attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for mikepenz/materialdrawer

Attack Surface: 1. Transitive Dependency Vulnerabilities

• Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in libraries that materialdrawer depends on (and their dependencies).
• materialdrawer Contribution: The library's dependency tree introduces potential vulnerabilities that wouldn't exist without its use. This is a direct contribution because the library chooses these dependencies.
• Example: A vulnerability in an older version of the Android Support Library (a transitive dependency) could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges.
• Impact: Varies widely, from information disclosure to remote code execution, depending on the specific vulnerability.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability in the dependency).
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Regularly update all dependencies (including materialdrawer) to their latest stable versions. Use dependency analysis tools (e.g., gradle dependencies, OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk) to identify and track vulnerabilities. Consider dependency pinning to specific, known-good versions. This is the most crucial mitigation for this direct risk.
  • Users: Keep the application updated to the latest version released by the developers.

Attack Surface: 2. Intent Redirection via Click Handlers (If materialdrawer provides default handling)

• Description: An attacker could craft a malicious Intent if click handlers for drawer items use unvalidated user input to construct Intents. This is only included if materialdrawer itself provides some default Intent handling that is not fully under the application developer's control. If the application fully controls the Intent creation, this is an indirect risk.
• materialdrawer Contribution: Potentially direct if the library has built-in Intent handling that is not fully configurable by the application developer. If the application developer has complete control over the Intent construction, this is an indirect risk and would be excluded from this list. I am including it here with this caveat because drawer libraries sometimes provide convenience methods that might handle Intents.
• Example: A drawer item's click handler, using a default materialdrawer mechanism, launches an Intent based on a URL provided by the user (or even a hardcoded, but attacker-influenceable, value). The attacker provides a malicious URL.
• Impact: Can lead to various attacks, including phishing, launching malicious activities, or accessing sensitive data.
• Risk Severity: High.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: If materialdrawer provides any default Intent handling, carefully review its documentation and implementation. Override or disable any default behavior that uses potentially untrusted data. Always validate and sanitize any data used to construct Intents, even if it seems to come from a trusted source within the library. Prefer explicit Intents.
  • Users: No direct mitigation, relies on developer implementation.

Attack Surface: 3. Custom View Vulnerabilities (If MaterialDrawer provides default custom views)

• Description: If MaterialDrawer provides default custom views within the drawer, vulnerabilities in those custom views can be exploited.
  • materialdrawer Contribution: The library provides default custom views.
  • Example: A default custom view that renders HTML without proper sanitization could be vulnerable to XSS.
  • Impact: Depends on the specific vulnerability in the custom view; could range from XSS to arbitrary code execution.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the custom view).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: If MaterialDrawer provides default custom views, thoroughly test and audit them for security vulnerabilities.
    • Users: No direct mitigation.