved some level of control or negative impact on the application through vulnerabilities related to MaterialDrawer.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit MaterialDrawer Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• This node represents the broad category of attacks that directly target weaknesses within the MaterialDrawer library itself or its integration points.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Client-Side Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• This focuses on vulnerabilities that manifest and are exploitable within the user's browser or client-side environment when interacting with the MaterialDrawer UI.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Drawer Content [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Injecting malicious JavaScript code into the content of the MaterialDrawer (e.g., item text, descriptions).
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker finds a way to inject script into data used to populate Drawer items (e.g., via application input vulnerability).
    • When the Drawer is rendered, the script executes in the user's browser.
  • Impact: Full client-side compromise, session hijacking, cookie theft, redirection to malicious sites, defacement, actions performed on behalf of the user.
  • Mitigation: Strict input sanitization of all user-controlled data used in Drawer content, Content Security Policy (CSP), regular MaterialDrawer updates.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Application fails to sanitize user-controlled data used in Drawer items [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The application's failure to properly sanitize user-provided or user-influenced data before displaying it in the MaterialDrawer.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker provides malicious input through application interfaces (forms, APIs, etc.).
    • Application stores or processes this data without sanitization.
    • This unsanitized data is used to populate Drawer items.
  • Impact: XSS vulnerabilities as described above.
  • Mitigation: Implement robust input sanitization and validation at all application input points, especially before data is used in UI components like MaterialDrawer.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Dependency Vulnerabilities in MaterialDrawer [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in the dependencies used by the MaterialDrawer library.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker identifies outdated or vulnerable dependencies of MaterialDrawer (e.g., by analyzing build.gradle).
    • Attacker leverages public exploits for these known vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Depends on the specific vulnerability, but can range from Denial of Service (DoS) to Remote Code Execution (RCE), potentially compromising the entire application and server.
  • Mitigation: Regularly update MaterialDrawer and all its dependencies, use dependency scanning tools, monitor vulnerability databases for alerts.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Exploit Vulnerable Dependencies of MaterialDrawer [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The general path of identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities within MaterialDrawer's dependencies.
  • Attack Steps: As described in "Dependency Vulnerabilities in MaterialDrawer".
  • Impact: As described in "Dependency Vulnerabilities in MaterialDrawer".
  • Mitigation: As described in "Dependency Vulnerabilities in MaterialDrawer".

Attack Tree Path: 8. Identify Outdated or Vulnerable Dependencies used by MaterialDrawer [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The initial step in exploiting dependency vulnerabilities - identifying the vulnerable components.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker analyzes MaterialDrawer's dependency files (e.g., build.gradle).
    • Attacker uses vulnerability databases or tools to check for known vulnerabilities in the identified dependencies and their versions.
  • Impact: Sets the stage for exploiting dependency vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation: Proactive dependency scanning and management are crucial to prevent this step from being successful for attackers.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Analyze MaterialDrawer's build.gradle or similar dependency files [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The specific action of examining dependency files to gather information about dependencies.
  • Attack Steps: Attacker directly inspects the project's dependency configuration files.
  • Impact: Provides attackers with the necessary information to proceed with dependency vulnerability exploitation.
  • Mitigation: While you can't prevent attackers from analyzing public files, robust dependency management and scanning are the key mitigations.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in those Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The action of actively using exploits against identified vulnerable dependencies.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker finds or develops exploits for the identified vulnerabilities.
    • Attacker deploys these exploits against the application.
  • Impact: As described in "Dependency Vulnerabilities in MaterialDrawer".
  • Mitigation: Patching vulnerabilities promptly is the primary mitigation. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) can help detect exploitation attempts.

Attack Tree Path: 11. Leverage public exploits for identified vulnerable dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Specifically using publicly available exploits, which lowers the barrier to entry for attackers.
  • Attack Steps: Attacker searches for and utilizes publicly available exploit code or tools for the identified vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Increases the likelihood of successful exploitation due to readily available tools.
  • Mitigation: Rapid patching is even more critical when public exploits exist.

Attack Tree Path: 12. Misconfiguration/Misuse of MaterialDrawer in Application [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• This node represents vulnerabilities arising from how developers incorrectly or insecurely implement MaterialDrawer features within their application code.

Attack Tree Path: 13. Insecure Implementation of Drawer Item Actions [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities introduced by insecurely handling actions triggered when users interact with Drawer items (e.g., clicking on a menu item).
  • Attack Steps:
    • Developer implements Drawer item actions that directly trigger sensitive functionalities without proper authorization or input validation.
    • Attacker manipulates Drawer interactions to exploit these insecure action handlers.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to functionalities, data manipulation, privilege escalation, unintended application behavior.
  • Mitigation: Implement secure action handling for all Drawer item interactions, enforce authorization checks before executing sensitive actions, validate and sanitize all user input from Drawer interactions.

