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Threat Model Analysis for oracle/helidon

Threat: Bypass Authentication via Misconfigured Security Provider

  • Threat: Bypass Authentication via Misconfigured Security Provider

    • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious request that exploits a misconfiguration in the Helidon security provider. They might provide an invalid JWT token that is incorrectly accepted due to a missing or flawed validation rule in JwtProvider, or exploit a misconfigured role mapping in OidcProvider to gain unauthorized access. The attacker actively probes the security configuration for weaknesses.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to protected resources, data breaches, potential for complete system compromise if administrative endpoints are exposed.
    • Helidon Component Affected: helidon-security (MP and SE), specifically the configured security providers (e.g., JwtProvider, OidcProvider, HttpBasicAuthProvider), configuration files (application.yaml, microprofile-config.properties), and any custom security implementations within Helidon's security framework.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Configuration Validation: Use schema validation for configuration files. Implement unit and integration tests that specifically target the Helidon security provider configuration, testing various valid and invalid inputs, including edge cases and known attack vectors.
      • Least Privilege: Enforce the principle of least privilege within Helidon's role-based access control. Avoid overly permissive configurations.
      • Regular Audits: Conduct regular security audits of the Helidon security configuration, focusing on provider settings and role mappings.
      • Secret Management: Use a secure secret management system for sensitive configuration values used by Helidon security providers.

Threat: Denial of Service via Reactive Stream Mismanagement (Helidon SE)

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Reactive Stream Mismanagement (Helidon SE)

    • Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests or a specially crafted request designed to overwhelm Helidon SE's reactive stream processing. This exploits missing backpressure handling, unbounded queues, or inefficient stream processing within Helidon's WebServer. The attacker aims to exhaust server resources.
    • Impact: Application becomes unresponsive, services become unavailable, potential for complete system outage.
    • Helidon Component Affected: helidon-webserver (SE), specifically the reactive stream processing logic within the server's request handling pipeline. This includes the use of Flow.Publisher, Flow.Subscriber, and related reactive operators as part of the Helidon WebServer implementation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Backpressure Implementation: Implement proper backpressure handling in all reactive streams used by the Helidon WebServer. Use operators like limitRate, buffer, or custom backpressure strategies.
      • Resource Limits: Set limits on the size of buffers, queues, and other resources used in Helidon's reactive stream processing.
      • Timeout Handling: Implement timeouts for all operations within Helidon's reactive streams to prevent indefinite blocking.
      • Load Testing: Conduct thorough load testing, specifically targeting Helidon's WebServer, to identify potential bottlenecks and resource exhaustion vulnerabilities. Simulate DoS attack scenarios.

Threat: Remote Code Execution via Vulnerable Helidon Dependency

  • Threat: Remote Code Execution via Vulnerable Helidon Dependency

    • Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in a Helidon-provided library or Helidon itself to execute arbitrary code on the server. The attacker leverages a publicly disclosed exploit or a zero-day vulnerability specific to a Helidon component.
    • Impact: Complete system compromise, data exfiltration, ability to install malware, potential for lateral movement.
    • Helidon Component Affected: Any Helidon-provided module or library (e.g., helidon-webserver, helidon-security, helidon-config, etc.). This threat is specific to vulnerabilities within Helidon's codebase or its direct, managed dependencies.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Dependency Scanning: Use a dependency scanning tool, focusing on Helidon and its declared dependencies. Integrate this into your CI/CD pipeline.
      • Regular Updates: Keep Helidon and all its official dependencies updated to the latest stable versions. Subscribe to security advisories specifically for Helidon.
      • Vulnerability Monitoring: Continuously monitor for newly discovered vulnerabilities in Helidon and its managed dependencies.

Threat: Object Injection via Unsafe Deserialization in Helidon Media

  • Threat: Object Injection via Unsafe Deserialization in Helidon Media

    • Description: An attacker sends a crafted request containing serialized data (JSON or XML) that, when deserialized by Helidon's media support libraries, leads to object instantiation or code execution. This exploits vulnerabilities in Helidon's handling of untrusted input during deserialization.
    • Impact: Remote code execution, denial of service, data corruption, potential for complete system compromise.
    • Helidon Component Affected: helidon-media-jsonp, helidon-media-jsonb, helidon-media-jackson (MP and SE). Specifically, the use of these libraries to deserialize untrusted input.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid Untrusted Deserialization: Minimize or eliminate deserialization of data from untrusted sources using Helidon's media libraries.
      • Whitelist Approach: If deserialization is unavoidable, use a strict whitelist approach to restrict the types of objects that Helidon's libraries can deserialize.
      • Input Validation: Validate the structure and content of the serialized data before it is processed by Helidon's deserialization mechanisms.
      • Security Manager: Consider using a Java Security Manager to restrict the permissions of objects deserialized by Helidon.

Threat: gRPC Service Exploitation within Helidon

  • Threat: gRPC Service Exploitation within Helidon

    • Description: An attacker sends malicious gRPC requests to exploit vulnerabilities in the service implementation running within Helidon's gRPC server. This could involve sending invalid input, overflowing buffers, or exploiting logic flaws in the service methods exposed through Helidon.
    • Impact: Remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service.
    • Helidon Component Affected: helidon-grpc-server (MP and SE), and the specific gRPC service implementations hosted by Helidon.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Robust Input Validation: Implement thorough input validation for all gRPC service methods within the Helidon context. Use Protobuf's validation features.
      • Authentication and Authorization: Use Helidon's security features to authenticate and authorize access to gRPC services managed by Helidon.
      • TLS Encryption: Use TLS for all gRPC communication handled by helidon-grpc-server.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting within Helidon to prevent denial-of-service attacks targeting gRPC services.

Threat: Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) in Helidon

  • Threat: Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) in Helidon

    • Description: An attacker tricks a user's browser into establishing a WebSocket connection to the Helidon application from a malicious site, exploiting Helidon's WebSocket handling. The attacker can then send/receive messages, potentially accessing sensitive data.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to data, impersonation of the user.
    • Helidon Component Affected: helidon-webserver (SE) and helidon-websocket (MP), specifically the WebSocket endpoint configuration and handling of the Origin header within Helidon's implementation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Origin Validation: Strictly validate the Origin header of incoming WebSocket connection requests within Helidon's WebSocket handling. Only allow connections from trusted origins, configured within Helidon.
      • CSRF Protection: Implement CSRF protection for WebSocket connections established with Helidon, using tokens or other authentication.
      • Secure WebSocket (WSS): Use secure WebSockets (WSS) with TLS encryption, configured within Helidon.