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Attack Tree Analysis for oracle/helidon

Objective: Gain Unauthorized RCE on Helidon Application Server [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized RCE on Helidon Application Server [CRITICAL]

└── 1. Exploit Helidon Core/Server Vulnerabilities ├── 1.2 Vulnerabilities in Helidon's Serialization/Deserialization [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.2.1 Insecure Deserialization of Untrusted Data [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.2.1.1 Craft malicious serialized objects [CRITICAL] └── 1.3 Configuration Errors Specific to Helidon [HIGH RISK] ├── 1.3.1 Misconfigured Security Providers [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.3.1.1 Weak or default credentials for Helidon's security features └── 1.3.2 Exposure of Internal Endpoints [HIGH RISK] └── 1.3.2.1 Accidental exposure of Helidon's management or monitoring endpoints

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Vulnerabilities in Helidon's Serialization/Deserialization [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This category encompasses vulnerabilities arising from how Helidon handles the serialization and, crucially, deserialization of data. If Helidon, or any of its dependencies, deserializes data from untrusted sources without proper validation, it becomes highly vulnerable to code execution attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Insecure Deserialization of Untrusted Data [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This is the most dangerous vulnerability within this category. It occurs when an application deserializes data (e.g., Java serialized objects, YAML, JSON with type information) received from an untrusted source (like user input) without verifying the safety of the classes being instantiated.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1 Craft malicious serialized objects [CRITICAL]

  • Description: An attacker crafts a specially designed serialized object (often called a "gadget chain") that, when deserialized by the vulnerable application, triggers a sequence of method calls that ultimately lead to arbitrary code execution. This is a classic Java deserialization attack, and it can affect any framework that uses vulnerable deserialization libraries or practices. * Likelihood: High (If untrusted data is deserialized) * Impact: Very High (RCE, complete system compromise) * Effort: Medium to High (Requires knowledge of serialization gadgets and the target application's classpath) * Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Hard (Often requires deep inspection of serialized data; may not be obvious in logs) * Mitigation: * Avoid Deserializing Untrusted Data: The best defense is to never deserialize data from untrusted sources. * Use Allow Lists: If deserialization is unavoidable, implement strict allow lists (whitelists) of classes that are permitted to be deserialized. Deny everything else. * Use Safer Serialization Formats: Consider using data formats less prone to deserialization vulnerabilities, such as JSON with strict schema validation and no type information. Avoid Java serialization whenever possible. * Keep Libraries Updated: Ensure that all libraries involved in serialization/deserialization (e.g., Jackson, SnakeYAML) are up-to-date with the latest security patches. * Monitor and Audit: Implement monitoring and auditing to detect attempts to exploit deserialization vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Configuration Errors Specific to Helidon [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This category covers vulnerabilities that arise from incorrect or insecure configurations of the Helidon framework itself. These are often due to human error or oversight during deployment.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Misconfigured Security Providers [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Helidon provides various security features (authentication, authorization, etc.). If these are misconfigured, it can lead to unauthorized access and privilege escalation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.1 Weak or default credentials for Helidon's security features

  • Description: Using default passwords (e.g., "admin/admin") or easily guessable passwords for Helidon's security providers (e.g., for database connections, management interfaces) allows attackers to easily gain access. * Likelihood: Medium (Human error is common) * Impact: High (Unauthorized access, privilege escalation) * Effort: Very Low (Often just trying default credentials) * Skill Level: Script Kiddie * Detection Difficulty: Easy (Audit logs, configuration reviews) * Mitigation: * Use Strong, Unique Passwords: Always use strong, unique passwords for all Helidon security providers. * Implement Password Policies: Enforce password policies that require complexity and regular changes. * Use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Where possible, enable MFA for critical accounts. * Regularly Audit Configurations: Review Helidon's security configurations regularly to ensure they are secure.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2 Exposure of Internal Endpoints [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Helidon, like many frameworks, may have internal endpoints (e.g., for monitoring, metrics, health checks) that are not intended for public access. If these are exposed without proper authentication, they can leak sensitive information or provide an attacker with a foothold.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2.1 Accidental exposure of Helidon's management or monitoring endpoints

  • Description: Endpoints like /metrics, /health, or custom management interfaces might be accidentally exposed to the public internet or an untrusted network. * Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration) * Impact: Medium to High (Information disclosure, potential for further attacks) * Effort: Very Low (Port scanning, directory brute-forcing) * Skill Level: Script Kiddie * Detection Difficulty: Easy (Port scanning, network monitoring) * Mitigation: * Disable Unnecessary Endpoints: Disable any internal endpoints that are not strictly required in production. * Require Authentication: Ensure that all internal endpoints are protected by strong authentication and authorization. * Use Network Segmentation: Isolate internal endpoints from the public internet using network segmentation (e.g., firewalls, private networks). * Regularly Scan for Exposed Ports: Use port scanning tools to identify any unintentionally exposed services.