Attack Tree Path: 14. Application code handles Drawer item clicks insecurely [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The application's code responsible for processing Drawer item clicks is written in a way that introduces vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Steps: As described in "Insecure Implementation of Drawer Item Actions".
  • Impact: As described in "Insecure Implementation of Drawer Item Actions".
  • Mitigation: Secure coding practices, thorough code reviews, and security testing of Drawer action handling logic.

Attack Tree Path: 15. Drawer item actions trigger vulnerable application functionalities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Drawer items are directly linked to application functionalities that are themselves vulnerable (e.g., due to missing authorization or input validation).
  • Attack Steps: Attacker uses Drawer navigation to directly access and exploit pre-existing vulnerabilities in application functionalities.
  • Impact: Exploitation of underlying application vulnerabilities, potentially leading to significant compromise.
  • Mitigation: Secure all application functionalities, regardless of how they are accessed (including via UI elements like MaterialDrawer).

Attack Tree Path: 16. Lack of proper input validation or authorization in Drawer item action handlers [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Specifically, the absence or inadequacy of input validation and authorization checks in the code that handles Drawer item actions.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Developer fails to validate user input received from Drawer interactions.
    • Developer fails to implement proper authorization checks before executing actions triggered by Drawer items.
    • Attacker exploits these omissions to bypass security controls.
  • Impact: Unauthorized actions, data manipulation, privilege escalation.
  • Mitigation: Mandatory input validation and authorization checks for all Drawer item action handlers.

Attack Tree Path: 17. Application doesn't validate user input or permissions when handling Drawer actions [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The application's failure to perform input validation and authorization for Drawer actions.
  • Attack Steps: As described in "Lack of proper input validation or authorization in Drawer item action handlers".
  • Impact: As described in "Lack of proper input validation or authorization in Drawer item action handlers".
  • Mitigation: As described in "Lack of proper input validation or authorization in Drawer item action handlers".

Attack Tree Path: 18. Insecure Deep Linking/Navigation via Drawer [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities arising from the use of MaterialDrawer for navigation via deep links, where the deep link handling is insecure.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Drawer items trigger deep links or navigation actions within the application.
    • Application's deep link handling logic is vulnerable to manipulation or injection.
    • Attacker manipulates deep links via the Drawer to redirect users or trigger unintended actions.
  • Impact: Redirection to malicious sites, bypassing application flow, triggering unintended actions, potentially leading to more severe vulnerabilities depending on the application's deep link handling.
  • Mitigation: Implement secure deep link handling, validate and sanitize all deep link parameters, enforce authorization before navigation via deep links, consider URL whitelisting/blacklisting.

Attack Tree Path: 19. Drawer items trigger deep links or navigation actions [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The application's design choice to use Drawer items for navigation via deep links, which introduces the potential for deep link related vulnerabilities if not handled securely.
  • Attack Steps: This is a prerequisite for deep link attacks via the Drawer.
  • Impact: Exposes the application to deep link vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation: If using Drawer for deep linking, prioritize secure deep link implementation.

Attack Tree Path: 20. Drawer is used as a navigation mechanism within the application [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The application's architectural decision to use the Drawer as a primary navigation method, making it a critical point for navigation-based attacks.
  • Attack Steps: This is a design characteristic that influences the attack surface.
  • Impact: Increases the relevance and potential impact of deep link and navigation vulnerabilities related to the Drawer.
  • Mitigation: Recognize the Drawer's role in navigation and ensure all navigation paths, especially those accessible via the Drawer, are secure.

Attack Tree Path: 21. Deep links/navigation actions are vulnerable to manipulation or injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The core vulnerability in the deep link handling logic itself, allowing attackers to manipulate or inject malicious parameters.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker identifies that deep link parameters are not validated or sanitized.
    • Attacker crafts malicious deep links with manipulated parameters.
  • Impact: As described in "Insecure Deep Linking/Navigation via Drawer".
  • Mitigation: Robust input validation and sanitization for all deep link parameters, secure deep link parsing and processing logic.

Attack Tree Path: 22. Application's deep link handling or navigation logic is insecure and exploitable [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The application's code responsible for handling deep links and navigation contains exploitable vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Steps: As described in "Insecure Deep Linking/Navigation via Drawer".
  • Impact: As described in "Insecure Deep Linking/Navigation via Drawer".
  • Mitigation: Secure coding practices for deep link handling, thorough security testing of deep link navigation logic.