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Attack Tree Analysis for reactivex/rxkotlin

Objective: To cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in an application utilizing RxKotlin, by exploiting RxKotlin-specific features or misconfigurations.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     Compromise Application (DoS or RCE)
                                                    |
                      -----------------------------------------------------------------
                      |                                                               |
             Exploit RxKotlin-Specific Features [HR]                       Exploit Misuse/Misconfiguration of RxKotlin
                      |                                                                    |
      ---------------------------------                                     -------------------------------
      |               |                                                                    |
  Backpressure    Improper Error                                              Insecure Deserialization
  Violation [HR]  Handling [HR]                                                  of RxKotlin Objects [CN]
      |               |                                                                    |
  ----- [HR]      --------------- [HR]                                                ---------------
  |   |       |   |       |                                                                |
 O  S  I      C [CN] D     U                                                               U [CN]
 v  l  n      r  i     n
 e  o  f      a  s     h
 r  w  i      s  p     a
 f  D  n      h  l     n
 l  i  i      |  a     d
 o  s  t      |  y     l
 w  p  e      |  |     e
    a          |  |
    t          |  |
    c          |  |
    h          |  |
               |
               |
       V [HR]  V [HR]                                                                    V

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 1: Backpressure Violation

Description: This attack exploits the lack of proper backpressure handling in RxKotlin streams. When a fast-producing Observable emits items faster than a slow consumer can process them, and backpressure mechanisms (like onBackpressureBuffer, onBackpressureDrop, onBackpressureLatest) are not used, it can lead to either a MissingBackpressureException (crashing the application) or excessive memory consumption if events are buffered internally. * Attack Steps: * O (Overflow): The attacker triggers a fast-producing Observable (e.g., by sending a flood of requests that generate events). Without backpressure, the system attempts to buffer all emitted items, leading to memory overflow. * S (Slow Subscriber): The attacker identifies or creates a slow subscriber (e.g., one that performs blocking operations in onNext). This exacerbates the backpressure problem. * I (Infinite Stream): The attacker targets an Observable that generates an infinite stream of data without a proper termination condition (e.g., Observable.generate used incorrectly). Combined with a lack of backpressure, this guarantees resource exhaustion. * Likelihood: High * Impact: Medium to High (DoS, application crash, resource exhaustion) * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 2: Improper Error Handling

  • Description: This attack exploits the lack of proper error handling within RxKotlin streams. If errors are not caught and handled using operators like onError, retry, or onErrorResumeNext, they can propagate and crash the application or lead to unexpected behavior.
    • Attack Steps:
      • C (Crash) [Critical Node]: The attacker provides input that causes an unhandled exception within an RxKotlin operator (e.g., in onNext, onError, or onComplete). This exception propagates and terminates the application, resulting in a Denial of Service.
      • D (Deadlock): While less directly related to unhandled errors, improper error handling combined with incorrect threading can contribute to deadlocks. If an error occurs and resources are not released properly, it can lead to a deadlock situation.
      • U (Unexpected Behavior): The attacker provides input that triggers an error, but the error is not handled correctly, leading to inconsistent application state or incorrect data processing.
    • Likelihood: High
    • Impact: Medium to High (Application crash, unexpected behavior, data corruption)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Insecure Deserialization of RxKotlin Objects

  • Description: This is a critical vulnerability, although less likely in practice. If the application serializes and deserializes RxKotlin objects (like Observable, Subject, Disposable) that contain or reference untrusted data, it becomes vulnerable to deserialization attacks. These attacks can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
    • Attack Steps:
      • U (Unsafe Deserialization) [Critical Node]: The attacker provides a crafted serialized object. When the application deserializes this object, it triggers the execution of malicious code embedded within the serialized data. This gives the attacker control over the application.
    • Likelihood: Very Low
    • Impact: Very High (Remote Code Execution (RCE))
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard